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# STEREOTYPING, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

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On the cusp of the twenty-first century, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have not abated. The front page of the September 15, 1995, issue of *The New York Times* announced lingering intergroup bloodshed in Angola, deadly ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, an antidiscrimination "platform for action" from the World Conference on Women, debates over the image of the elderly in proposed overhauls of Medicare, and controversies about what kind of person benefits from welfare. Category-based images, emotions, and actions certainly abound in postmodern life. Despite considerable change in the status of various historically excluded groups and despite social scientists' ever-deepening understanding of these processes, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination persist.

This chapter examines why stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are enduring human phenomena. Social psychological research, reviewed here in four major sections, explains that stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have (1) some apparently automatic aspects and (2) some socially pragmatic aspects, both of which tend to sustain them. But, as research also indicates, change is possible, for (3) stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination seem individually controllable, and consequently, (4) social structure influences their occurrence. Before tackling these major themes, the chapter will introduce past and present theoretical approaches to these issues.

Following one traditional division of attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998, and Petty & Wegener, 1998, both in this *Handbook*), stereotyping is taken as the most cognitive component, prejudice as the most affective component, and discrimination as the most behavioral component of category-based reactions—that is, reactions to people from groups perceived to differ significantly from one's own. Although some theorists would disagree and call all three instances of prejudice (defined as an intergroup attitude, itself with three components), this chapter will highlight cognitive/affective/behavioral distinctions by retaining the separate terms. This chapter, then, reflects the current emphasis of the literature, as revealed in computer-aided searches. Thus the discussion will emphasize stereotyping far more than prejudice, and both stereotyping and prejudice more than overt discrimination.[1]

Current reviews of stereotyping abound (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brown, 1995; Duckitt, 1992b; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Jones, 1997; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; for notable collections, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Hamilton, 1981; Macrae, Stangor & Hewstone, 1996; Miller, 1982). This review offers this explicit thesis: Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are partly automatic and socially pragmatic, yet at the same time individually controllable and responsive to social structure. By chapter's end, the reader may judge how persuasive this thesis is. But first, some theoretical context.

## A VENERABLE HISTORY OF STUDYING STEREOTYPING, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

As one indication of their unfortunate longevity, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination were reviewed in the first edition of the Lindzey *Handbook of Social Psychology* (1954). The chapter by Harding et al. (1954), "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," commenced a decades-long interplay between individual- and group-level analyses, as well

as between motivation and cognition, to account for stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. The Harding et al. (1954) chapter covered the contents, correlates, development, determinants, and change of attitudes held by individual "old Americans" toward "minority groups," with a distinctly motivational tone, aided by cognitive components. Conceptual foci prominently featured were attitude measurement, the psychodynamic authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al., 1950), the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939; *cf.* Lindzey, 1950a, 1950b), the effects of education, and intergroup contact; note the prevalent individual level of analysis.

Fourteen years later, Harding et al. (1969) teamed up to revise their chapter for the second edition of the *Handbook,* covering the same topics, but introducing some emphasis on cognitive factors, characterized by Rokeach's (1960) belief congruence model, and greatly expanding the coverage of intergroup contact, a group-level variable. Fifteen years later, Stephan's chapter (1985), although still focusing on an individual level of analysis, was retitled "Intergroup Relations." Nevertheless, it represented a major break with the past: the cognitive revolution had intervened. So the Stephan chapter stressed cognitive information-processing approaches, supplemented by subsequent work on the contact hypothesis.

In the current edition of the *Handbook,* the chapter titled "Intergroup Relations" (Brewer & Brown, 1998) continues the focus on cognitive theory, but finally at a truly group level, stressing group categorization processes, under the rubric of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). The theses in this chapter also draw heavily on cognitive approaches, but at the individual level, with an explicit return to early concerns with motivation as modifying and guiding cognitive processes (for reviews of more purely cognitive approaches to stereotyping, prejudice, and intergroup relations, see, respectively, Hamilton, Stroessner, & Driscoll, 1994; Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994; and Rothbart & Lewis, 1994).

Another way to look at the history of research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination is to trace the outlines of major theories. During a pretheoretical period extending into the early 1940s, the field stressed the measurement of prejudice (with an emphasis on social distance; Bogardus, 1927) and the measurement of stereotypes (with an emphasis on their content; Katz & Braly, 1933) (for reviews, see Cauthen, Robinson, & Krauss, 1971; Devine & Elliot, 1995). Subsequently, major theoretical trends in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have alternately emphasized the individual and the context, depending in part on social climate (Duckitt, 1992a; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996). As a brief historical tour this section merely introduces the trends, to orient the more detailed discussions in the main body of the chapter.

## Individual Levels of Analysis: Mostly Individual Differences

Theories about individual contributions to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination began with the monumental work on the authoritarian personality in the late 1940s and 1950s, followed by subtle racism theory in the 1970s, and most recently by the dissociation model in the 1990s. Although all these approaches focus on individual differences in prejudice, each analysis also includes social psychological factors, such as socioeconomic status or perceived norms, that contribute to or exacerbate these personality factors. Note, too, that each approach revolves around individual psychological conflict as an origin for its respective kind of prejudice.

**Authoritarian Personality Theory** Developed in response to the unthinkable horror of the Holocaust, research on anti-Semitism soon revealed a pattern of hatred of outgroups and a particular character structure responsible for these entrenched prejudices. The authoritarian personality syndrome (Adorno et al., 1950) included blind submission to authority, strict adherence to middle-class conventions, aggression against those who do not live conventionally, and the tendency to think in rigid categories. The development of this syndrome theoretically arises from status-obsessed parents who want to turn their working-class children (whom they view as full of unacceptable sexual, aggressive, and other primitive impulses) into middle-class adults (whom they view as self-controlled conformers to the social order, knowing their place in any given hierarchy). The syndrome itself concerns parenting styles, not social class. The strict, punitive, dominant parent expects an obedient, conforming, submissive, respectful child—a relationship that becomes the prototype for idealized authority relations throughout life.

The child's unacceptable impulses become the adult's repressed aggression, fear, and sexuality, according to this psychodynamic model. In a hydraulic model of the psyche, the impulses have to go somewhere, and they are unconsciously projected onto outgroups. The outgroups are negatively stereotyped as aggressive, sexually daring, and otherwise "bad." Authoritarians view people unambivalently: outgroups are completely inferior and threatening, whereas parents and authorities are idealized. Thus, a cluster of outgroups, such as Jews and blacks, provide the targets of prejudice; however, it is rarely noted that authoritarians viewed women negatively as well, with a mixture of pseudo admiration and underlying contempt and resentment (Adorno et al., 1950; Nadler & Morrow, 1959). Overall prejudice is associated with blind patriotism and conservative values, reflecting the authoritarian's well-socialized aim to enjoy mainstream middle-class status.

After a decade of prominence (e.g., Allport, 1954;

Harding et al., 1954, 1969), research on the authoritarian personality fell into disfavor. Methodological and conceptual problems (Brown, 1965; Christie, 1991), a growing skepticism about Freudian theory, and a 1960s cultural emphasis on the possibilities of social change all contributed to a receding role for this initially influential work. Yet some of the core ideas (i.e., submission to authority, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism) have resurfaced in a new scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) also correlated with prejudice and stereotyping.

**Subtle Racism** Whereas work on the authoritarian personality has focused on blatant racism, other research has examined the possibility that racism is also expressed more covertly. The reported racial attitudes of American whites changed dramatically in surveys between the 1940s and the 1980s (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985). For example, the percentage of whites supporting school integration rose from 32 (in 1942) to 90 percent (in 1982); the percentage willing to vote for a black presidential candidate rose from 37 (in 1958) to 81 percent (in 1983); and the percentage rejecting laws against cross-racial intermarriage rose from 38 (in 1963) to 66 percent (in 1982). Yet subtle indicators of white prejudice remained (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980): Given the opportunity to help a black person or a white person, whites gave less help and less helpful help to blacks; discrimination occurred in 44 percent of the laboratory and field studies reviewed, especially those in which the helper and the victim were not face-to-face. Similarly, in studies of sanctioned aggression (e.g., the white participant has the role of teacher who must punish the black confederate's apparently wrong answer), whites were more aggressive toward blacks (e.g., administered more intense shocks as punishment) when the whites were anonymous or when the black target person could not retaliate. Finally, in other studies, subtle nonverbal cues (i.e., tone of voice) indicated less positive feelings of whites toward blacks. All these unobtrusive measures may belie the surveys, suggesting that the "true attitudes" of whites remained quite negative. An alternative framing would suggest that the surveys indicate true change in whites' perceptions of the acceptability of expressing racial prejudice—that is, a change in the perceived norms. Even a change in perceived norms, no doubt reinforced by 1960s civil rights legislation, represents a genuine change, at least in social context.

Confronting the discrepancy between words and deeds, as well as examining the subtle indicators of prejudice (e.g., less positive tone of voice) led some social psychologists to wonder whether the dominant affect was not hatred, leading to aggression, but rather ambivalence and discomfort, leading to avoidance. Attempts to resolve these dilemmas resulted in several theories of subtle racism, briefly introduced here. The earliest theory was also the one most oriented to individual differences: the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay & Hough, 1976) built on the related concept of "symbolic racism" (Sears & Kinder, 1971; Sears & McConahay, 1973). That is, because whites were no longer comfortable expressing racism directly (perhaps as the result of a change in norms), they would express it instead by advocating traditional values and policy preferences that all happened to disadvantage black people. By this token, opposition to busing, affirmative action, and welfare were really attitudinal cover-ups for an underlying theme of antiblack racism, for which these issues were symbolic. "It's not the blacks, it's the buses," a white could claim, with self-justified impunity.

The Modern Racism Scale was designed to measure this symbolic form of racism as a stable individual difference. Modern racists believe that blacks are gaining undeserved status and attention, pushing themselves where they are not wanted, and that blacks' anger is unreasonable because discrimination is no longer a problem. The Modern Racism Scale predicts antiblack feeling, social distance, job discrimination, and voting (Kinder, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1983; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Kinder, 1971), yet the scale is controversial in many quarters (Bobo, 1983; Fazio et al., 1995; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Weigel & Howes, 1985; but see Wood, 1994). The scale certainly has been influential. Recently, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) created a new subtle racism scale that can be used in Europe as well as in the United States. In addition, two separate scales—the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995) and the Neo-Sexism Scale (Tougas et al., 1995)—have created parallel measures of subtle opposition to policies that would advance women's rights.

Almost simultaneously with the development of the Modern Racism Scale—and in response to the same apparent contradiction between almost unanimous public opposition to racial discrimination and whites' continuing interracial aversion—Katz and Hass (1988) developed a scale of separate pro- and antiblack attitudes. Building on a more general theory of stigma (Katz, 1981), the premise was that whites' conflicted attitudes represent ambivalence: a feeling that blacks are disadvantaged, therefore deserve sympathy and help, along with a feeling that blacks are deviant, therefore resented for not playing by society's conventional rules, such as hard work and individualism (Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986). Because of a value base in conventional rules, antiblack attitudes correlate with belief in the Protestant Work Ethic, whereas pro-black attitudes correlate with humanitarianism and egalitarianism (Katz & Hass, 1988). The more intense the racial ambivalence, the more variable a white person's response to individual black people, resulting in response polarization. That is, the ambivalence is resolved by extreme responding, whenever context pushes the response in a positive or negative direc-

tion. For example, the more racially ambivalent the white observer, the more a black person's brave altruism elicits especially high praise, whereas a black person's incompetence provokes special condemnation (Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986). Ambivalence theory has accounted for polarization in cross-racial helping (Katz, Cohen, & Glass, 1975), harming (Katz et al., 1979), and scapegoating (Katz, Glass, & Cohen, 1973).[2] More recently, a measure of ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) developed a parallel idea about attitudes toward women. The core idea is that the ambivalent racist or sexist, like the modern racist and the authoritarian personality, is attached to the status quo and defends traditional, conventional values.

A third theory of subtle racism takes the same modern contradictions between words and deeds as its point of departure, although it is not primarily oriented toward individual differences. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) proposed that most whites endorse egalitarian values, but that American culture and their own cognitive biases nonetheless result in antipathy toward blacks and other minorities. Modern norms against overt racism make their own racism aversive to whites, so they cannot admit it to themselves. Because aversive racists are concerned with their own egalitarian self-images, they avoid acting in overtly discriminatory ways. But when their behavior can be explained away by other factors (i.e., when they have a nonracial excuse), or when situational norms are weak, ambiguous, or confusing (i.e., when right and wrong are less clear), then aversive racists are most likely to discriminate overtly because they can express their racist attitudes without damage to their nonracist self-concept. The theory of aversive racism has been applied to interracial help giving and seeking (for a review, see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Aversive racism also accounts for some basic cognitive processes (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986); for present purposes, the cognitive findings hint that even apparently well-intentioned people, who do not think of themselves as racist, may have rapid, automatic, racially biased associations, which would be aversive to them if they were consciously aware of them.

The fact that most studies of subtle (modern or symbolic, ambivalent, aversive) racism have come from the United States (for an exception, see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) may reflect American social structure: The centuries of heterogeneous population have forced an earlier confrontation with racial issues than has been true elsewhere; the explicit ideology of equality has forced a norm of at least appearing unprejudiced; the shared value of individualism lays the responsibility on the individual, rather than the group, for complying with the norm; and individualism privileges individual autonomy over group identity.

**Dissociation Model** Subtle racism of all types lurks at the level of unconscious conflict. The dissociation model (Devine, 1989) also emphasizes unconscious processes, but in conflict with more conscious efforts at control, thereby taking the conflict out into the psychic open. In this view, people learn cultural stereotypes early, before they can critically evaluate the validity of these (predominantly negative) stereotypes. Through repeated encounters in a variety of contexts, the stereotypes become automatically activated. In contrast, people's personal beliefs—which may complement or contradict their knowledge of cultural stereotypes—develop later than their cultural knowledge, are less practiced, and thus are less automatic.

The resulting dissociation between cultural and personal beliefs leads to different dynamics for low- and high-prejudiced people (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). Low-prejudiced people, after the initial automatic activation of stereotypic ideas, can control their subsequent responses, making them fall in line with the unprejudiced standards they hold for themselves. When they fail to behave in accord with those standards, low-prejudiced people feel guilty and attempt to make their behavior consistent with their internalized egalitarian values. For high-prejudiced people, cultural stereotypes and personal beliefs are less in conflict. Nevertheless, even high-prejudiced people may possess standards that prohibit excessively prejudiced responses. When they encounter a discrepancy between these standards and their behavior, they externalize the conflict, becoming angry at the outgroups and sympathizers who perpetuate the standards, perhaps dismissed as "political correctness."

Although this work has sparked responses to be reviewed later, Devine's dissociation model of individual differences in prejudice applies successfully to racism, sexism, and homophobia. The mechanisms of dissociation between automatic and controlled responses are presumably even broader (on stereotyping and intent, see Fiske, 1989; on dissociation and prejudice, see Fazio et al., 1995; for a general review of automaticity and control, see Wegner & Bargh, 1998, in this *Handbook*).

**Summary** Individual-level analyses have progressively described the authoritarian personality (1940s–1950s), modern or symbolic racism, ambivalent racism, and aversive racism (1970s–1980s), and dissociated cultural and personal stereotypes (1990s). All of these models hinge on the individual's conscious or unconscious conflict between the personal (desires, beliefs, or feelings) and the social (appropriate or learned responses) (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996). Movement away from stereotypes and prejudice, if it occurs, is rooted in the individual who behaves according to highly internalized egalitarian values. The alternative, as detailed next, is change rooted in the social context.

## Contextual Level of Analysis: Mostly Categorization

Context-driven contributions to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination began with ideas about interethnic contact in the 1950s. Gordon Allport's (1954) brilliant analysis of prejudice developed the nascent ideas about contexts conducive to contact. More immediately relevant here is Allport's claim that social categorization is driven by context. But Allport's contributions to categorization theories were not seriously followed until the 1970s—by work in the United States on cognitive categorization, errors, and biases; and by work in Europe on social identity theory. Both sets of research have metamorphosed into a 1990s focus reintegrating motivation and categorization. All these context-driven approaches stress ordinary cognitive processes, most often social categorization, and de-emphasize individual differences. These normal categorization processes, when they can be modified, are changed by context, for example, the context of interracial contact.

**Categorization, Prejudice, and Contact** A cogent, wise, and humane analysis, Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice,* appeared in 1954. Although featuring several chapters devoted to psychodynamics and to character structure, the book is not only oriented to personality processes; it is also intensely social psychological and invented most current ideas about stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination as resulting from cognitions in context. Allport argued brilliantly for the role of social categorization and its amelioration by constructive interethnic contact.

About the former, he said that humans inevitably categorize objects and people in their world, and that to prejudge is entirely normal. Just as people categorize furniture into tables and chairs, putting their drinks on one and sitting on the other, so, too, people categorize each other into ingroups and outgroups, loving one and (therefore, he argued) hating the other. This core insight, although refined over time, still sustains most current theories of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Allport (1954) summarized his argument thus:

> Impressions that are similar, . . . especially if a label is attached, . . . tend to cohere into categories (generalizations, concepts). All categories engender meaning upon the world. Like paths in a forest, they give order to our life-space. . . . The principle of least effort inclines us to hold to coarse and early-formed generalizations as long as they can possibly be made to serve our purposes. . . . An ethnic prejudice is a category concerning a group of people, not based on defining attributes primarily, but including various "noisy" [nonessential, possibly false] attributes, leading to disparagement of the group as a whole. (pp. 175–176)

About contact, Allport said it depends on a constructive social context. Given some nascent ideas about the beneficial effects of contact (Harding et al., 1954), Allport promoted equal-status contact, in the pursuit of common goals, sanctioned by institutional supports, and allowing perceptions of each other's common humanity. For people whose prejudice is not too deeply rooted (i.e., in their stable character structure), he suggested, contact can allow them to go beyond their casual but pernicious categorizations. As reviewed elsewhere (Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*; Pettigrew, 1997), the contact hypothesis has been tremendously influential, and Allport's ideas about categorization processes proved to have ubiquitous intellectual descendants.

**Social Identity and Self-categorization Theory** Categorization processes figure prominently in a crucial theory developed in Europe in the 1970s. Following Allport's discussion of categorization into "us" and "them," with favored ingroups and rejected outgroups, Tajfel (e.g., 1981) proposed that prejudice results from the need for a positive social identity with an ingroup, which recruits the outgroup as a relatively devalued contrast. The mere perception of belonging to different groups triggers ingroup favoritism and relative outgroup discrimination. The minimal group paradigm, in which research participants are divided into arbitrary groups by explicitly trivial or random means, reliably demonstrates ingroup favoritism in the distribution of rewards (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983; for reviews, see Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook;* Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Categorizing people into ingroups and outgroups minimizes within-group differences (they all look alike) and accentuates between-group differences (they don't look like us). Categorization processes, in turn, depend on the contextual salience of groups and their perceived boundaries.

Self-categorization theory (Turner & Oakes, 1989) built on social identity theory and proposed some specifically contextual principles for categorizing self and others into groups (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). The principle of metacontrast, sometimes termed "comparative fit," states simply: To the degree that the perceived differences within the group are small relative to perceived differences between groups, the items or people will be categorized in terms of those groups. That is, to the degree that race, gender, age, sexual orientation, occupation, nationality, or political opinions differentiate two clusters of people, that particular self- and other-categorization will be used, with all the attendant stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Other contextual principles of categorization focus more on what is termed "normative fit"—the social meaning of various differences between people and the resulting

stereotype content—and the "accessibility" of various categorizations (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). (For a more detailed consideration of social identity theory and self-categorization theory, see Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*).

**Categorization and Other Cognitive Shortcuts** In the late 1970s and 1980s, proceeding in parallel with European developments, researchers in the United States generated several theories that explained stereotyping as an inevitable by-product of normal cognitive processes, especially categorization. Compared to individual-differences work on the authoritarian personality, which emphasized the abnormality of prejudice, these new cognitive approaches were revolutionary. However, they built explicitly on Allport's insights concerning the normality of prejudice and stereotyping, as well as Tajfel's insights concerning the categorization of persons into groups. Indeed, in the germinal volume collecting prominent representatives of various early cognitive approaches, edited by Hamilton (1981), Allport and Tajfel are cited more than anyone else (except, as academic tradition dictates, those authoring a chapter for the volume). In this early volume, the basic principles all presuppose that people are cognitive misers, overwhelmed by the complexity of the social environment and forced to conserve scarce mental resources. (These early themes will be elaborated and caveats duly cited later.) Some introductions at this point illustrate the original ideas about cognitive shortcuts.

For example, Taylor (1981) proposed that categorization (1) tags information by physical and social distinctions such as race and gender, (2) minimizes within-group differences and exaggerates between-group differences, and (3) causes group members' behavior to be interpreted stereotypically. As a result of categorizing a set of people into two or more groups, smaller groups (i.e., solos, pairs, or minorities within a larger group in any given setting) elicit (4) more distinctions among themselves and (5) more stereotyped perceptions. Increasing familiarity, however, (6) allows more distinctions and (7) creates subtypes. Taylor successfully applied these categorization theory principles to perceivers confusing people within-race and within-gender more than between (Taylor et al., 1978) and to perceivers stereotyping and exaggerating the impact of racial or gender solos in otherwise homogeneous groups (Taylor et al., 1977).

Wilder (1981) also addressed the efficiency of categorization, noting that it increases the perceived homogeneity of group members, consistent with the ideas of both Tajfel and Taylor, but his analysis focused on ingroup-outgroup distinctions. Ingroup members, although arbitrarily determined in a given experiment, assumed they resembled each other and not outgroup members, whom they viewed as even more homogeneous than the ingroup. The information that ingroup members most preferred and best remembered further supported these biased assumptions, as did their ingroup favoritism in allocating rewards (e.g., Wilder, 1984; Wilder & Allen, 1978; for a review, see Wilder, 1986).

After categorizing, people may misperceive outgroup targets according to their implicit personality theories for that group, another resource-saving device. Ashmore (1981) described gender stereotypes as the "structured set of inferential relations that link personal attributes to the social categories male and female" (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979, p. 280). Ashmore applied his scheme to gender stereotypes' content, dimensions, subtypes, and evaluation (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979; Ashmore & Tumia, 1980).

Another form of efficient misperception occurs when people think that category membership covaries with certain behaviors, a phenomenon termed illusory correlation. Hamilton (1981) described how people can misjudge on the basis of, first, shared meanings or expectancies—for example, when people overestimate the frequency with which outgroup members act stereotypically. A second mechanism for illusory correlation is shared distinctiveness: For a majority-group member, interactions with minority-group members are distinctive, and for everyone, encounters with socially undesirable behaviors are distinctive; the doubly distinctive experience of a minority and an undesirable behavior is overemphasized in people's judgment, again resulting in a misperception of correlation where none exists. A voluminous research program (early papers included Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Hamilton & Rose, 1980) has applied illusory correlation to both hypothetical and actual minorities, with considerable explanatory power.

Rothbart (1981) developed the implications of cognitive economy in people's biased memory for stereotype-confirming information, describing how expectancies contaminate the data, which are then viewed as confirming the expectancies. Some beliefs are more disconfirmable than others (for example, how does one demonstrate in the short term that one is not crazy?). In addition, Rothbart described two subsequently influential models of how experience could disconfirm beliefs. The "bookkeeping model" suggests that stereotypes are eventually changed by the gradual accumulation of more disconfirming than confirming instances, whereas the "conversion model" implies catastrophic change, based on a few highly salient critical disconfirming instances, powerful discrepancies between expectancy and data. The ensuing program of research demonstrated with precision the role of memory biases in efficiently sustaining stereotypic beliefs (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979; Rothbart & John, 1985; Rothbart & Park, 1986; Rothbart et al., 1978).

The classic Hamilton (1981) volume on cognitive shortcuts did not omit behavior. Snyder (1981) described behavioral confirmation processes, in which a perceiver's cate-

gorical expectations cause the perceiver to behave in a biased fashion that elicits stereotype-confirming behavior from the unsuspecting target. Making one's expectations come true can be most efficient, if not effective. The early studies in this research program spotlight how self-fulfilling stereotypes can be, whether based on reputation, physical attractiveness, race, or gender (Snyder & Swann, 1978a, 1978b; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; see also Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974; Zanna & Pack, 1975).

The United States cognitive-shortcuts approach, especially categorization, remains a dominant theme in current understandings of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, as subsequent headings in this chapter assert.

**Goals and Cognition** As the cognitive-shortcuts approach has matured, the metaphor of the cognitive miser has paled, however, and in the 1990s a broader perspective has emerged, which includes the cognitive miser's habitual shortcuts as simply one cognitive option among others. Approaches based on this perspective, elsewhere characterized by a "motivated tactician" metaphor (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), assume that people normally engage in cognitive shortcuts, unless motivated to go beyond them. The term "tactician" suggests that people strategically choose which interactions merit additional effort and which do not, motivated by their current goals. Goal-based choices could be made strategically (that is, planned before a specific encounter), but more likely they are made on the fly, tactically, in the course of a busy social interaction.

As reviewed elsewhere (Fiske, 1992, 1993b; Fiske & Taylor, 1991), one of the earliest attempts to integrate relatively thoughtful and thoughtless cognitive strategies, in general, was Kruglanski's motivated opening or closing of the mind (Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; for a specific application to prejudice, see Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Need for cognitive closure (i.e., closing the mind) can be an individual difference or a situational pressure, and it freezes the search for more information; this need, then, favors the use of preconceptions, such as stereotypes, or simply the person's current state of (incomplete) knowledge. The tendencies toward urgency (e.g., time pressure) and permanence (i.e., stability) both encourage need for closure, in this general model of social epistemology. Another general model focuses on the development of a concept from initial open-minded information seeking to later, more rigid application, followed by low levels of information seeking but flexible concept usage (Ruble, 1994; Ruble & Stangor, 1986; Stangor & Ruble, 1989; see also Ruble & Goodnow, 1998, in this *Handbook*).

Several models focus more directly on stereotypes and prejudice. Fiske and Neuberg (1990, building on Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986) proposed a continuum of ways to form impressions, from category-based (prominently including stereotypic) through attribute-based (individuated); use of the continuum is determined by information fit and by motivations, some of which encourage an immediate decision and some of which orient toward accuracy. Stangor and Ford (1992) also focus on the development of stereotypes and prejudice, identifying expectancy-confirming versus accuracy-oriented processing goals. Brewer (1988) similarly describes two modes of impression formation, category-based and personalized, which are hypothesized to recruit distinct cognitive representations; category-based representations are picto-literal prototypes ("pictures in our heads," in Lippmann's, 1922, felicitous phrase), whereas personalized representations are networks of attributes linked to a single person. Goals contribute to the choice of modality.

Some other approaches are more explicitly rooted in behavior. Gollwitzer (e.g., 1990) distinguishes decision-making stages, not unlike the first two stages of Ruble's developmental model: from predecisional, open-minded, and deliberative mind-sets, to postdecisional, action-oriented, implementational mind-sets. Focusing specifically on interaction goals, Hilton and Darley (1991) also distinguish an assessment set and an action set, the assessment set encouraging more information search than the action set, which tends to confirm prior judgments. Snyder (1992) examines the motivations of both perceivers and targets in the context of behavioral confirmation. Expectancies (such as stereotypes) are most likely to be confirmed when (1) perceivers adopt a motivation to "get to know" the targets' stable and predictable dispositions (presumably including stereotypes), while (2) targets adopt a motivation to "get along" with the perceiver and not dispute the possibly erroneous expectancies. Conversely, expectancies are more likely to be *dis*confirmed when (1) perceivers adopt a "get along" motivation to adapt themselves to the targets' apparent self-concept (usually not stereotypic), while (2) the targets adopt a motivation to "get to know" the perceiver's stable dispositions (presumably including attitudes toward one's self).

Finally, social judgeability theory stands back from accuracy goals and immediacy goals, suggesting that any social judgment must meet certain psychological goals or "standards of adequacy" (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992, 1994; Schadron & Yzerbyt, 1991). People have theories about judgment, and they refrain from judging unless they feel they (1) have adequate information (i.e., supposedly not just stereotypes); (2) are entitled to judge because of their role (e.g., being powerful); (3) can judge without damaging their personal or group identity (e.g., judgments will defend one's identities from threat); and (4) can provide, in their view, a satisfying theory that makes the judgment meaningful (e.g., contributing to their understanding of a coherent social world).

**Summary** Contextual explanations of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination began with work on the contact

hypothesis in the 1940s, followed by Allport's 1950s analysis of contact and categorization in social contexts. Allport foreshadowed both European social identity/self-categorization theory, as well as U.S. categorization and other cognitive-shortcut approaches, in the 1970s and 1980s. The most recent work of the 1990s blends categorization and situational goals. These approaches all focus on interactions within a social context, with stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination driven by social structure, assuming fundamental cognitive processes of categorization and other cognitive economies. Change, if it occurs, hinges on the social context that affects intergroup contact (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996).

## STEREOTYPING, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION HAVE SOME APPARENTLY AUTOMATIC ASPECTS

Fifty years of research reveals how rooted stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are. Research traditionally stressed reportable (i.e., conscious), explicit stereotyping and prejudice, but cognitive (stereotypic) and affective (prejudiced) associations can be overlearned and operate outside conscious awareness. According to current wisdom, automatic categorization and automatic associations to categories are the major culprits in the endurance of bias. Building on Allport's original insight, elaborated decades later by Tajfel, Turner, Taylor, Wilder, and many others, researchers now unanimously converge on the pervasive human propensity to categorize each other. What is startling about categorization is, first, how rapid and apparently automatic it can be; and second, whether automatic or not, how many potentially automatic ramifications it has.

### Rapid and Automatic Categorization

Automatic stereotypic associations reveal themselves in part by people's speed of responding (for a review, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993). That is, a group label can prime (i.e., make cognitively accessible) stereotypic or prejudicial associations more rapidly than it does irrelevant or contradictory associations. If the initial primes are presented too rapidly to be reportable, then their effects in turn are necessarily not reportable, and they constitute, in Bargh's (1989) terms, "preconscious automaticity." If the initial primes are conscious, but their effects on stereotypic associations are not reportable, they constitute "postconscious automaticity."

**Ingroup Advantage (Preconscious and Postconscious)** One type of stereotypic association creates an ingroup advantage. In one paradigm, participants responded on a lexical decision task (i.e., they were directed to respond as rapidly as possible whether two strings of letters are both words); high- and low-prejudiced white participants alike responded faster to positive, ingroup stereotypic words ("smart," "ambitious," and "clean") when primed by "whites" than when the same words were primed by "blacks" or "Negroes." This result constitutes evidence for an automatic white ingroup bias. These white participants did not, however, respond faster to negative, outgroup stereotypic words ("stupid," "lazy," and "welfare") when these were primed by "blacks" and "Negroes," rather than by "whites" (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983); thus, they did not show automatic outgroup derogation.

The rapid and seemingly automatic ingroup bias appears repeatedly in split-second judgments, regardless of participants' otherwise-measured levels of prejudice. Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986) primed white participants by the words "white" or "black" and assessed their speed of responding to white and black stereotypic characteristics, and to positive and negative personality traits (i.e., "Could this word ever describe a person? Yes or no?"). The white participants responded faster to both white and black stereotypic pairings, but the speed advantage for the white stereotypic pairings was twice that for the black ones, again suggesting a more rapid ingroup speed advantage than outgroup speed disadvantage. Separately, these white participants also responded faster to positive than negative traits paired with a "white" prime; in addition, they responded more rapidly to positive than negative traits given a "black" prime, but the positive-negative difference for "black" was smaller than for "white." This result is again consistent with the idea that the mental action resides more with immediate positive associations to the ingroup than with immediate negative associations to the outgroup, although the negative outgroup associations still occur. A similar pattern of ingroup advantage and outgroup indifference emerges from studies of young college students primed with the word "young" or "old," then reacting to positive and negative trait adjectives (Perdue & Gurtman, 1990; on gender, see Klinger & Beall, 1992).

Even stronger evidence for preconscious automatic ingroup favoritism comes from similar work using "we" and "they" as primes. When these primes were followed extremely rapidly (within fifty-five milliseconds) by a positive or negative trait adjective, the ingroup advantage for positive over negative traits was significant, whereas the outgroup disadvantage was not (small and nonsignificant in one study and nonsignificantly reversed in another study; Perdue et al., 1990). The mechanism for favorable ingroup associations need not be complex; classical conditioning procedures—repeatedly pairing nonsense syllables with "we," "us," "ours" or with "they," "them," "theirs"—produced a clear evaluative advantage for nonsense syllables paired with ingroup-designating pronouns, and a lesser,

nonsignificant decrement (compared to a neutral control) for outgroup-designating pronouns (Perdue et al., 1990). In short, there is substantial evidence for the operation of ingroup evaluative favoritism in rapid, probably preconscious automatic responses to both abstract primes (pronouns) and concrete ones (race, age, and possibly gender).

Besides the speed advantage for ingroup primes and positive targets, ingroup advantage also takes relatively automatic (in this case, postconscious) forms, even when evaluations are irrelevant. For example, in sorting by gender, participants classify same-gender photographs faster than other-gender photographs; the same-gender effect even holds when they sort by job, based on photographs of job-holders in context. Both cases display a kind of ingroup advantage (Zárate & Sandoval, 1995; Zárate & Smith, 1990). The results of other research show that males classify "he" as a pronoun faster than "she," whereas females classify "she" as a pronoun faster (Banaji & Hardin, study 2, 1996).

All these findings of rapid and relatively automatic ingroup favoritism fit with Allport's (1954) discussion of ingroup "love prejudice" as preceding hostility to outgroups and with Brewer's (1979) conclusion that ingroup-outgroup discrimination effects depend primarily on ingroup favoritism, rather than on outgroup derogation. Although most previous studies have failed to find outgroup disadvantage, some recent findings did. Fazio et al. (1995) activated racial categories consciously (by showing black or white faces as part of a sequence of tasks), and then asked participants to judge as "good" or "bad" a series of positive and negative (but not stereotypic) personality traits. For white participants, negative responses were speeded by a black prime, whereas as for black participants, negative responses were speeded by a white prime. Doubtless, the next few years' research will clarify when and for whom outgroup disadvantage does occur. For now, the more robust finding is ingroup advantage.

**Stereotype-Matching Advantage (Preconscious)** In addition to speed advantages for judging the ingroup, there is a stereotype-matching advantage for primes and targets that share stereotypic meaning. In a widely cited study testing the dissociation model (Devine, 1989, Study 2), high- and low-prejudiced participants were preconsciously presented primes associated with black people, both as labels (e.g., "blacks," "Negroes," "niggers," "minority") and as stereotypes (e.g., "poor," "lazy," "athletic," "oppressed," "slavery," "Harlem"). As part of an apparently separate experiment, participants read a paragraph describing Donald, who behaved in several ambiguously hostile ways. In accord with white stereotypes of black people, stereotypically primed participants interpreted Donald's ambiguous behavior as more hostile, but they did not interpret his behavior more negatively along other, nonstereotypic dimensions. High- and low-prejudiced participants did not differ in their susceptibility to preconscious priming, a provocative result conceptually replicated by Fazio et al. (1995). Devine suggests, in accord with her dissociative model, that even automatic acquaintance with a cultural stereotype does not indicate personal endorsement of it. Indeed, in a separate study (Devine, 1989, Study 3), high- and low-prejudiced participants did differ in their reported personal beliefs.

Under some circumstances, however, high- and low-prejudiced participants may differ in their automatic responses (Lepore & Brown, 1997). The critical test preconsciously activates merely the ethnic category; that is, the label (e.g., "blacks," "West Indians") is primed alone—without the additional stereotypic primes present in the original Devine study. In this situation, the responses of high- and low-prejudiced participants differ (with the high-prejudiced showing more prejudiced automatic responses), suggesting differential endorsement of stereotypes. As in this part of the Lepore and Brown study, which primed the label only, without stereotypic content, Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997) also found evidence of an automatic stereotype-matching advantage, but again unlike Devine, the ingroup advantage and outgroup disadvantage depended on level of prejudice. Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park primed racial categories by showing the word "black" or "white" outside conscious awareness, then asked participants to decide whether a second word presented at a conscious level was a word or not (i.e., the standard lexical decision task). These words were independently varied on valence and stereotypicality. For their white participants, black primes speeded decisions about words representing negative, as opposed to positive, black stereotypic traits, whereas white primes speeded decisions about words representing positive, as opposed to negative, white stereotypic traits. Like the results of Lepore and Brown, these facilitation scores correlate with Modern Racism Scale scores. All these studies looked at one particular component of interracial attitudes: the valenced content of automatically activated stereotypic beliefs.

In support of the original Devine study, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that high- and low-prejudiced participants may not differ in their responses to label-plus-stereotypic content, which primes additional stereotypic content regardless of prejudice. Consistent with this interpretation, in another study, participants highly prejudiced against Australian Aborigines endorsed negative descriptions faster, and low-prejudiced participants endorsed positive descriptions faster, although each group described the cultural stereotype equivalently (Augoustinos, Ahrens, & Innes, 1994; see also Locke, MacLeod, & Walker, 1994). What remains consistent across studies is the ability of stereotypic content to prime preconsciously other stereotype-matching content, regardless of prejudice. What the

label by itself primes—and for whom—is still open to debate.

Banaji's research also supports the preconscious automaticity of stereotype-matching associations. For example, in priming nonevaluative responses, such as judging whether a pronoun is masculine or feminine, or even whether it is a pronoun or not, speed accrues to targets that match the preceding prime. When preconsciously primed with gender-defined nouns ("mother," "father," "woman," "man"), gender-segregated jobs ("secretary," "mechanic"), gender-specific roles ("chairman," "chairwoman"), and even generic masculine terms ("mankind," "layman"), participants responded faster to gender-matched pronouns ("he," "she"). These results support an advantage for automatic stereotypic associations, regardless of participant gender or overt sexism (Banaji & Hardin, 1996). Similarly, when participants were preconsciously primed with stereotypic personality traits and other characteristics (e.g., "pink," "muscular"), they identified faster the gender of first names that matched the primes on gender (Blair & Banaji, 1996). In these studies, the brevity of exposure to the primes strongly suggests preconscious automaticity. The overall point is that categories can speed unconscious stereotypic associations.

**Stereotype-Matching Advantage (Postconscious)** Other indicators of automatic stereotyping are more clearly automatic in the postconscious or implicit sense (i.e., the initial primes are conscious, but their effects are not reportable). At a conscious level, scrambled phrases conveyed neutral primes ("crossed the street") or gender-stereotypic primes regarding dependence ("can't make decisions") or aggression ("threatens other people"). Participants unscrambled the phrases in the context of one study, and then in the context of an allegedly separate study, they rated a male or female target described engaging in a series of relatively uninformative activities. Trait ratings of the man and woman did not differ following the neutral primes, but they differed stereotypically when preceded by primes consistent with gender stereotypes (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993). That is, the primes activated stereotypic concepts that altered participants' interpretations of ambiguous behavior, consistent with findings on other types of priming (i.e., not focused on stereotypes; for reviews, see, e.g., Higgins, 1989; Wyer & Srull, 1981). Explicit memory for the primes was unrelated to stereotypic judgments, suggesting that the conscious primes had unconscious effects on people's stereotypic interpretations of subsequent applicable stimuli.

In another form of implicit, postconscious gender stereotyping, participants first pronounced long lists of names of famous and not famous men and women. A day or two later, they judged the fame of these names and new ones. People are generally biased to misjudge familiar (already-seen) names as famous. But a systematic gender bias indicated that participants more willingly (mis)judged as famous the already-seen male than the already-seen female names (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). This effect was independent of participants' overt sexism. Thus, implicit stereotyping, not even fully automatic, could explain discrimination and prejudice by people who do not view themselves as biased (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

Other research provides yet another example of postconscious automaticity, again a gender-matching advantage. Participants were shown photographs of women and men depicted in respectively female and male stereotypic or counterstereotypic occupations; the stereotypic combinations were classified by occupation faster than the counterstereotypic combinations (Zárate & Sandoval, 1995). People also categorized faster by gender when gender was situationally salient (Carpenter, 1994).

Stereotypes become efficient through repeated exposures in the culture. Practice on stereotypic judgments, in effect, compiles the procedure, making it rapid and sometimes automatic (see Smith, 1998, in this *Handbook*). All of this evidence for speed advantages to stereotypic associations fits with evidence that people process stereotype-consistent information faster than nonstereotypic information, all else being equal (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Lalonde & Gardner, 1989).

**Marked (Dis)Advantage** In addition to the speed advantages that associations to the ingroup and stereotypic matches have, certain categories seem to be privileged over others. For example, given no other information, the word "person" apparently brings to mind a white, heterosexual, able-bodied, youngish man; these are the U.S. cultural default values (some defaults, such as heterosexual, may be supported by real-world probabilities, but others, such as male gender, are not). Deviations from these default categories are linguistically marked (Eagly & Kite, 1987; Goffman, 1963; Smith & Zárate, 1992; see McGill, 1993, for other references); people say "black lawyer," "female doctor," "lesbian therapist," but not (usually) "white lawyer," "male doctor," or "straight therapist." Of course, certain role expectations can override the cultural defaults, as in "male nurse"; such situations arise when the marked category normally monopolizes a particular role. Nevertheless, "gender studies" usually means an emphasis on women, and "racial issues" supposedly pertain mainly to black people. Women have gender, and blacks have race, more than men and whites respectively do (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1994). Marked status suggests that people will be categorized according to the ways in which they differ from the default. Thus, black men are more likely and more quickly categorized as black, not male, and white women are rapidly categorized as women, not white (Zárate, Bonilla, & Luevano, 1995; Zárate & Smith, 1990). With no other cues present,

women are categorized faster as women than men are as men (Zárate & Sandoval, 1995). To the extent that nondefault, or "marked," categories have priority, then, they might be said to have a marked (dis)advantage.

**Categorization Advantage** Using gender, age, and race to categorize clearly buys some processing advantage over not using them. People categorize others more rapidly when they can use gender and race than when they cannot (McCann et al., 1985). Gender and age dominate personality traits in meaningful categorizations of others (Brewer & Lui, 1989). Other types of summary stereotypes are also judged faster than trait adjectives (Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990), suggesting a human penchant for stereotypic categorization. Furthermore, it may be time to revisit the possibility that (for example) ethnically prejudiced people are especially likely to categorize along ethnic lines (Allport & Kramer, 1946; Lindzey & Rogolsky, 1950). Overall, in contrast to the more specific ingroup advantage (comparing ingroup to outgroup), matching advantage (comparing stereotypic to counterstereotypic), and marked advantage (comparing marked to unmarked), one might term this a simple categorization advantage, comparing category use to nonuse.

**Automaticity of Categorization: Its Utility** Given this catalog of relatively automatic category use, one might well argue that categories are cognitively functional for people. In the most systematic attempts to examine the resource-savings automaticity of sheer category use, several vivid studies by Macrae and colleagues demonstrate that using stereotypes preserves mental resources. For example, stereotype labels—such as doctor, artist, skinhead, or real estate agent—saved resources in an impression formation task, enabling perceivers to perform better on a simultaneous, irrelevant task, such as monitoring a tape describing Indonesia or quickly turning off a computer's bleeping; resources were saved whether the labels were presented preconsciously or postconsciously (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Because of the cognitive economy of stereotypes, people preferentially recall stereotype-consistent information under conditions of cognitive overload (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). And given the choice, people preferentially search for stereotype-matching information (Johnston & Macrae, 1994). Having in mind (via postconscious priming) a category label, such as "soccer hooligan" or "child abuser," enables people to perceive stereotypic traits more efficiently when the traits are perceptually degraded, embedded among complex stimuli, or are competing with auditory stimuli (Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994). In addition to facilitating access to confirmatory material, stereotypes inhibit access to stereotype disconfirmatory material (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996).

In arguing for the utility of stereotype and category use, however, one must distinguish between stereotype activation and use, especially in activating stereotypes about real people rather than verbal labels. In a pair of studies (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), white participants who encountered an Asian woman incidental to their main task showed no evidence of stereotype activation when they were cognitively busy (e.g., rehearsing an eight-digit number) during category activation. These results, on first reading, apparently contradict the presumed automaticity of stereotype-matching associations. However, although the stereotype may not have been automatically activated in this instance, when it *was* activated, it was the cognitively busy participants who were more likely to use it. With a live person, rather than with verbal labels, the automaticity of stereotyping may depend on interaction goals, making it "conditional automaticity," in Bargh's (1989) terms (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

**Summary** Rapid and automatic category-based responses are indicated by (1) the ingroup advantage, for speedily or even subliminally identifying and favoring ingroup members; (2) the matching advantage—namely, facilitating stereotypic association even when the category is primed preconsciously; and (3) the marked (dis)advantage, whereby members of the nondefault categories can be judged more speedily. These three relatively automatic ways of responding can operate simultaneously and independently. Categorization and stereotyping save cognitive resources, which helps explain why their relative automaticity is functional, but the form of automaticity may vary, depending on people's goals and the form of contact.

## Outgroup Homogeneity

According to several classic theories (noted earlier), having rapidly, even automatically, categorized other people as members of a group, those group members will be seen as resembling each other and differing from members of other groups. If the people being judged are outgroup members, the perceiver will see them as especially similar, lacking in variability. Because this chapter focuses on perceptions of individuals rather than groups, this review of the outgroup homogeneity effect will simply note the conclusions of previous reviews (see Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*, for more emphasis on intergroup perceptions). Several principles seem important.

The outgroup homogeneity effect is really two effects: viewing the outgroup as less variable than average (a small but reliable effect), and viewing the ingroup as reliably more heterogeneous than average (a smaller effect; Mullen & Hu, 1989). Though small, the effects are strongest in natural groups and weak in artificial, laboratory-created groups, according to meta-analyses (Mullen & Hu, 1989;

Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Motivation, such as natural groups' greater interdependence (Messick & Mackie, 1989) or greater requirements for accuracy (Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991), might account for this difference. But the major effect is outgroup homogeneity, more than ingroup heterogeneity.

The idea that outgroup homogeneity has purely cognitive bases has sparked much debate. One mechanism for outgroup homogeneity—greater familiarity with individual exemplars of the ingroup—has been proposed (e.g., Linville & Fischer, 1993; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) and contested (e.g., Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991; see Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook,* and Linville, in press, for references). Park, Judd, and Ryan (1991) propose a mixed model, in which variability information is stored within an abstracted group representation, but group exemplars also are stored separately (for more general discussion of exemplar-based and abstraction-based models, see Smith, 1998, in this *Handbook*). Exemplar-based models rely more on memory retrieval, whereas abstraction-based models respond more sensitively to the way information is presented. Information about outgroups may be acquired in ways that encourage perceived homogeneity, such as learning about the category before learning about examples of the category, judging individuals without noting their discrepancies from the group, and knowing about subgroups (Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991). Although reviewers disagree about the cognitive mechanisms involved, outgroup homogeneity, when it occurs, sets the stage for stereotyping; for example, people who believe there is little outgroup variance also make stereotypic judgments about specific, real outgroup members with greater confidence than those who believe there is much outgroup variance (Ryan, Park, & Judd, 1996; for reviews, see Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996). To the extent then that category use is automatic, perceived outgroup homogeneity—and the attendant stereotype confidence—will be the norm.

An ingroup homogeneity effect, opposite the expected bias, occurs when the ingroup is a minority relative to the outgroup and when the judgment dimensions are important to group identity (for references, see Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*; Messick & Mackie, 1989).

## Information Search: A Stereotype-Matching Advantage

Stereotypes alter the interpretation of behavior in the earliest moments of encoding, and perceptual advantages accrue to stereotype matches (for a review, see von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995). From the first few microseconds of perception, expectancies and, doubtless, stereotypes shape the perceptual interpretation of fleeting, unfocused, degraded, and partial sense impressions (Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994). Stereotypes allow people to assimilate a person who fits within the generally accepted boundaries of the outgroup, making people seem more similar to their stereotype than they actually are (Krueger & Clement, 1994; for other references, see Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

Stereotypes also limit the amount of encoding necessary; stereotypes facilitate rapid initial identification of congruent information because, as noted earlier, speed accrues to stereotypic associations. Thus, compared to people not using stereotypes, people using strong stereotypes attend less to additional information that is ambiguous, neutral, or confirming (Belmore, 1987; Fiske et al., 1987; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). People under time pressure also can process stereotype-consistent information faster, presumably because it is easier to assimilate, as noted earlier. People encode less perceptual information when they can use stereotypes and expectancies to fill in the details (von Hippel et al., 1993). Von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, and Vargas (1995) point out that inhibited perceptual encoding reinforces stereotypes by limiting the perceptual information in memory, which would otherwise be available for reinterpretation.

Given some choice, people also often skim over stereotype-discrepant information. When allowed to read at their own rate, people preferentially attend longer to stereotype-confirming than disconfirming information (in the baseline, unmotivated conditions of several studies: Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). When allowed to control the type and amount of information received, people prefer stereotype-matching information, allowing no change in their stereotype of the outgroup (Johnston & Macrae, 1994). Even when judging whether someone belongs to the ingroup, people request more ingroup-consistent information (to affirm) than ingroup-inconsistent information (to disconfirm) (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995).

When people can question a person directly, they sometimes work to confirm their hypotheses, including stereotypes, by selecting from an experimenter's list the biased, leading questions (Snyder, 1984). Most often, this sort of bias occurs when people can imagine only one possibility or when the hypothesis is extreme. Then, they prefer to ask questions that are confirming, in the sense of seeking information along the dimensions of the stereotype, but diagnostic, in the sense that they assess an association between the hypothesized type of target and expected type of answer. Either a "yes" or "no" answer would be informative (Trope & Bassok, 1982). Along the same lines, people freeze their search more rapidly when they have only one alternative in mind (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988).

In situations that encourage people to be rational, however, people do not often formulate leading questions on their own (Trope, Bassok, & Alon, 1984). But in situations

that encourage people to get along with eacn other, leading questions may actually facilitate the interaction, if both people likely agree on the way one of them is described (Leyens, 1989). Hypothesis testers ask hypothesis-consistent questions, and targets may be routinely inclined to acquiesce (Zuckerman et al., 1995), completing the cycle. Socially competent people moreover may favor biased questions in sensitive situations (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995) because they seem empathic (for reviews of this material, see Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994).

There are two points here—one descriptive, the other prescriptive. Descriptively, people clearly ask biased, leading questions under some circumstances, especially when alternatives seem unlikely or when conveying a shared understanding to their partner. When more self-consciously rational, people formulate diagnostic questions. Prescriptively, which type of question is better or more appropriate? Biased questions can produce biased answers, but if the two people share the same bias (e.g., a sexist man and a sexist woman), then that bias may be socially useful. If the two people disagree, however, as is often the case with stereotypes, then biased questions convey prejudice.

When people have less choice and must attend to a variety of information, it takes them longer to assimilate stereotype-discrepant information than congruent information, as noted earlier (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981). But attention does not imply memory and use. The attended discrepancies may have little impact on stereotypes. If people fail to elaborate potentially disconfirming information, they may not remember it, as seems the case for highly prejudiced participants (Sekaquaptewa & von Hippel, 1994). If people explain away discrepancy by attributing it to situational factors, then it need not impact the stereotype (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Kulik, 1983). And if people expect a certain degree of variability in a group—more than, for example, within an individual person—then a few discrepancies do not discredit the stereotype (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

In short, a variety of information search mechanisms—perceptual assimilation of ambiguous material to the stereotype, time-saving inhibition of stereotype-congruent perceptual encoding, preference for stereotype-confirming information, and acceptance of stereotype-confirming information—seem to maintain stereotypes. People are hardly equal-opportunity perceivers; a stereotype-matching advantage dominates.

## Attributional Mechanisms

Why are Jews overrepresented in social sciences, law, and medicine, Catholics in the humanities, and Protestants in the "hard" sciences? Most readers, including this author, can construct plausible explanations based on religious and cultural values, which of course ultimately reside in the individual. The natural attraction to dispositional explanations (Gilbert, 1998, in this *Handbook*) blinds us to at least equally plausible social structural factors: the eras of collective mobility of these groups in North America and the independent expansions of the respective academic fields (see Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997, for the original example and for references).

Thus, even assuming that people were equal-opportunity encoders, their subsequent use of information would maintain stereotypes. By attributing stereotype-confirming information to the underlying disposition of a person, the perceiver asserts that the stereotypic material resides in the nature or essence of the target individual (Eberhardt & Randall, 1997; Hewstone, 1990; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Jones, 1997; Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1996). This insight stems from two germinal theories, one about intergroup relations and the other about gender, but the effect seems to generalize to a variety of outgroups. Pettigrew (1979) identified the "ultimate attribution error" as the tendency to accept the good for the ingroup and the bad for the outgroup as personal and dispositional, but more important, to explain away the bad for the ingroup and the good for the outgroup with situational attributions. In parallel with this idea, Deaux (Deaux, 1984; Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Deaux & LaFrance, 1998, in this *Handbook*), drawing on Weiner (Weiner et al., 1971), suggested that women's success at traditionally male tasks was attributed to luck, whereas men's comparable success was attributed to ability, a more flattering interpretation.

**Status Advantage** Focusing first on gender, a meta-analysis of nearly sixty studies (Swim & Sanna, 1996) supports an earlier narrative (i.e., nonquantitative) review (Deaux, 1984) indicating that success on masculine tasks was attributed to stable ability for men more than for women, but to unstable effort for women more than for men. The ability attribution is more flattering because, as a stable, internal cause, it implies a valued essence. Failure on masculine tasks was attributed to bad luck and lack of effort for men, factors that can change, but for women such failure was attributed to task difficulty, a factor that is stable although external. On feminine tasks, often less valued by the culture, the effects are weaker and sometimes reversed, to women's advantage. Overall, the effects occur most clearly in studies that ask participants to choose among two or more explanations. Participant gender does not affect these results, so the effect relies less on ingroup-outgroup dynamics than on a cultural attributional bias that favors men. If the effect generalized to other group comparisons, it might suggest a status advantage in achievement attributions.

**Ingroup Advantage** Ten years after Pettigrew, a narrative review of nineteen studies (Hewstone, 1990) stressed interethnic comparisons and indicated an ingroup advantage, as in the automaticity ingroup advantage. The ingroup advantage took the form of ingroup protection, more than ingroup enhancement or outgroup derogation. That is, internal attributions explained positive or successful ingroup behavior, as well as ingroup high social status, but a specific internal factor, lack of ability, did *not* explain ingroup failure. Any failures by the ingroup were attributed to unstable (effort, luck) or external (task difficulty) factors. In contrast, negative or failing outgroup behavior, as well as lower social status, had internal causes, and any outgroup success might reflect effort, luck, or an easy task, confirming both Pettigrew's and Deaux's perspectives. But the Hewstone review suggests that the effect revolves around ingroup favoritism more than outgroup derogation, although the net effect may be the same in practical terms.

One especially interesting intergroup attributional bias emerges in language use. People apparently encode and communicate positive ingroup and negative outgroup behavior more abstractly (Maass et al., 1989) than counterstereotypic behavior. The effect is subtle but telling: An ingroup member may have punched someone, but an outgroup member was aggressive. This linguistic intergroup bias apparently stems from stereotype congruency, rather than from ingroup protection (Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Maass et al., 1995). As von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, and Vargas (1995) note, people use such remembered abstract summaries ("aggressive") as the basis for future interactions, rather than returning to the data on which the summaries were based, and such abstract summaries resist disconfirmation for the same reason—because they are not easily unpacked and scrutinized. Such linguistic attributional bias subtly perpetuates stereotypes (see also Karpinski & von Hippel, 1996; Rubini & Semin, 1994).

**Marked (Dis)Advantage** In addition to a status advantage and an ingroup advantage, coupled with some outgroup disadvantage, attributions reflect a marked disadvantage, penalizing groups that are not the cultural default. Just as automatic processing speeds categorization of marked groups (e.g., women and blacks), so too are marked groups the ones whose behavior needs to be explained. According to norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), when people explain an event, they focus on things that could easily have been otherwise (the most mutable features). If the default person is white, male, and otherwise "unmarked," then as the expected person, he does not need to be explained. But less typically imagined groups require explanation because of their difference from the norm. So, for example, explanations of the "gender gap" in voting (women disproportionately voting Democratic, men disproportionately voting Republican) focus on the seemly aberrant behavior of women, because men are the default; logically, however, one could just as easily focus on why men voted the way they did, compared to women (Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). In rare cases, the typically marked group is instead the norm (e.g., one says "male kindergarten teacher" but not "female kindergarten teacher"); then, it is not the women but the men who need explaining.

The smaller the group, the more likely it is to be marked, which can sometimes lead to a marked advantage. A counterstereotypic experience with a member of a large group is easy to explain, on the basis of lay assumptions about variability and the probability of encountering someone outside the norm; thus, one counterstereotypic individual does not invalidate beliefs about the large group, because it is easy to imagine running into one of the expected exceptions. But a counterstereotypic experience with someone from a small group is harder to explain and seems too coincidental, unless indeed the group stereotype is wrong and several members violate it. Holding constant the proportions of counterstereotypic individuals, then, stereotypes of small groups should be easier to change than stereotypes of large groups (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989).

**Stereotype-Matching Advantage** In searching for explanations, most of which seem to focus on marked groups, people concentrate on stereotypic dimensions in three important ways. First, stereotype-consistent behavior is attributed internally, whereas inconsistent and unrelated behavior is attributed externally (BenAri, Schwarzwald, & HorinerLevi, 1994; Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Gordon & Anderson, 1995; Macrae & Shepherd, 1989). Second, stereotype-consistent causal explanation actually blocks consideration of stereotype-irrelevant explanations (Sanbonmatsu, Akimoto, & Gibson, 1994). These two points suggest that marked groups, the ones who need explaining in the first place, according to norm theory, will not only be the ones explained, but they will be explained in stereotypic terms.

Third, targets of comparison will be picked on the basis of stereotypic expectations, but only for the marked group (McGill, 1993). That is, men are compared with other men, whereas women are compared with other women on stereotypically feminine tasks but with men on stereotypically masculine tasks. When men succeed or fail, gender is not a relevant explanation, but for women undertaking masculine tasks, gender is a salient explanation, again restricting explanation to stereotypic dimensions. As in automatic processes and information search, attributional mechanisms also reveal a stereotype-matching advantage (also see Banaji & Greenwald, 1994).

**Essentialism and Attribution** If attributions and explanations advantage status, ingroup, unmarked ("normal")

groups, and stereotypes, then perhaps they rationalize the status quo. Existing arrangements for division of labor, for example, may be attributed to the personality or individual essence of those involved (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990), thereby absolving the power holders of responsibility for arrangements that benefit themselves. The outcomes of groups are consistently attributed to dispositions of group members, even when performance is held constant and arbitrary decision rules provide better explanations (Allison, Mackie, & Messick, 1996). Writers have long noted the system-justifying functions of stereotypes (Allport, 1954; Huici, 1984; Jost & Banaji, 1994; O'Leary, 1974; Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Tajfel, 1981; Williams & Best, 1982).

Coming back to the theme that opened this section, Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1996) go one step further, arguing that essentialistic explanations best rationalize the way things are. Essentialistic explanations characteristically frame category membership as an unalterable, highly diagnostic, unifying theme, revealing a universally shared feature and excluding other memberships. To the extent that people endorse essentialistic explanations for gender and race—that is, biological rather than social and circumstantial factors—they also believe group differences to be substantial and immutable (Martin & Parker, 1995). Still, to the extent that people attribute outcomes to group essence, any nevertheless perceived changes in group outcomes can and will modify stereotypes of the entire group (Mackie et al., 1992a, 1992b).

## Memory Biases

**Ingroup Advantage** Memory sustains stereotypes in several respects. First, similar to the ingroup advantage on automaticity of judgment speed, perceptual fluency, and attributional patterns, people exhibit an ingroup advantage on memory. They recognize same-race targets more accurately than other-race targets (Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Brigham & Malpass, 1985), and they recall more individuating information about same-sex than other-sex targets (Park & Rothbart, 1982).

**Matching Advantage** Second, recall favors stereotype-congruent information, especially in more complex environments characteristic of everyday social interaction, suggesting a matching advantage in memory. For example, under high processing loads, participants displayed preferential recall for material consistent with their stereotype of a woman doctor or hairdresser (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993); this matching advantage reversed under low processing loads. This experiment illustrates, in a nutshell, the conclusions of meta-analyses of person memory. A meta-analysis of twenty-six studies of memory for information about existing social groups demonstrates an overall consistency advantage for both free recall and recognition memory uncorrected for guessing (which would tend to favor stereotypes). Strong mental links between the group label and expectancy-consistent associations account for this effect (Fyock & Stangor, 1994; see also Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992); this connection might be expected, given the automaticity results reviewed earlier.

The stereotype-congruent advantage fits the stereotyping literature, but at first glance, it contradicts the person memory literature, which for a decade reported reliable memory advantages for expectancy *in*congruent material (see Fiske, 1993b, for a review and commentary). Another meta-analysis of person memory studies across all kinds of expectancies (Stangor & McMillan, 1992) reinforces the conclusion that the incongruency advantage is located at encoding, where incongruency may attract attention, but not so much at retrieval, where memory structure and guessing both favor congruency. And the incongruency advantage is limited to several laboratory conditions, including experimentally induced expectancies (which are weak and temporary); evaluative plus descriptive incongruency (the strongest kind); individual targets (who are expected to be more internally consistent than groups); an explicit impression formation goal (thereby maximizing coherence); no interpolated tasks (maximizing the contrast between the expectancy and the incongruency); and restriction of the task to a single experimental session (again maximizing the contrast).

In contrast, the congruency advantage, or matching advantage, as described here, seems most likely when the expectancy is strong, any discrepancy is minimal or ambiguous, the target is a group, the goal is evaluation or is not explicit, other tasks intervene, and the expectancy predates the encounter with the discrepant information; all of these factors characterize typical interactions with potential targets of stereotyping. And, as noted, more demanding, natural conditions also undermine or reverse the incongruency advantage (Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991), presumably because people do not have time to form the explanatory links that make discrepancies memorable (Sherman & Hamilton, 1994; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 1994; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995; see also Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Like the outgroup homogeneity effect, the stereotype-matching advantage is stronger outside than inside the laboratory.

**Categorization Disadvantage** In addition to ingroup and stereotype-matching memory advantages, a categorization disadvantage suggests that people confuse other people they have lumped into the same category (as noted earlier, Taylor, 1981), not remembering, for example, which

one said what. It is as if people tag comments by race and gender: "I know a woman said it, but I can't recall which woman" (Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995; Frable & Bem, 1985; Hewstone, Hantzi, & Johnston, 1991; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Miller, 1986; Stangor et al., 1992; Taylor & Falcone, 1982; Taylor et al., 1978; Walker & Antaki, 1986). Confusions are worsened when these social categorizations are reinforced by a redundant categorization, such as gender-segregated roles (Arcuri, 1982) or attitudes that covary with group membership (Biernat & Vescio, 1993), especially when the redundant categories fit stereotypically (van Knippenberg & van Twuyver, 1994). Category confusions occur for other visible categories, such as attractiveness (Miller, 1988) and even for nonvisible categories, such as sexual orientation (Walker & Antaki, 1986) and attitudes (van Knippenberg & van Twuyver, 1994). Category confusions are associated with prejudice, in studies that measure prejudice adequately (Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Frable & Bem, 1985; Miller, 1986; Taylor & Falcone, 1982; van Knippenberg & van Twuyver, 1994; Walker & Antaki, 1986).

## Prejudice

A pleasant, polite college student reported being introduced to a family friend, dutifully shaking hands, and exchanging pleasantries with her. On learning afterward that she is a lesbian, however, he felt disgusted, literally wanting to wash his hand, and hostile, claiming that some people might want to kill her and her family. The same nice young man thought interracial dating somehow unnatural, again disgusting. Bosnian Muslims, Palestinian Arabs, and black South Africans, among others, understand this kind of prejudice.

This is not the kind of prejudice traditionally studied by social psychologists, who have focused, ever since Bogardus (1927), on reported attitudes such as social distance and generic evaluations. Until recently, the cognitive revolution in social psychology had focused the field's attention on stereotypes to the exclusion of prejudice; a computer-aided literature search for the period 1974 to 1995 listed 7,998 entries for stereotyp* and 1,527 entries for prejudice*, a 5:1 ratio (impressive, even subtracting irrelevant references to behavior stereotypy).

Where and how do social psychologists study prejudice? At the outset, this chapter defined stereotypes as the cognitive component, prejudice as the affective component, and discrimination as the behavioral component of (group) category-based responses. Prominent researchers (C. Judd, M. Zanna, 1996, personal communications) disagree, defining prejudice as a negative attitude, with cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Regardless of one's definition, the affects (feelings, prejudices, evaluations) measured by social psychologists have not always been strong ones. One exception is work on individual differences in authoritarianism; the older work (reviewed earlier) and the newer work (to be reviewed later) both reveal the most extreme forms of affect-laden prejudice. Moreover, in the 1990s, social psychologists who previously stressed stereotypes have finally focused more seriously on stronger affects (for a collection of chapters on affect and stereotyping, see Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; for a review of two basic emotional mechanisms—classical conditioning and mere exposure—as related to prejudice, see Mackie, Queller, et al., 1996).

**The Power of Prejudice** Recent meta-analysis suggests that this shift is well timed: Prejudices predict discrimination far better than do stereotypes (Dovidio et al., 1996); across twenty-three studies, individual differences in racial stereotyping correlated little (.16) with discrimination, whereas individual differences in prejudice correlated at least moderately (.32). (Stereotypes and prejudice also correlated little to moderately, .25, with each other). Similarly, in two U.S. studies of stereotypes and prejudice—regarding people termed Americans, Arabs, Asians, blacks, Hispanics, homosexuals, Jews, Russians, and whites—emotional responses outperformed stereotypes in predicting social distance, which includes behavior-related items about degrees of contact (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

In predicting more explicitly evaluative measures, emotions again outperform cognitive measures such as stereotypes (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991), which makes sense if both evaluations and emotions are considered elements of prejudice (i.e., affect). In another series of studies, English Canadians evaluated French Canadians, Native Canadians, Pakistanis, and homosexuals; stereotypes did not predict overall evaluations as well as various gut-level responses did, such as (1) emotions reported when seeing, meeting, or thinking about typical members of the group; (2) beliefs about customs, values, and traditions either blocked or facilitated by the group; or (3) direct behavioral experience with the group (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993, 1994). Similarly, Americans' and Russians' emotional reactions to Americans, Russians, and Iraqis were more associated with the evaluative aspects of stereotypes, rather than with the cognitive (trait) content of stereotypes (Stephan et al., 1994). Affect toward a variety of groups (child abusers, rock musicians, heterosexuals, and homosexuals) performed as well as or better than beliefs in predicting judgmental bias (Jussim et al., 1995). Pettigrew (1997) argues that affect-laden attitudes have a special character; namely, they are more confident, less semantically filtered, less subject to consistency pressures, strongly predictive of political behavior (Abelson et al., 1982), and more effectively altered by affective persuasion (Edwards & von Hippel, 1995).

Emotion measures seem to predict both evaluation and discrimination better than cognitive measures do. Trying to make measures of stereotyping more evaluative (rather

than cognitive), at least in various studies of the U.S. interracial context, does not improve their ability to predict discrimination (Dovidio et al., 1996). In summary, although the data vary—across different measures, categories of raters, and target groups—stereotypes clearly underperform in predicting evaluations of and behavior toward outgroup members; more gut-level types of prejudice may be stronger predictors. Two words, to the wise researcher, should be sufficient: Study prejudice.

**Group Threats** Where does prejudice come from? The origins of gut-level prejudices lie in at least two features of intergroup contexts; the first is group threats (sometimes called fraternal deprivation; see Tyler & Smith, 1998, in this *Handbook*); the second, covered next, is direct contact. Along the group-threat line, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) suggest that blatant prejudice—hot, close, and direct—comes partly from perceived threat to one's group, which comprises a focus on the group's relative gains, jobs, and welfare.

Further support for the role of group threats comes from an analysis focusing on negative interdependence—that is, the ways in which outgroup members are perceived to interfere with the perceiver's goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993). Comparable to the group-level threats, specific outgroup members are presumed to block ingroup goals, either by directly competing or by simply having different goals. Because shared goals define groups, and because outgroups presumptively differ from ingroups, people assume that outsiders will block ingroup goals. Interrupted goals create anger, frustration, anxiety, and fear—all emotions commonly directed toward outgroups.

Another analysis likewise focuses on group-threat origins of prejudice; it combines the perspectives of social identity theory and appraisal theories of emotion (Smith, 1993). Appraisal theories suggest that emotions result from directly perceived impact on the welfare of the self; possible harm, for example, provokes anger (if the harm doer is a person acting unjustifiably), fear (if the harm is in the certain future), anxiety (if the harm is in the uncertain future), or sadness (if the harm is in the past). One's own actual or potential positive outcomes similarly elicit emotions, such as happiness or hope. Extending appraisals beyond harm or benefit to the self—namely, to the ingroup—one can see the application to prejudice. As already noted, social identity theory and its extension, self-categorization theory, posit that people's sense of self extends to the ingroup. Thus, perceived outgroup harm or ingroup benefit provokes strong emotions directed to the outgroup as a whole. Research on symbolic racism, described earlier, and on fraternal (group-level) deprivation leading to prejudice both fit Smith's analysis.

**Direct Contact** Besides group-level emotions, what are the more intimate origins of prejudice? Close personal contact can evoke highly personal prejudice, as evidenced in this section's opening example of personal disgust at physical contact. As noted, people's reports of emotions during intergroup contact do correlate with attitudinal prejudice (Dijker, 1987; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993), suggesting that contact-based emotions are important features of prejudice. According to Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), important aspects of blatant prejudice include, first, a personal focus on face-to-face comfort, similarity, and ability. A second aspect comprises rejection of intimacy with outgroups: having sexual relations, marrying, sharing grandchildren, and having an outgroup boss. (Not coincidentally, the intimacy items represent the more extreme social-distance items from Bogardus, 1927, suggesting that he was onto something subsequently neglected.)

Direct contact also enters the interdependence analysis of prejudice (as already noted; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993). Another person's mere membership in an outgroup provokes people's discomfort with direct contact because of their own potentially interrupted interaction goals. The other person's sheer novelty may be disruptive, as when one interacts with someone from a completely foreign culture without knowing the ground rules, or when one interacts with someone from an unusual social category, such as a person who is physically disabled (Langer et al., 1976). Even after the novelty wears off, mere membership may disrupt direct contact because of the other person's presumed or actual differences from one's familiar ingroup. Interacting with an outgroup partner requires monitoring one's behavior: Familiarity smooths people's transactions; difference disrupts (see Fiske & Ruscher, 1993, for references). Such disruptions cause anxiety, discomfort, and irritation. Thus, mere outgroup membership alone can produce negative affect in direct mixed-group encounters.

**Individual Hostility** Besides people contextually under group threat and direct contact, those who are most chronically intolerant and likely to be hostile, by current measures, are right-wing authoritarians. Introduced earlier as conceptual descendants of the original authoritarian personalities, right-wing authoritarians were described as submissive to authority, aggressive in an authoritarian way (i.e., down a sanctioned hierarchy), and conventional (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). People high on this scale are more prejudiced than mere stereotypes would explain; the evaluative implications of stereotypes (e.g., incompetent, lazy) do not explain the hostility of people high on this scale. The attitudes of high right-wing authoritarians seem to be based not on stereotypes, but on perceived value differences, and such people are more likely to act on their hostility (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). Conventional values and authoritarianism also predict rejection of the stigmatized (Crandall & Cohen, 1994). Rokeach (1960) was the first to recognize the importance of perceived value differences as underlying hostility, and this insight has proved enduring.

Prejudice toward various outgroups who defy traditional values may well underlie the antipathy of fundamentalist Christians (Batson & Burris, 1994; Bierly, 1985; Hunsberger, 1995). It is not fundamentalism per se that apparently underlies its association with prejudice, but rather a categorical, stringent, monopolistic, authoritarian way of being religious, which entertains no doubts, uncertainties, relativities, or inclusivities. People who defy authoritarian certainties apparently are viewed as deserving complete rejection, or worse.

In a related vein, a belief that the world is just (that people get what they deserve) predicts rejection of, for example, homosexuals and depressives (Crandall & Cohen, 1994). Believing that people get what they deserve extends conceptually to men who accept rape myths (i.e., that women want to be raped); men who easily accept the rape myth increase positive affect and self-esteem as a function of exposure to the report of a rape (Bohner et al., 1993). Some sexual harassment arises from overt hostility toward women or homosexuals, who are seen as deserving what they get (Fiske & Glick, 1995; Pryor & Whalen, 1996).

Perhaps the individual hostility of right-wing authoritarians (and the correlated group of religious fundamentalists) shares the psychology of those described earlier as responding to group threats and individual contamination through direct contact. People whose values are seen to differ—fundamentally—threaten the worldview that one's group is right and will triumph. Because there can be no compromise or alternative set of values, one is contaminated at one's core by people who practice something different from what we preach.

**Summary** The strong forms of prejudice may be occasioned by group threat of relative deprivation or by interpersonal threat of intimacy with people who seem different. Or it may result from the value orientation of right-wing authoritarians. All three share an underlying dimension of perceived threat to the core of the prejudiced person, so the depth and intensity of the evoked hostility is not surprising. Although social psychologists have only recently examined specific emotions directed at outgroup members, research has long documented the extremity of evaluations of individual outgroup members (e.g., Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Katz, 1981; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986; Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980; Taylor, 1981). These extreme evaluations may stem from various cognitive mechanisms, a currently favored hypothesis, but extremity may stem from emotional prejudices as well.

## Discrimination

Documenting discriminatory behavior has not been social psychology's strong suit. Like the attitude-behavior debacle that almost destroyed the foundations of persuasion research, a debacle threatens stereotyping research if it does not soon address behavior. Of course, information seeking entails behavior, social-distance measures of prejudice imply behavior, evaluations have behavioral consequences, and behavior surfaces in various accounts of stereotyping and prejudice already covered here. Moreover, the organizational psychology literature deals with employment discrimination (for references, see, for example, Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Glick, Zion, & Nelson, 1988), and the educational psychology literature deals with discrimination in schools (for a collection, see Hawley & Jackson, 1995). Nevertheless, researchers need to document better the links to behavior.

Maybe social psychology has documented discrimination so little because its real job is to document not discrimination's frequency (the work of sociologists, economists, and organizational researchers), but instead its underlying psychological processes. Primary among these processes is the self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby the perceiver's stereotypes and prejudices, through the perceiver's treatment of the target, induce the target behaviorally to confirm those stereotypes and prejudices (Snyder, 1984, 1992; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974; to be reviewed shortly). Self-fulfilling prophecies and other forms of bias often leak out nonverbally (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980); for example, several studies already cited used seating distance to indicate stereotyping or prejudice. Helping and aggression often differ by the race and gender of the target as well (Batson, 1998, and Geen, 1998, both in this *Handbook*). And people may express prejudice by avoiding the outgroup member (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, in this *Handbook*) or by overcompensating (e.g., inflating their ratings) (Ickes, 1984).

But it is intergroup research, not one-on-one stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination research, that has documented discrimination most carefully, especially in studies testing social identity theory and self-categorization theory (see Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*). As noted earlier, an extensive literature demonstrates a shocking, reliable effect: Arbitrary categorization of people into groups elicits ingroup favoritism in the distribution of rewards, and none of the obvious alternative explanations (e.g., self-interest, reciprocity) applies. Even this literature, however, needs to attend explicitly to how categorization provokes people to inflict *aversive* consequences on the outgroup, because the link between categorization and ingroup reward apparently does not generalize to categorization and outgroup harm (Mummendey et al., 1992).

In all likelihood, there are two kinds of discrimination to document. One was suggested in the last section's plea for greater consideration of "hot prejudices": that is, "hot discrimination," based on disgust, resentment, hostility, and anger. People high in right-wing authoritarianism might well enact this kind of affect-laden discrimination.

The second type might be termed "cold discrimination," based on stereotypes of an outgroup's interests, knowledge, and motivations. For example, in many job discrimination cases, failure to promote or hire may be based on calm, cool, collective stereotypes, without any hot prejudices (Fiske et al., 1991). Used-car dealers may exploit groups they consider gullible, and teachers may scold groups they consider thick-skinned (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Garst, 1997); both are types of "cold discrimination."

Consistent with the possibility of "cold discrimination" are some forerunners of discrimination that follow directly from the automatic cognitive processes that opened this major section. After being primed by components of the elderly stereotype, young participants themselves enacted an unprimed but central component of the stereotype—namely, walking more slowly. And after being subliminally primed by faces of young African-American males, white participants themselves enacted a component of their stereotype—in this case, hostility (Bargh, 1997). Suppose that a potentially stereotyped target primes one to enact components of the stereotype (e.g., being slow or hostile). The target may reciprocate, and thus one may thereby elicit the corresponding stereotypic behavior. Such discrimination would be the "cold" sort.

### Summary

This major section has argued that stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have automatic aspects. In particular, categorization demonstrates advantages in both speed and evaluation for the ingroup and advantages in speed for stereotypic matches, marked groups, and categorized targets in general. Automatic categorization saves cognitive resources. Categorization exaggerates between-group differences and minimizes within-group differences, increasing perceived homogeneity. Subsequent information search favors stereotype-matching information. Explanations attribute stereotypic qualities to the essence of the category members, especially regarding positive qualities for the ingroup and high-status individuals and, to a lesser extent, negative qualities to outgroups and lower-status individuals. Conversely, negative ingroup qualities are attributed to the situation, as are positive outgroup qualities. Marked individuals are explained more often than the default, unmarked individuals, and the marked individuals are explained in stereotypic terms. Memory also supports stereotypic matches, as well as confusions between stereotyped individuals and more individuation of ingroup individuals.

Stereotypes, however, predict discrimination and evaluations less than emotional prejudices do. Hot prejudice may stem from group-level threat, personal discomfort with difference, or rigid value conflict. But cold discrimination also demonstrably occurs. Hot prejudice, as well as both hot and cold discrimination, may be relatively automatic, but work on the automaticity of discrimination is in its infancy.

To reiterate one of the themes introduced in the historical overview: Most of the phenomena reviewed in this section are context-driven—with the notable exception of right-wing authoritarianism. The context-driven nature of most of this work implies that most people, given the wrong context, are prone to stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. However, most people, given the *right* context, can avoid stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. It is well to recall the time-honored contextual solution to hot forms of prejudice, which may be invoked for cold prejudice as well: Safe intergroup contact, within mixed neighborhoods, encourages intergroup friendships. Intergroup friends reduce prejudice. (And this is not explained merely by the simple self-selection bias of unprejudiced people selecting intergroup friendships; Pettigrew, 1997.)

## STEREOTYPING, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION CAN BE SOCIALLY PRAGMATIC

Categorical reactions persist in part because they are cognitively useful. They also persist because they are socially useful. They can help people interact more easily. This social pragmatism appears in the nature of the categories used and the nature of stereotypic accuracy, both of which are driven mostly by the social context.

### The Nature of the Categories Can Make Them Useful

**The Top Three: Primacy of Race, Gender, and Age Categories** If categorization proceeds relatively automatically, with so many implications, then identifying the central categories is crucial. What is a category? Are all categories equal? This chapter focuses on race, gender, and age as primary examples, in part because they have been the primary research foci. But also, they are physically manifest and therefore socially functional. Visual cues provide useful categories (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 144, for references) because they can shape encounters from the outset. A category conveyed verbally has much less impact than the same category conveyed visually (Beckett & Park, 1995), so race, gender, and age make sense as central, visually conveyed, automatically accessed categories. But why focus on these three visually conveyed categories, rather than others? Stereotypes are triggered by other visual, immediately accessible categories—for example, being overweight (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, in this *Handbook*; Ryckman et al., 1989), attractive (Eagly et al., 1991), baby-faced (Zebrowitz, 1997), and even a smoker (Echebarria-

Echabe, Fernandez-Guede, & Gonzalez-Castro, 1994). Yet visually prominent stereotypes such as these have not stimulated the same degree of research focus—or legal recognition.

A second factor, then, that determines the significance of race, gender, and age is social significance. The cultural meaning of the categorization determines whether people use it, researchers study it, and legislators outlaw it. For example, English Canadians may stereotype French Canadians but not Filipinos or Mexicans (Lalonde & Gardner, 1989). Europeans have much more detailed stereotypes of each others' nationalities (Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994) than Americans do. But few Europeans truly understand U.S. stereotypes of Texans, Californians, Midwesterners, Southerners, New Yorkers, or Yankees. Even within a culture, use of a particular stereotype changes over time; witness the tremendous changes in U.S. norms about overt racism, described earlier (see also Cox, Smith, & Insko, 1996). If even specific, short-term context influences stereotype use (Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1991; Smith & Zárate, 1992), then so, too, would ethnic or cultural identity (Zárate, Bonilla, & Luévano, 1995). Cultural context clearly determines stereotyping of concealable categories, such as homosexuality (for a meta-analysis, see Whitely & Kite, 1995). Cultural context defines the utility of various categories (race in one context, religion in another), and people develop consensus about the cultural categories as they mature and presumably become acculturated (Augoustinos, 1991). Note that gender, age, and race all are ascribed (given) statuses, rather than achieved (earned, voluntary) statuses, and they are ascribed by the culture.

Besides visual access and cultural meaning, immediate interaction goals determine which stereotypes matter. For this reason, gender stereotypes probably matter widely, across cultures, given human pair-bonding goals. So, the heterosexual goals, power goals, and gender identity goals salient in male-female interactions underlie sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Similarly, age and race matter, to the extent that they shape immediate interaction goals, regarding expected kinds of possible relationships. The most salient content of stereotypes follows from their use in interaction as well; to the extent that dispositional inferences allow perceivers the sense that they can predict the course of future encounters, traits will be central in stereotypes—and so they are (Biernat & Crandall, 1994). Interaction utility probably determines the developmental sequence of acquiring gender, age, and race categories (usually in that order; for a review, see Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996).

Finally, the preferred level of categories will depend on social and cognitive utility. People are capable of quite specific stereotypes, such as types likely to be their significant others (e.g., petite, dark, and deferent; wild, unconventional, and seductive) (Andersen & Cole, 1990). At the other extreme, general stereotypes exist for women, blacks, or the elderly. But evidence increasingly suggests that people operate at the intermediate level, using subtypes of these overarching categories.

**Evidence for Subtypes** Allport (1954) put it well:

> There is a common mental device that permits people to hold prejudgments even in the face of much contradictory evidence. It is the device of admitting exceptions. . . . By excluding a few favored cases, the negative rubric is kept intact for all other cases. (p. 23)

Following Allport's insight, but building more explicitly on Rosch's (1978) work on levels of categorization, Taylor (1981) proposed that, with sufficient familiarity, abstract trait conceptions of an overall group would lose descriptive value, but that more useful subtypes would emerge, relying on roles such as motherly woman, street-smart black, or macho man. To this list, Brewer, Dull, and Lui (1981) added subtypes of the elderly, such as grandmother type or elder statesman. Both initial efforts relied on descriptive data to derive evidence for subtypes. And both emphasized the cognitive more than the social utility of subtypes.

Weber and Crocker (1983) competitively tested subtyping against two other cognitive models described earlier: dramatic change by conversion and gradual change by bookkeeping. The crucial test compares stereotyping of a group that concentrates exceptions in a few deviant individuals, which facilitates subtyping, or disperses exceptions equally across individuals, which facilitates bookkeeping or conversion. Indeed, subtyping occurred under concentrated conditions, and bookkeeping occurred under dispersed conditions.

Subsequent research established subtyping as a way to allow exceptions but maintain stereotypes of the group as a whole. According to Hewstone's research, people do spontaneously generate subtypes, and their memories for group members can cluster by such subtypes. Several studies (Hewstone, Johnston, & Aird, 1992; Hewstone et al., 1994; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Johnston et al., 1994) support Weber and Crocker's finding that subtyping occurs if disconfirming instances are concentrated in a few individuals, and that stereotypes of the group as a whole then do not change. If disconfirming instances are dispersed across individuals, the stereotype does change, perhaps by conversion. Whether stereotypes change or not is mediated by how otherwise typical the disconfirming individuals are perceived to be. If they are otherwise typical, the stereotype could change; but if they are otherwise atypical, they are subtyped and excluded, so the stereotype need not change. Thus, when people assume low variability—the default for outgroups—an atypical group member does not reflect the group, and vice versa (Lambert, 1995).

Deviant subtypes are excluded not only from altering people's generic stereotypes, but also from influencing pol-

icy attitudes regarding the group (Lord et al., 1994). And deviant subtypes do not receive the treatment predicted by attitudes toward the group as a whole (Ramsey et al., 1994). Subtypes, then, are socially as well as cognitively useful. In particular, subtypes are convenient because they justify and perpetuate the status quo.

Subtyping requires a naive theory about why the exceptions differ from the stereotypic group member. For example, people can maintain stereotypes about gay men's promiscuity by subtyping supposed exceptions (a nonpromiscuous gay man) on the basis of a single neutral attribute (e.g., he's also an accountant), which allows them to explain why the exception is atypical of the group (accountants are cautious; Kunda & Oleson, 1995). As another example, counterstereotypic police officers (school police) are viewed as a version of social worker, isolated from the general police category, which allows the general police category to be maintained (Hewstone, Hopkins, & Routh, 1992). People probably have theories to explain why, for example, a black-woman subtype (e.g., ghetto mamma, ambitious black career woman) does not partake of all the features of the generic female stereotype; thus they use multiple social features to create subtypes combining, for example, sex and race (Stangor et al., 1992) or race and class (Smedley & Bayton, 1978). Developing a theory requires at least minimal thought, so subtyping to maintain one's stereotype requires some minimal capacity, knowledge, and motivation (Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1996).

Increased knowledge and motivation move people beyond subtypes to subgroups. Subtypes distinguish a cluster of people who disconfirm the stereotype in some ways but otherwise are stereotypical of the group (e.g., career women might be seen as having women's stereotypic concern about appearance, but as otherwise atypical). Subgroups, in contrast, are not restricted to people who disconfirm the stereotype. Subgroups consist of people most similar to each other, within the larger group; different subgroups all could manifest the stereotype, but in different ways (e.g., housewives and secretaries both might be stereotypic female subgroups). Subtyping supports perceived stereotypicality and homogeneity (Maurer, Park & Rothbart, 1995), whereas subgrouping increases perceived variability (Maurer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995; Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). People categorize by subgroup especially when they have the requisite knowledge and involvement, via familiarity and social identity. People identify subgroups in the ingroup more than in the outgroup, whether the ingroup consists of young people (Brewer & Lui, 1984), a Latino subgroup (i.e., Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican; Huddy & Virtanen, 1995), business or engineering majors (Park & Judd, 1990), fraternity or sorority (Wallace, Lord, & Ramsey, 1995), or student athletes (Wallace, Lord, & Ramsey, 1995). Ingroup familiarity facilitates subgrouping (Park & Judd, 1990). One's ingroup social identity provides a sense of positive distinctiveness, which also motivates subgrouping, to the extent one considers oneself typical of the subgroup (Brewer & Lui, 1984; Huddy & Virtanen, 1995; Wallace, Lord, & Ramsey, 1995). Consistent with the importance of motivation and perhaps also with ingroup identification, accountability also enhances subgrouping (Pendry & Macrae, 1996). The problem is that many researchers do not distinguish between subtyping and subgrouping. But greater clarity would separate stereotype maintenance (through subtyping) from ingroup heterogeneity (through subgrouping).

Subtyping may not require the level of familiarity characteristic of one's knowledge of the ingroup, but it does require minimal knowledge. With insufficient knowledge, one cannot construct a naive theory to combine crucial features into a subtype. For any given context, not all social features combine easily. Thus, a pair of superordinate or subordinate features can be mutually exclusive and even inhibit each other. In some contexts, for example, categorizing someone as Chinese or Mexican might suppress categorizing her as a woman (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Zárate & Cappello, 1995). Similarly, activating one female subtype suppresses others (Rudman & Borgida, 1995). But given at least minimal knowledge and familiarity, people are probably capable of combining nearly any category with any other to create a subtype.

Allport's ideas about the cognitive, social, and personal utility of subtypes are well supported. Using such subtypes is socially pragmatic, in that the overall stereotype can be maintained. (Subgrouping also is socially pragmatic, to maintain optimal distinctiveness of a familiar group. But because researchers have not yet consistently maintained the optimal distinction between subtyping and subgrouping, the rest of the chapter will revert to current usage—namely, subtyping only.) Moreover, the nature of the categories for gender, race, and age will depend on the content of the subtypes.

**The Nature of Gender Stereotypes** This *Handbook* contains an entire chapter on gender (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998), with ample coverage of gender stereotypes, so the aim here is merely to highlight rather than review some major characteristics of gender stereotypes and subtypes. Of the top three categories, gender most clearly commands perceivers' attention. In several contexts, gender dominates race (Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991; Stangor et al., 1992), age (Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991), and occupation (van Knippenberg & van Twuyver, 1994) as a basis for categorization, and children use gender earlier than race or age (for a review, see Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996). Of course, context clearly matters in the relatively heavy use of gender.

The typical woman is seen as nice but incompetent, the typical man as competent but maybe not so nice. These

stereotypes mean that people may like women more than men (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), but may not necessarily respect them. On social and interpersonal dimensions, the generic woman wins, but on task dimensions, the generic man wins (for reviews, see, for example, Deaux, 1985; Deaux & LaFrance, 1998, in this *Handbook*; Ruble & Ruble, 1982; Spence & Helmreich, 1978). Across cultures, the generic man is adventurous, independent, strong, and active; the generic woman is sentimental, superstitious, and emotional. But who are the typical man and woman?

The previous section claimed that subtypes dominate generic gender stereotypes. And the typical woman is closest to the subtype of either a housewife or a sexy woman, according to different western studies (Deaux et al., 1985; Eckes, 1994; Noseworthy & Lott, 1984; Six & Eckes, 1991); this variability suggests that context determines which subtype people use to supply a generic stereotype. The housewife subtype comprises a submissive, dependent, selfless, nurturing, tidy, gentle, and unconfident woman. The sexy subtype, which includes secretary and "chick," is dependent, flirtatious, well built, well dressed, and attractive. A third subtype, career woman, is high on intelligence, confidence, ambition, hard work, dominance, and dress. Finally, the feminist/athlete/lesbian subtype is independent, dominant, leftist, masculine, and poorly dressed. These subtypes doubtless vary with time and culture, but many of the core dimensions generalize. Note the recurring roles of (un)attractiveness, (in)dependence, and (non)traditional identity in these subtypes, suggesting the importance of interpersonal dimensions and the perceiver's potential relationship with the target.

On the basis of men's and women's traditional relationships, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Fiske & Glick, 1995; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997) proposed three dimensions, related to attractiveness, dependence, and identity; each has hostile and benevolent versions, to capture female stereotype and subtype contents: heterosexual hostility and attraction, dominative and protective paternalism, and competitive and complementary gender differentiation.[3] For people who are sexist toward women, the "benevolent" attitudes (heterosexual attraction, protection, and gender-role complementarity) apply to traditional women (e.g., pink-collar job holders, sexy chicks, or housewives), whereas the hostile attitudes (heterosexual hostility, such as hostile harassment, domination, and competition) apply to nontraditional women (e.g., career women, feminists, athletes, or lesbians) (see also Haddock & Zanna, 1994; MacDonald & Zanna, 1996).

Subtypes of men appear less clear-cut and less narrowly relevant to gender roles. A businessman cluster ranks high on grooming, education, and materialism; a macho man ranks high on sociability, sexuality, style, self-centeredness, and muscles. The typical man lies somewhere in between, probably depending on context. Some studies also identify separate clusters for athlete, blue-collar man, intellectual, loser, or radical, but these subtypes are less consistent. With the exception of macho man, note that gender is less intrinsically relevant to these subtypes than to those for women. Moreover, the male subtypes are characterized less by interpersonal dimensions and more by competence in various specific domains, again giving them a less direct link to gender. The asymmetry between perceptions of men and women is further reflected by the tendency of both sexes to view women as a more homogeneous group than men (Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & Stewart, 1995), which fits with the work reviewed earlier suggesting that women as the marked group, compared to men as the default, are more readily categorized by gender.

Subtypes for women and men do seem to emphasize, respectively, interpersonal versus competence dimensions, but the specific contents vary across time and culture (Blee & Tickamyer, 1995; Chia et al., 1994; Kirchler, 1992), as well as the specific ethnic group of the man or woman (Niemann et al., 1994). Moreover, the contrasting emphasis on social versus task dimensions carries more than a descriptive message about how men and women are; it prescribes how men and women should be (for a review, see Fiske & Stevens, 1993).

What is the social pragmatism of prescribing task roles for men and social roles for women? Much ink and toner have been spilled over this topic, but essentially the argument runs as follows: Division of labor had its advantages in other places, other times (e.g., Eagly, 1987; a later section returns to the social-role analysis). What's more, the traditional arrangements provided some structural power advantages to men and dyadic power advantages to women (Fiske, 1993a; Guttentag & Secord, 1983; Jost & Banaji, 1994), so sexism helped maintain the status quo.

In addition, the content of gender stereotypes is heavily prescriptive—that is, telling how men and women should behave. Men should be competent; women should be nice. Other gender stereotype content is more descriptive: Men are (too) aggressive; women are (too) emotional. Gender stereotypes uniquely emphasize prescriptive content more than other stereotypes do (Fiske & Stevens, 1993), and this adds to their particular form of social control. That is, one can admonish a person for not being enough of a girl, boy, woman, or man, because the person does not fit prescriptions about the relevant gender role. People are sanctioned and disliked when they move outside their traditional roles. Gender (as opposed to biological sex) is a social construction that serves social control and social utility.

**The Nature of Race Stereotypes** Race, too, is a social construction, a point often missed in the categorical, reified comparisons of "black" versus "white." Social psychologists have been slow to assimilate the difference between ethnic background (which can include one's ancestors as

well as one's current identity) and race (which implies an "objective" genetic mix that in fact escapes objective analysis). Race tends to be reified, turned into a biological essence that determines the target's status (for reviews, see Banks & Eberhardt, 1998; Eberhardt & Randall, 1997; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Nevertheless, viewed as a social concept with pragmatic utility, the meaning of race depends on history and current social context. For example, skin color varies along a continuum, which some cultures (e.g., the U.S.) use more than others, where religion (e.g., in the Middle East) or social class (e.g., in Brazil) may be more important. Even in the U.S., the "one-drop rule," whereby a person with three white and one black grandparent is black, is arbitrary. Similarly, Americans of Caribbean descent may be (mis)classified as African-Americans, and people of Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Indian descent all may be lumped together as racially Asian, a concept formerly of little relevance to themselves, except in how they are treated by others. And Americans whose first language is Spanish may identify as Hispanic, Latino, or more specifically Cuban-American, Mexican-American, or Puerto Rican, depending on personal circumstances, life history, and social context (for a review, see Phinney, 1990). Sometimes the group itself will advance a particular identity (e.g., African-American, Latino-American, Asian-American) because being a larger minority group creates a more powerful political base.

But this chapter concentrates on how people are viewed by others, and how social psychologists have studied people's perceptions of each other. Social psychologists in the United States have concentrated on how white people (of European origins) view black people (of African origins), primarily defined by skin tones, as reviewed in the initial section on the history of (racial) stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. This section concentrates on the content of the generic stereotypes of blacks (for whom the most data are available), as well as Latinos, whites, Asians, and Jews, with the caveat that race is in the eye of the beholder. As this section will show, racial stereotypes depend also on the role of the beholder and the beheld.

The generic stereotypes for black people are historical legacies—in particular the stereotype of rural, enslaved manual laborers (Campbell, 1967; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; for historical reviews, see Plous & Williams, 1995; Stephan, 1985; Stephan & Rosenfield, 1982; see also Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996). From the historic roles can be predicted the content of whites' generic stereotypes of blacks as lazy, ignorant, loud, musical, rhythmic, poor, stupid, dirty, and physically skilled (e.g., athletic). More recent historical context contributes to white views of blacks as militant, violent, criminal, and hostile (Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliott, 1995; Duckitt, 1992a, 1992b; Krueger, 1996). Subtypes of blacks doubtless matter, based on race-class combinations (Smedley & Bayton, 1978) and race-gender combinations (Stangor et al., 1992), but social psychologists have not studied black subtype content nearly enough. Possibilities include athlete, businessman, and a cluster including streetwise, from the ghetto, and on welfare (Devine & Baker, 1991); other subtypes (Uncle Tom, Oreo cookie) might be salient in other contexts.

Stereotypes and especially subtypes of Latino Americans have received even less research attention, probably because most Anglo Americans (the majority of researchers) differentiate less among types of Latinos than Latinos do themselves (Huddy & Virtanen, 1995). Anglos' generic stereotypes of Latinos include aggressive, poor, lazy, ignorant, loud, unreliable, emotional, unambitious, uneducated, inefficient, rude, messy, unindustrious, family-oriented, and proud (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996; Marin, 1984). The origins of this stereotype content have not been elaborated either, but it might stem from presumed class differences, based on an erroneous assumption that immigrants come from and join only the lower social classes.

Stereotypes and subtypes about white Anglos are rarely studied, partly because of the ethnicity of most researchers and partly because the white Anglo person is the cultural default. But a few studies indicate that American people of color stereotype the generic white as deceitful, sly, intelligent, treacherous, dirty, industrious, lazy, cruel, selfish, nervous, conceited, ambitious, and efficient (Krueger, 1996; Stephan & Rosenfield, 1982). These contents overlap almost completely with rural dwellers' views of urban dwellers and lower social classes' views of higher social classes (Stephan & Rosenfield, 1982). Subtypes of whites are not documented in the stereotyping literature, which necessarily lags behind ordinary people's everyday knowledge; the subtypes are there, according to anecdote, but social psychologists have not yet reported them.

Similarly, stereotypes for Asians are not well documented, but Asians in the United States are subsumed in the second half of the twentieth century as the Model Minorities (Hurh & Kim, 1989; Kitano & Sue, 1973; Sue & Kitano, 1973; Sue, Sue, & Sue, 1975): quiet, law-abiding, hardworking, and intelligent. Earlier stereotypes for Chinese and Japanese immigrants (as well as other Asian ethnic subgroups) held that they were strange, dirty, and tricky. In turn, these stereotypes gave way temporarily to more ambivalent views combining industrious and sly, which again became more uniformly negative during World War II, and then turned into the current Model Minorities view. Clearly, changing content is largely a function of social roles and social conflict at different historical periods. Despite their dramatically different immigration histories and countries of origin, subtypes for Asian-Americans are documented even less than is the overall stereotype.

Stereotypes for Jewish people (nowadays viewed more often as an ethnic group than a racial group, but interesting in this context nonetheless) share some of the content for

Asians: perceived disloyalty, power, intelligence, and dishonesty overlap. In addition, Jews are seen as clannish, greedy, ambitious, and pushy (Wuthnow, 1982). The similarity in content between stereotypes of Jews and Asians may stem from the fact that many immigrant Jews and Asians both developed a merchant role, a role also historically held by many Indians in East Africa, where their stereotype content resembles that for Asians and Jews in the United States.

To summarize, stereotypes held by white Anglos about most other groups are predominantly negative, and the content of stereotypes about blacks and Latinos probably reflects stereotypes about rural dwellers to a great extent. In that sense, these stereotypes were once socially useful, as views of rural manual laborers. In a broader sense, of course, negative stereotypes are socially useful to the powerful group because they maintain the status quo (Fiske, 1993a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996; Operario & Fiske, 1998). The utility of stereotyping by the less powerful group is less documented, but defense against group threat may be key to their use or nonuse of stereotypes (Dépret, 1996; Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996). In any case, stereotypes about traditionally less powerful groups are studied to the virtual exclusion of stereotypes about traditionally more powerful groups; more work is needed on stereotypes of white Anglos.

**The Nature of Age Stereotypes** The study of age stereotypes has focused mostly on how younger people view the elderly, and not vice versa. (This imbalance may change, of course, as baby-boomer researchers age.) The elderly are viewed as ill, unattractive, asexual, senile, incompetent, ineffectual, slow, rigid, stingy, dull, forgetful, poor, isolated, and conservative. Some contradictions inhere in stereotypes of the elderly: they can be wise or demented, as well as grouchy, depressed, or serene (Branco & Williamson, 1982; Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995; Kite & Johnson, 1988; Pasupathi, Carstensen & Tsai, 1995; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). The contradictions imply different subtypes, such as the John Wayne conservative (patriotic, religious, nostalgic), perfect grandparent (wise, kind, happy), small-town neighbor (frugal, quiet, conservative), despondent (depressed, neglected), severely impaired (incompetent, feeble), golden-ager (adventurous, sociable, successful), and shrew/curmudgeon (bitter, complaining, prejudiced) (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Brewer & Lui, 1989; Hummert et al., 1994, 1995). Inventories to assess ageism suggest that valence, vitality, and maturity are central dimensions (Hummert et al., 1994; Knox, Gekoski, & Kelly, 1995).

Age is unusual among social categories, in that people change categories and do so involuntarily. To the extent that younger people feel threatened by becoming elderly, the stereotypes may serve an ego-protective function (*cf.* Snyder & Miene, 1994). The negative aspects of age stereotypes can distance one's current self from the target group, as well as justifying the dominance of middle-aged and younger people in society. For those who fully expect to join the aged group themselves, however, the positive aspects of age stereotypes can mitigate the negative.

**There Are Two Kinds of People** Content is not arbitrary, and it responds to principles, just as process does. One set of principles, discussed throughout this section on stereotype content, governs the way in which roles give rise to stereotypes. Another set of principles may explain content across stereotyped outgroups. According to bigots, there are two kinds of stereotyped groups: those one likes but disrespects (women, blacks, Latinos, native peoples, the Irish, the Mediterraneans, the elderly, the poor, the blind), and those one respects but dislikes (Asians, Jews, Germans, the wealthy, whites, men).

Groups in the first category, liked but disrespected, share perceived incompetence, but at the same time they are accorded some (perhaps grudging) affection or admiration for less valued dimensions having something to do with interpersonal skills and possibly spirituality. Women are nice, blacks are streetwise, Latinos are gregarious, the elderly are wise about people, the blind are intuitive. And all of them are religious or at least spiritual. Because they are all incompetent, one can afford to like them, granting them some compensatory but less important skills. One can even appropriate some of their skills (blacks' music and dress, women's alleged people-oriented management style), but still maintain the disadvantage in terms of structural power.

Groups in the second category, respected but disliked, share perceived competence, but at the same time they are derogated for being mean-spirited, cruel, rigid, and certainly not fun. A bigot cannot justify his or her antipathy by derogating a competent outgroup's talent and effort. Hence, competent outgroups are devalued for lacking more human qualities, such as kindness, honesty, and spirituality, again maintaining ingroup-outgroup distance but in a different way. Competent outgroups are threatening in a way that nice outgroups are not.[4]

The twin dimensions of competence and likability are no accident. Person perception researchers ever since Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968), and perhaps since Asch (1946), have understood the trade-offs between task and social dimensions. Moreover, Allport (1954) and Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950) suggested that outgroup stereotypes can be classified in terms of Freudian id (perhaps likeable but incompetent) and superego (competent but not likable). Although this trade-off has not

since the 1950s been explicit in research on the content of group stereotypes, it contributes to the idea of the social pragmatism of stereotype content.

## Accuracy Would Make Stereotypes Useful

**A Kernel of Truth Would Make Stereotypes Pragmatic** Stereotypes might have better utility if they were more often accurate than not. Lay people and professionals alike perennially debate the accuracy or inaccuracy of stereotypes. For some, the debate is a pure intellectual and methodological enterprise; for others, it is a political, social, or personal issue. In both cases, the debate dates back to the earliest studies of stereotypes (Allport, 1954). In the 1990s, a spate of research has asserted that stereotypes often contain important elements of accuracy. The accuracy researchers argue that the question needs to be reopened, mainly because the topic has been avoided (for a collection, see Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995).

Ottati and Lee (1995) review studies of stereotype accuracy that find (1) convergence among various groups' stereotypes of a particular other group, (2) convergence between an outgroup's view and the ingroup's view of itself, (3) convergence between stereotypes and more objective indicators, and (4) sensitivity to within-group variation. They provide several theoretical explanations for any obtained accuracy to stereotypes: Some stereotypes are rational categories for understanding the world (Allport, 1954); stereotypes are probabilistic generalizations, not all-or-none judgments (McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980); stereotypes evolve as adaptations to the exterior world (Baron, 1995); perceptions reflect reality as well as construct it (Jussim, 1991); stereotypic information processing not only uses categories but also responds to data; and although motivations may change connotations, the denotations could still be accurate.

Jussim, McCauley, and Lee (1995) protest the dominant view of stereotypes, which they characterize as saying that stereotypes are factually incorrect, illogical in origin, based in prejudice, irrationally resistant to new information, exaggerating real group differences, biased toward the ingroup, implying genetic origins, maximizing outgroup homogeneity, ignoring individual differences, biasing perceptions, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies. They state exceptions to each of these points. At this stage in this review chapter, the reader is in a position to evaluate whether these points actually characterize stereotyping research; the present author holds that these characterizations are overblown caricatures, drawn for effect.

To summarize contributions to their volume (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995), McCauley, Jussim, and Lee (1995) make some arguments that are not inconsistent with those made in the current review: Stereotypes contain more than just traits; assessing stereotype accuracy is not simple, particularly for traits; stereotypes do not necessarily lead to negative attitudes; and to understand evaluations and actions (prejudice and discrimination), one must understand people's theories about the origins of differences. However, the current review does not support some of their other arguments. For example, they claim that stereotypes do not necessarily exaggerate real group differences and do not necessarily lead to inaccurate judgments of individuals. Moreover, they differ from the present review in their conclusions, which do not follow from their premises: If two resumés are otherwise equivalent, it is permissible to use stereotypes associated with group membership as a factor in a hiring choice, if group membership has previously predicted success on the job. (In this, they evidently disagree with current U.S. civil rights law.)

In response, Stangor (1995) argues that it is premature to study the accuracy of stereotypic content because group differences are not well catalogued, because they are mostly about perceived personality trait differences, the meaning of which are hard to interpret. He also argues that the payoffs are likely to be limited at best, or dangerous at worst. Instead, he advocates studying the accuracy of stereotype *application,* because privately held stereotypes themselves could be neutral, if they were never expressed or influenced no other psychological process (a circumstance the current review would suggest is unlikely). But the application of stereotypes clearly is damaging, Stangor argues, even if they contain some accuracy. For example, stereotypes can cut short the search for more information about the individual or group. Moreover, even supposing that the average member of the category were accurately described, the stereotype would not be accurate for every individual, who could be derogated or excluded on the basis of group characteristics.

The program of research that best elucidates the complexity of studying stereotype accuracy is the work of Judd, Park, and their colleagues. Judd and Park (1993; Ryan, 1995; Ryan, Park, & Judd, 1996) identify three types of inaccuracy: (1) stereotypic inaccuracy, exaggerating stereotypic attributes or underestimating counterstereotypic attributes; (2) valence inaccuracy, disproportionately exaggerating negative (or positive) stereotypic attributes more than the reverse; and (3) dispersion inaccuracy, overgeneralizing members of the group as less (or more) dispersed around the average than they actually are. (And for each of these, there are several possible patterns of bias; see Cronbach, 1955.) The judgment of accuracy thus is complex: Stereotypes can be inaccurate because their content is stereotypically or evaluatively biased, or too restricted. One can be wrong in saying that the average African-American is on welfare, that the average woman is a housewife, or that the average elderly person is ill; all of

these statement would constitute stereotypic inaccuracy. Valence bias would be exaggerating the negative (the degree to which African-Americans are on welfare) and underestimating the positive (the degree to which African-Americans are athletic). Dispersion inaccuracy would be saying that, whatever African-Americans' estimated average athletic ability, there is less variability in their ability than there actually is. Ryan, Park, and Judd (1996) demonstrate that stereotypes of outgroups, compared to those of ingroups, exaggerate stereotypic attributes, underestimate counterstereotypic attributes, underestimate the dispersion of group members, and are insensitive to between-attribute differences in central tendency and dispersion. Judd, Ryan, and Park (1991) also show that outgroup stereotypes are overgeneralizations. In contrast, Swim (1994) argues that people accurately estimate the relative effect sizes of gender differences (combining mean and variability estimates), and Eagly (1995) argues that sex differences identified in meta-analyses fit gender stereotypes. Consensus on this issue remains elusive.

In any event, what does it mean to say that, "actually," women are dependent, men are aggressive, Jews are stingy, the elderly are conservative, blacks are criminal, or whites are conceited? The problem of the actual criterion is complex, especially for traits (Judd & Park, 1993). The target group's self-report is a common criterion, but this is plagued by various self-report biases and sample selection biases. Also, the validity of self-reports is affected by group identity issues (Judd et al., 1995). Another plausible criterion would be "objective" measures, but their validity, too, is unclear. What measure would objectively indicate whether a group is ambitious, lazy, or efficient? And how ambitious is ambitious? And for what proportion of the group, compared to what other group, does the trait have to hold? Expert judgments are possible, but they themselves are not immune to stereotypes.

Examining a more individual level of stereotype accuracy, Jussim, Eccles, and Madon (1996) argue that self-fulfilling prophecies occur because the initial perceptions are accurate in the real world. That is, the literature on self-fulfilling prophecies, as noted earlier and reviewed next, has indicated that people's expectations can cause them to treat others in ways that influence the targets to confirm the perceivers' expectancies. Thus, if a teacher views a wealthy student as smarter than a poor student, that teacher may treat the rich child preferentially, such that the rich child later outperforms the poor child. Jussim and colleagues suggest that more often than not, the teachers' initial expectations are accurate, so performance results from accurate stereotypes, not from behavior distorted to confirm stereotypes (Jussim & Eccles, 1995). Of course, even initially "true" expectations could create unfair advantages for the privileged, perpetuating and exaggerating their initial privilege.

The face-to-face effects of stereotypes, "accurate" or not, spotlight the problem of judging individual people on the basis of even accurate population distributions. One has to take into account relative numbers of the groups compared and relative proportions of each group possessing the relevant characteristic (leaving aside, for the moment, the threshold for specifying when someone possesses or does not possess the characteristic). Even if, for example, the violent crime rate among blacks is, as the stereotype goes, higher than that among whites, there are many times more whites in the United States than there are blacks. So there are many more white criminals than black criminals. The odds that any particular violent crime was committed by a black person are lower than the odds that it was committed by a white person. Moreover, violent criminals are the minority among both blacks and whites, so the odds are low that any particular black person or white person is a violent criminal. Note that this example leaves aside the type and severity of crime, as well as the most likely victim of the crime (for example, violent crimes are most often directed against a member of the same race). In this case, what is the most "accurate" statement about race and criminality?

To take another example, suppose that there are roughly equal numbers of men and women, that many more women than men are homemakers, but that only the minority of women are exclusively full-time homemakers. What is the accuracy of the stereotype that women are homemakers? What is the accuracy of the stereotype that homemakers are women? Wise heads since both Allport (1954) and Brown (1986) have grappled with these issues, but the resolutions are not an objective issue, nor are they just a matter of being fair to individuals (Stangor, 1995); scientific, social, and political judgment are involved in the very definition of accuracy, so stereotype accuracy is a problem unlikely to go away.

**Stereotype-Confirming Behavior Makes Stereotypes Useful** Even if the group-level stereotype does not contain a kernel of truth, the perceiver can always make the stereotype useful by *making* it true for a given individual. In this process, known as the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1957) or behavioral confirmation (Snyder, 1984, 1992), the perceiver (e.g., a white person) who holds a stereotype (e.g., black people are hostile) behaves accordingly (e.g., guarded, defensive, suspicious) and thereby elicits confirmatory behavior (e.g., coldness, distance) from the target (for reviews, see Claire & Fiske, 1997; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder, 1984, 1992). Being able to make the stereotype true can be convenient for the perceiver because it makes the target predictable and potentially more controllable.

Of course, convenience depends on people's goals, which influence a variety of mediators, both verbal (e.g., types of questions posed, opportunities provided to talk)

and nonverbal (e.g., friendliness and openness of posture) (Chaikin, Sigler, & Derlega, 1974; Cooper & Baron, 1977; Darley et al., 1988; Jones & Cooper, 1971; Neuberg, 1994; Skrypnek & Snyder, 1982; Snyder & Haugen, 1994, 1995; Snyder & Swann, 1978a, 1978b; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). For example, a perceiver with an explicit accuracy goal gives targets more chances to talk, which in turn allows them to dispel a negative stereotype (Neuberg, 1989).

The target's own awareness of the stereotype (Hilton & Darley, 1985) and certainty of self-concept (Swann, 1987; Swann & Ely, 1984) can mitigate confirmatory behavior. Some have argued that behavioral confirmation is therefore rare (Hilton & Darley, 1985; Jones, 1990; Jussim, 1989; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Swann, 1987), especially because extended contact could undermine the role of expectancies and enhance the role of disconfirming behavior (Darley et al., 1988). But this argument ignores the systemic effects of an individual target's repeated experience with stereotypes over a lifetime; pressures to confirm a consensual stereotype—not individualistic autonomy and total freedom—define the marked person's social context (Claire & Fiske, 1997). Also, expectancies—if internalized—become self-maintaining. Time may compound the pressures to conform to stereotypes.

Apart from the perceiver's immediate convenience, behavioral confirmation may have long-term utility. Targets may repeat behavior elicited previously (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Snyder & Swann, 1978a), thereby making the stereotype ultimately, although not initially, "true." Although the evidence indicates that targets rarely internalize stereotypes (see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, in this *Handbook*), sometimes perceivers and targets do share stereotypes, as when the stereotype and the group's own identity reinforce each other. This sharing of stereotypes must be most likely to hold for positive features that can be a source of group pride (e.g., emotional sensitivity for women, Grossman & Wood, 1993; and possibly music or athletics for blacks, family orientation for Latinos, academic achievement for Asians). Indeed, high-status minorities (e.g., Ivy League graduates) are the ones even more likely to self-stereotype (Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Individual identity that is not a function of group identity, such as being classified as physically attractive, can lead to accurate positive stereotypes, such as being socially skilled (Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992). As noted earlier, a stereotype shared between perceiver and target can usefully smooth the interaction, because the two people are operating from the same premises and the target feels understood (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Leyens, 1989; Leyens, Dardenne, & Fiske, in press).

In some cases, then, stereotype confirmation could be socially pragmatic for both perceiver and target, although in the most common case of negative stereotypes, the target is the party less likely to benefit. Of course, even positive stereotypes may be constraining to group members. Moreover, targets do not have to self-stereotype or internalize a negative stereotype in order for behavioral confirmation to do damage. As the work on stereotype threat indicates (Steele, 1997; see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, in this *Handbook*), mere salience of the stereotype can debilitate performance, sometimes precisely confirming the stereotype.

**Stereotypes Can Be Useful If They Fit Common Social Roles** What if stereotypes are not necessarily accurate or made accurate by self-confirmation, but reflect the social relationships between different social groups? As noted earlier, the content of racial stereotypes can be traced to historical roles, such as those filled by African-Americans and Euro-Americans. The shift in social roles—for example, the termination of slavery and the advent of the industrial revolution—strips away the historical underpinning, but current economic disparities—and the roles they create—may continue to contribute to whites' racial stereotypes of black people.

Other group stereotypes may also be defined by social relationships. At the broadest level is sheer group membership, that is, ingroup identification and outgroup perception. In defining oneself as a group member, vis-à-vis some other group, one shares the group's collective representation of itself and other groups, which creates certain role demands. Group reality may be considered another criterion for accuracy because it provides context for intergroup and intragroup relationships. As Oakes, Haslam, and Turner (1994) put it, one could consider stereotype content to be a social representation, with empirical truth simply irrelevant. As they note, in some contexts, people do act in terms of their group membership (e.g., their group roles as police versus demonstrators), so group-level representations may be more appropriate than individual-level representations of targets. In this view, ingroup-outgroup categorization reflects contexts in which behavior is best predicted by group membership (according to the metacontrast principle of comparative fit), and predictions fit the perceiver's theories about differences between those groups (normative fit) (Oakes & Reynolds, 1997).

The implication that all perception is to some degree categorical is not controversial; behavior is categorized as reflecting dispositions (Gilbert, 1998, in this *Handbook*), and people have single-person categories for specific people (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The idea that categorization depends on social context is also not controversial. What is controversial is the assertion that group-level perception necessarily reflects reality, that social categorization "reflects constant *real* variation in the patterning of social behaviour" (Oakes & Reynolds, 1997, p. 60); it certainly reflects "real" variation in the perceiver's social behavior, but

we are far from knowing how to know if it reflects "real" variation in the target's social behavior.

A well-developed argument for the impact of the target's role on the origins of stereotypes comes from Eagly (1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Eagly & Wood, 1991). Women and men are differentially distributed in the roles of homemaker, which requires communal skills, and worker, which requires agentic skills. People observing this covariation confuse the person with the role, a common attributional process (see Gilbert, 1998, in this *Handbook*). Social roles, then, help explain gender differences: for example, according to meta-analyses, female-male differences in democratic, participatory versus autocratic, directive leadership styles (Eagly & Johnson, 1990) and in gender-related types of motivation to manage (Eagly et al., 1994).

In reaction to the social-role analysis, Hoffman and Hurst (1990) wonder why, if people use role-behavior covariation as a basis for stereotypes, people have gender stereotypes rather than homemaker and worker stereotypes. They suggest that the gender stereotypes serve to justify rather than merely reflect the traditional gender-based division of labor, just as other stereotypes may both reflect and justify other historically determined social roles (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996; Pettigrew, 1968; Pratto et al., 1997; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1996).

Consistent with the utility of stereotypes to justify current arrangements, people who violate prescriptive stereotypes are routinely disliked. For example, women leaders (a nontraditional role), when they lead in masculine styles, are judged harshly (see meta-analysis by Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992). Heilman (1983) developed a "lack-of-fit" model to explain how people moving into nontraditional jobs are penalized. The distribution of men and women into various jobs sex-types those jobs, on the basis of simple actuarials (Kiesler, 1975). The perceived job requirements become stereotypic (Glick, 1991), and then the person's gender can create a perceived lack of fit. Thus, if welding is viewed as typically a man's job, it comes to be seen as requiring masculine characteristics, and a woman, viewed stereotypically, is regarded as a poor fit to the job requirements. For the same reasons, people may self-select out of certain jobs, if they perceive a (stereotypic) lack of fit. Although Heilman developed this model for gender, the model applies equally to race and age—for instance, leading people to race-type or age-type certain jobs (e.g., manager or flight attendant), and then to perceive a lack of fit for people of the supposedly wrong type. Lack of fit is more of an issue for low-status targets (women, people of color) than for high-status targets; men applying to teach nursery school are treated better than women applying to weld navy ships (Pettigrew & Martin, 1987).

Indeed, one might speculate that much day-to-day stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination occurs thus: A person differs from the norm—either actuarial or prescriptive—in a given context, so the individual is discouraged or excluded because of a feeling—vague or explicit—that he or she simply does not fit in with the heretofore homogeneous group. In a sense, the problem may be wanting to maintain a familiar ingroup, as much as wanting to exclude a particular outgroup. The problem may be not so much the content of the stereotype—true, made true, or true in certain roles—as the perceived fact of difference (from self or from the "normal" person in the role). One excludes outsiders—not only because of their race, gender, or age, but because they just do not fit in.

**Bias Can Be Pragmatic for Perceivers, If Undisputed or Undetected by Targets** For bigoted whites observing militant blacks or unsympathetic men observing feminist women, it may seem all too easy for would-be victims to cry "ism"; prejudice scales document that blacks and women are perceived as too sensitive to slights or as seeing discrimination everywhere (Glick & Fiske, 1996; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995). Nevertheless, discrimination easily goes undetected by targets, for several reasons. First, one is never one's own control group. One never knows how one would have been treated if one were identical except for the potentially stereotyped status. When oneself constitutes the entire research sample ($n = 1$), judgment is difficult. This lack of perspective is likely to make people cautious about shouting "ism."

Second, targets deny that they personally have suffered discrimination, while seeing the pattern for others (Crosby, 1984). When aggregate information arrives in ways that mimic how people might receive everyday information about themselves—that is, in dribbles and confounded comparisons—people do not perceive existing discrimination (Crosby et al., 1986; Crosby, Tabb, & Twiss, 1989; Rutte et al., 1994; Twiss, Tabb, & Crosby, 1989). Targets thus tend to detect bias against their group, but not against themselves personally as group members (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995; Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994; Taylor et al., 1990).

People have developed scripts for discrimination. People are primed to detect discrimination and prejudice as perpetrated by traditionally empowered sources against a variety of traditionally targeted groups, such as blacks, women, and homosexuals. People also expect that discrimination, when it occurs, will be directed against the perpetrator's outgroups, on the basis of (for example) gender or age. Discrimination is also seen as most likely to be directed at anyone less empowered than the perpetrator; this disempowerment occurs especially when the stigma is perceived to be uncontrollable (Baron, Burgess, & Kao, 1991; Inman & Baron, 1996; Rodin et al., 1989, 1990; Rutte et al., 1994; but see Hartman, Hoogstraten, & Spruijtmetz, 1994).[5]

Thus, isms are most easily detected in aggregate, unconfounded data and scripted scenarios. Furthermore, one might expect members of targeted groups to have more sensitive scripts for sexism or racism, for example; results vary on this point, but some studies find supporting evidence (Inman & Baron, 1996). Regardless of group membership, the consensus about what constitutes discrimination is greater for high-intensity racial attacks (Wilson & Bennett, 1994) or more egregious sexual coercion (Burgess & Borgida, 1997).

Even when targets do detect racism, sexism, or the like, they may be reluctant to bring it up because of the social costs of accusing someone of being, for example, racist (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996; Feagin & Sikes, 1994). Work on sexual harassment indicates, too, that women are most likely to respond to the situation by telling no one and doing nothing (Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, 1995); endurance and denial are the most common responses, followed by problem solving in the forms of avoiding or appeasing the perpetrator and seeking social support. Complaining to the institution or confronting the perpetrator are exceedingly uncommon, precisely because of the social and organizational costs, which have been documented as considerable (Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, 1995). Moreover, labeling one's outcomes as due to other people's bias costs a great deal in perceived control; being a victim is famously disempowering. Yet when people, however reluctantly, do attribute negative feedback to prejudice, it may salvage their self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989; see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, in this *Handbook*).

### Summary

Perceivers find bias socially useful, first, because the categories fit a certain social context. The top three (race, gender, and age) are visually accessible, culturally meaningful, and interactionally relevant. Subtypes are particularly pragmatic because they maintain global stereotypes while admitting exceptions. The content of gender stereotypes is useful as a social construction that explains and justifies traditional divisions of labor, as well as structural and dyadic power arrangements. Race stereotypes, also a social construction, usefully perpetuate historic distributions of people into work roles and power roles, maintaining the status quo. (Age stereotypes may function differently, because people expect to change age categories in their lives.) Various stereotypes seem to create two pragmatic types of people, those who are liked but disrespected, and those who are respected but disliked; the pragmatics lie in maintaining the status quo of the one and staving off the threat of the other.

A second major way in which stereotypes might be useful is the degree to which they are true. The controversy around this issue has been structured somewhat by the delineation of different types of and criteria for accuracy. If stereotypes are not true, stereotype-confirming behavior can make them true. And certain stereotypes might be actuarially true, given common social roles. Stereotypes are most socially useful to perceivers if undetected or undisputed by targets.

## STEREOTYPING, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION CAN BE CONTROLLED BY INDIVIDUALS—OR MAYBE NOT?

The chapter so far has described the automatic aspects of bias (often categorization), and how bias can be socially useful. If stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are substantially automatic and if they are so pragmatic, then one is left with a dreary fatalism about the prospects for anything different. However, the social context drives the automatic aspects and the pragmatic utility of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. So far, then, most research fits the context-driven intellectual trends noted in the historical overview.

The remainder of the chapter examines how controllable these processes really are, first by the individual, and briefly in conclusion, by the collective. For the individual, some culprits might be sheer ignorance, bad faith, lousy moods, or character defects. For the collective, the chapter will just touch on social structural interventions.

### Sheer Ignorance: Lack of Information, or the Right Kind of Information

A student in a course on prejudice explained the racism of her country cousins by calling them "just such ignorant hicks." The implication, of course, is that people could overcome their ignorance if they tried.

Stereotyping of country folks aside, ignorance is the first cause of prejudice identified by most laypeople. "One of the oldest hypotheses in intergroup relations" (Stephan & Stephan, 1984, p. 229), the idea of ignorance as a cause of prejudice has been studied since the 1930s. Over the decades, the effects of interventions to reduce ignorance have been mixed. Propaganda (i.e., a direct effort at attitude change) preaches mainly to the converted, but curricula that stress group similarities often do educate, and multicultural education that stresses group differences can promote empathy and understanding. Stephan and Stephan propose and support a model whereby lack of contact allows ignorance, which promotes anxiety and frustration, assumed dissimilarity, and stereotyping, together leading to prejudice. Presumably, individuals might seek information to stave off this ignorance-to-prejudice process.

Most social psychological research since the 1970s has also assumed the importance of information or its lack.

This section presents a fine-grained analysis of kinds of information, stressing its diagnosticity (to be defined in terms of valence, consistency, and ambiguity) and perceived covariation (i.e., illusory correlation between category and behavior; situational covariation). Although this section on information use does not explicitly examine controllability, the question lurks in the background.

**Diagnosticity** People use information about group members that is *typically* diagnostic, even if it is not diagnostic for a particular judgment (Fein & Hilton, 1992). And people preferentially use information that accentuates differences between categories, presumably because it *seems* diagnostic, and that information then becomes stereotypic (Diehl & Jonas, 1991; Ford & Stangor, 1992; Krueger, 1991).

One general principle of diagnosticity concerns the valence of information. Positive and negative information demand asymmetrical processing (for a historical review, see Lewicka, Czapinski, & Peeters, 1992; for a recent selection, see "Positive-Negative Asymmetry," 1992). There seem to be two negativity effects. Negative information is especially informative, in part because it is rare and unexpected (Fiske, 1980; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972) and therefore carries more weight. Negative information in general preempts other perceptual processes and is detected automatically (Pratto & Oliver, 1991). Thus positive information carries less weight; each piece of positive information is less diagnostic than negative information would be (*cf.* Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992).

In addition, negative information, especially on the morality dimension, is also diagnostic because of an inferential asymmetry (Reeder & Brewer, 1979): A dishonest person can do honest things, but an honest person cannot do dishonest things without being reclassified (Martijn et al., 1992; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989, 1992). On other dimensions, such as abilities, positive information can be the more diagnostic; a person who sets the world record in the high jump once or who makes a Nobel Prize–winning discovery clearly has the commensurate ability, even if not able to do it every time. So a genius can do stupid things sometimes, but a stupid person cannot be a genius sometimes.

Studies of negativity and positivity have not focused on fit to positive and negative dimensions of stereotypes, so the interaction of these asymmetries with stereotypic expectations is not yet clear. Nevertheless, because outgroup stereotypes invariably contain a negative dimension, and often one concerning morality or honesty, as noted in the section on stereotype content, that negative content should be especially salient. Moreover, negative information is uniformly more threatening than is positive information. Given all this, people are unlikely to be able to control the diagnostic asymmetry of negative and positive information.

Another principle of diagnosticity is stereotype consistency. Stereotype-inconsistent information should be particularly diagnostic about the individual because it is not redundant with category membership (see Jones & McGillis, 1976, for a discussion of category-based versus target-based expectancies). Four major stereotype consistency effects emerge (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990):

1. *A stereotype, combined with mixed, stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information,* typically yields category-based judgments; in this case information is so mixed that perceivers can make of it what they will.
2. In contrast, *a stereotype, combined with uniformly inconsistent information,* yields recategorization or some other fairly individuated response; this information is so clearly diagnostic that perceivers would be hard put to stick with their original stereotypic category (Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Seta & Seta, 1993).

Between the first two extremes are the cases where information's perceived diagnosticity depends on the strength of the stereotype.

3. *A strong stereotype plus judgment-irrelevant, category-irrelevant information* allows perceivers to maintain their stereotypes; why should they change a well-established view in light of such weak information?
4. But *a weak stereotype, combined with judgment-irrelevant, category-irrelevant information,* surprisingly does dilute the stereotype, even though from a normative perspective, that kind of information should have no impact (De Dreu, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1995; Denhaerinck, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 1989).

Various factors could influence stereotype strength, including source credibility (Macrae, Shepherd, & Milne, 1992; Weisz & Jones, 1993) and how well developed the expectancy is (for reviews, see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Ruble & Stangor, 1986).

People use the diagnosticity of consistent and inconsistent information to create meaningful theories about a person's combination of category and attributes (Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993). Interpretation is easier when information is mixed or irrelevant, as just noted, or when information is inherently ambiguous and open to multiple understandings. Ambiguous information can be assimilated to stereotypes (Hilton & von Hippel, 1990; Nelson, Biernat, & Manis, 1990). And stereotypes themselves can be mutable standards; that is, a woman might be viewed as competent, "for a woman"—a standard different from that applied to men (Biernat & Manis, 1994; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Biernat, Vescio, & Manis, 1997; McGill, 1993). Both effects depend on the perceived objectivity or subjectivity of the stereotype and the associated information.

The judgment processes regarding diagnosticity may

not be open to individual control any more than are the memory biases that generally favor stereotype-matching information (reviewed earlier). But if control has any chance, it might seem to be in the ambiguous cases open to construal.

**Covariation** One form of information covariation depends on the perceived relative frequencies of co-occurrences of two kinds of information: category labels and other attributes. Illusory correlations are judgments that two variables are related when they are not. As a mechanism for the development of stereotyping, the most relevant example is minority status and negative behaviors: Both are distinctive in the larger context, so people especially attend to these rare events and later overestimate their co-occurrence. The effect is reliable (for a meta-analysis, see Mullen & Johnson, 1990; for reviews, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1989; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996) and may be based on distinctiveness at encoding (Johnson & Mullen, 1994; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994a, 1994b; for alternative accounts, see Fiedler, 1991; Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994 [forgetting]; McGarty et al., 1993 [accentuation]; for a discussion, see Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Also, illusory correlation depends on the perceiver's group membership; it may not occur for members of minority groups judging themselves (Schaller, 1991).

Another, more recently proposed type of misperceived correlation is the inability to perceive covariation between group membership and different, constraining social contexts. A normative judgment would involve covarying out the effect of context. People can use this strategy, but mainly if they are trained in analysis of covariance reasoning (Schaller, 1994; Schaller & O'Brien, 1992; Schaller et al., 1996).

**Controllability** This section has suggested that people use diagnostic information, defined here as differentiating groups, often with negative valence and stereotype consistency. Some types of perceived covariation also encourage stereotyping—for example, the co-occurrence of distinctive membership and distinctive attributes, which allows illusory correlation, and the inability to covary the effects of context. The jury is still out on people's ability to control these effects of perceived diagnosticity and covariation.

Ironically, the actual presence of information may not be crucial. The feeling of being informed, even without any information objectively present, may be sufficient to allow stereotypic judgment (Yzerbyt et al., 1994). What probably matters is people's own impressions of diagnosticity, configuration, and covariation, based on personal experience and group membership.

To what extent, then, is a person's use of information individually controllable? When the undergraduate dismissed her cousins as ignorant, she probably intended to blame them for not having enough information or the right kind of information, a lack she probably assumed they could remedy. When social cognition researchers describe people "using" information, they imply that the use is intentional. Yet people are not aware that they have a bias toward group-differentiating, negative, stereotype-confirming information, or paired distinctiveness. If they are unaware, how can they control these biases? With regard to cognitive biases, the issue of control, intent, and stereotyping is complex, but if people have a default mode (i.e., using subjectively diagnostic information), which they can demonstrably override, making the "hard choice" (i.e., not to stereotype) on at least some occasions, then laypeople, psychologists, and legal scholars describe them as having intent and control (Fiske, 1989). The next section takes up the motivational circumstances under which people can make the hard choice.

## Motivation: Good Intentions and Bad Faith

The section entitled "A Venerable History of Studying Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination," at the beginning of this chapter, reviewed several general models that incorporate goals and cognition (for references, see that section or Fiske, 1992, 1993b; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994). Included in that discussion were Kruglanski's and Ruble's models of general epistemology and motivation; the models of Brewer, of Fiske and Neuberg, and of Stangor and Ford, all contrasting two stereotyping modes, determined largely by motives; the goal-based models of Gollwitzer, of Hilton and Darley, and of Snyder, more oriented to behavior, but also contrasting two modes; and Yzerbyt, Leyens, and Schadron's model of when people feel able to judge at all, depending on goals and motives. Although crucially different, these models all contrast more and less open-minded strategies, as influenced by motives.

The litany of motives toward most or least effort, which guides the pragmatic social perceiver ("motivated tactician"), can be mind-numbing, until one frames such motives precisely in terms of social pragmatics—one potential framework among many, but a convenient one. Consider the possibility that people's core motivation is social survival: People's physical and psychological well-being depends on other people. Although multiple frameworks are possible, five basic motives identified by personality and social psychology over the years (Stevens & Fiske, 1995; also see Pittman, 1998, in this *Handbook*) summarize and extend the literature on motivation and stereotyping: belonging, understanding, controlling, self-enhancing, and trusting.

**Belonging** Belonging is a, if not the, core social motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). People need other people.

Being paired with another person to obtain outcomes that both people desire defines the elementary beginning of a social group. Such outcome dependency demonstrably undercuts stereotyping processes, by drawing on cognitive capacity to (1) increase attention to stereotype-discrepant information and (2) increase dispositional inferences to stereotype-discrepant information, as well as (3) to make impressions more idiosyncratic to the perceiver (Dépret & Fiske, 1996; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Goodwin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 1997; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Pendry & Macrae, 1994; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher et al., 1991; Snodgrass, 1992; Stevens & Fiske, 1996; for a review, see Fiske & Dépret, 1996). Sometimes, just anticipating interaction can cause people to ask more searching questions than otherwise (Johnston et al., 1994). This research presumes that the stereotype is negative and too simple; being accurate—in order to know, predict, and accommodate the other person—pragmatically suggests careful consideration of the other. This process breaks down under conditions of threat (see subsequent sections), but otherwise, when people need each other, they often go beyond their initial stereotypes (for a review of field research on interdependence, see Johnson, Johnson, & Maruyama, 1986).

Getting along with other people facilitates belonging. As noted earlier, when perceivers are motivated to get along, they do not behaviorally or perceptually confirm their negative stereotypes (Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Haugen, 1994). Conversely, when targets are motivated to get along, they do confirm the perceiver's expectations. The general principle is that each party tries to perpetuate the other's expectations, so as not to disrupt the interaction. Similarly, when motivated to have a pleasant interaction, participants express attitudes consistent with their partners' opinions (Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996), and when motivated to reach consensus, dyads focus on stereotypic information about a third party (Ruscher, Hammer, & Hammer, 1996). Essentially, when people try to get along and have a pleasant interaction, they try not to dispute each other's expectations—including stereotypes.

Belonging entails compliance with various norms, which can include going along with stereotypes, or can conversely include rejecting group stereotypes (for a discussion, see Mackie, Hamilton, et al., 1996). For example, sexual harassment is entirely predicted by a model that combines individual differences in the dispositional proclivity to sexually harass with perceived group norms about the permissibility of sexual harassment (Pryor, Geidd, & Williams, 1995). And hearing someone condemn or condone racism (implying the local norm) leads people to express more or less antiracist attitudes (Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Blanchard et al., 1994). Public compliance in writing an essay endorsing a pro-black policy costly to whites reduced white prejudices (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994); the ambivalent respond most to this social pressure. And socially skilled people use stereotyping or individuating processes, depending on what they think other people are doing (Fiske & Von Hendy, 1992)—i.e., what the norms are. People's perceptions of the operative norms and their attempts to comply or at least manage impressions of compliance, may describe what is currently meant by being politically correct (Barker, 1994).

Generic others lurk behind norms. Accountability (for a review, see Tetlock, 1992) to specific others has the same impact as adherence to norms. That is, people play the role of the careful, thorough decision maker, given no information about the audience (Pendry & Macrae, 1996), but they will shape their judgment processes to the intended audience if they know the audience's opinions beforehand (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). A variety of research identifies the need to belong as a moderator of people's stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination.

**Understanding** Besides anticipating others' views to enhance belonging, sheer accuracy of understanding appears to be an intrinsic motive, which also facilitates social survival. As part of a shared meaning system, people have to understand each other's personality and knowledge (see Gilbert, 1998, and Krauss & Chiu, 1998, both in this *Handbook*). Sometimes, understanding is also motivated by curiosity or personal integrity. Whatever the ultimate origins, a motive for accurate understanding encourages individuating processes (Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987) and systematic processing (Chen, Schechter, & Chaiken, 1996). In addition to instructions to be accurate, fear of invalidity can be increased by the extent to which the judgment is important to self and others; then people can be more careful (Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988). People high in need for cognition (for a review, see Petty & Wegener, 1998, in this *Handbook*) may have a more chronic motive for accuracy, because they tend to process information more systematically. People self-consciously trying to be scientific also operate in a more data-driven, less categorical mode (Zukier & Pepitone, 1984).

**Controlling** Accuracy may take a backseat when people are pushed to be decisive and in control. Need for closure (for a review, see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) and personal need for structure (Neuberg, Judice & West, 1997; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Schaller et al., 1995) arguably cause people to use more stereotypic, simplistic impressions. Both urgency (decisiveness) and permanence (fixedness) of the decision theoretically underlie need for closure. Preference for order, preference for predictability, and discomfort with ambiguity are the most replicable dimensions, along with, more weakly, closed-mindedness.

Order, predictability, and ambiguity have situational analogs. For example, a communication goal forces people to be organized, coherent, and committed to their communication (Zajonc, 1960; for reviews, see Fiske, 1993b; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). And a communication set encourages the use of stereotypic information (Hoffman, Mischel, & Baer, 1984). A goal of getting to know another person's dispositions (Snyder, 1992) similarly causes perceivers to focus on structured, coherent, categorical expectations.

By itself, time pressure increases the cost of being indecisive (for reviews, see Fiske, 1993b; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Time pressure can increase discrimination (Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitajzen, 1985; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), as can the pressure to implement a decision (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). All these enhance control motives and stereotyping.

Being effective and in control also comes into play in people's use of interpersonal power, when power is defined as the control of others' outcomes (for a review, see Dépret & Fiske, 1993). People given power over others can maintain it by relying on stereotypic information and ignoring counterstereotypic information; any inaccuracy is less costly for them than for the powerless (Fiske, 1993a; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin & Fiske, 1996; Goodwin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 1997), and they can bring about the very outcomes they expect (Claire & Fiske, 1997; Copeland, 1994). Sometimes, people in power use stereotypes merely because they are rushed (Esper & Fiske, 1996).

Structure, order, time pressure, and control all relate to being effective within the constraints of an unruly environment. And all potentially encourage stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.

In contrast, major deprivation of perceived control—that is, a lack of contingency between one's own efforts and changes in the environment—undermines an array of well-being, from mood to longevity (for reviews, see Deci & Ryan, 1987; Chapter 5 in Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Control-deprived perceivers seem acutely aware of the importance of control, and they form more detailed, effortful, and data-driven impressions (Pittman & D'Agostino, 1989; for reviews, see Pittman, 1998, in this *Handbook*; Pittman & Heller, 1987). Apart from the work on interdependence just noted, this area cries out for more research directly relevant to intergroup bias. The relationship of lost control to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination seems apparent: Many of the relevant individual differences contain an important element of felt loss of control and effectiveness. Loss of control contrasts with the motivational effects of maintaining control.

**Self-enhancing** Self-esteem is often proposed as a panacea for the downtrodden, but ironically, there may be less evidence for its uplifting effect than for its role in treading on others (see Baumeister, 1998, in this *Handbook*). People's efforts to protect their personal self-esteem can lead them to be more aggressive (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996), and people whose collective high self-esteem is threatened are most likely to discriminate (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), as noted earlier, posits that positive identity results from intergroup perception favoring the ingroup, which often entails at least relatively disadvantaging the outgroup (see Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*). Under threat, the individuating effects of interdependence, just reviewed, break down (Dépret & Fiske, 1996; Stevens & Fiske, 1996). And being insecure or anxious enhances stereotyping (Fiske, Morling, & Stevens, 1996; Stephan & Stephan, 1984; Wilder & Shapiro, 1989a, 1989b). Thus, self-esteem maintenance can require outgroup derogation.

Nevertheless, as noted earlier, an entire class of racism theories is predicated on people's maintenance of a nonracist self-image. These theories provide an opposite role for self-esteem in outgroup derogation. Specifically, aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), racial ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988), and modern racism (McConahay & Hough, 1976) all presuppose that self-esteem can depend on an unprejudiced self-concept. The Modern Sexism (Swim et al., 1995) and Neo-Sexism (Tougas et al., 1995) scales extend the analysis to gender, and the Anti-Fat Attitudes Questionnaire extends the analysis to obesity (Crandall, 1994). Some have argued that the measures of subtle racism confound prejudice with traditional values, but the theories of subtle racism explicitly *include* conservative values (Nosworthy, Lea, & Lindsay, 1995; Wood, 1994; see also references in the earlier section entitled "Subtle Racism"). All these theories rely on self-esteem as stemming from expression of values.

More explicit emphasis on values related to personal and collective self-esteem informs Altemeyer's (1981, 1988) right-wing authoritarianism scale, also reviewed earlier. With its focus on conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression, this scale arguably represents "an intense (and insecure) identification with one or more important social groups (usually national, ethnic, tribal, or societal) and a consequent emphasis on and demand for group cohesion" (Duckitt, 1992b, p. 210). The demand for group cohesion (belonging and social survival, in the current framework) takes the form of subordinating the individual to the group's values. Individuals high in authoritarianism are prejudiced against outgroups because the outgroups are seen to violate important symbolic beliefs, blocking cherished values associated with ingroup membership (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). People whose values are high in authoritarianism derive those values largely from their parents (Rohan & Zanna, 1996), and they may then use these values to justify their attitudes and rationalize their preju-

dices (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994), maintaining their positive personal and collective sense of self.

**Trusting** As reviewed earlier, people often notice negative information, perhaps because it is relatively unexpected and therefore informative. People prefer to view other individuals in a positive way (Sears, 1983), stereotypes notwithstanding. Preferring the positive and alerting to the negative (perhaps to manage it) fit with the idea that people are motivated to see the world, and especially other individuals, as benevolent. They are motivated to trust.

People seem especially likely to view in a positive light those individuals who are close (see also Berscheid & Reis, 1998, in this *Handbook*): the ingroup (as predicted by social identity theory), team partners (Darley & Berscheid, 1967; Heider, 1946, 1958; Klein & Kunda, 1992), evaluators (Pepitone, 1950; Stevens & Fiske, 1996), and actual or would-be romantic partners (Berscheid et al., 1976; Goodwin et al., 1994; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). Because outgroup members are excluded from these types of associations, one might assume that they are excluded from the motivation to see the world as benevolent. The field could use more explicit research on trust and its interplay with bias.

**Limits to Motivational Control** The idea that good intentions and bad faith can influence stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination underlies much of the work on the motives of belonging, understanding, controlling, self-enhancing, and trusting. Yet the work on automaticity, reviewed earlier, limits this optimism. Mental contamination—defined as an unwanted response, based on unconscious or uncontrollable processing—results when people are unaware of their mental processes and have incorrect theories about their biases (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). When people deliberately try to control their stereotypes, the stereotypes can rebound with doubled force (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1996; Macrae et al., 1994; Wegner, 1994). For example, attempts to inhibit stereotypic descriptions (in writing about a skinhead) resulted in more pejorative reactions to a subsequent member of the same category, as measured by the stereotypicality of a second essay; greater seating distance; and faster reaction times to stereotypic traits (Macrae et al., 1994). And people who are intentionally trying to forget stereotypic memories, when their attention is overloaded, then recollect the very stereotypic material they were trying to forget (Macrae et al., 1997). This rebound effect (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998, in this *Handbook,* for a review) indicates that stereotypic categories, once activated, are difficult to control.

Explicit efforts to motivate accuracy sometimes fail (Nelson, Acker, & Manis, 1996; Nelson, Biernat, & Manis, 1990; Snyder, Campbell, & Preston, 1982) and sometimes work, depending in part on available resources (Blair & Banaji, 1996) and type of causal thinking (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Good intentions, then, ameliorate yet do not cure stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. But bad faith clearly abets these phenomena.

## Mood

As noted earlier, prejudiced emotions and evaluations are integral to stereotyping and discrimination, although prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination each can also occur independently. Until recently, the important links of affect to stereotyping occurred mostly in analyses of individual differences. But in the 1990s, affect has come to the fore as a situational independent variable, most particularly in studies of mood effects on stereotyping. In keeping with multiprocess models of affect effects (Petty & Wegener, 1998, in this *Handbook*), mood operates on stereotyping in two major ways (Forgas, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). Both good and bad moods, relative to neutral moods, can increase stereotyping, and the manner depends on processing effort.

**Low-Effort Processing** Stereotypes can serve as heuristics. And when mood constrains processing, people do use stereotypes as heuristics (Bodenhausen, 1993). Mood affects stereotyping in ways that constrain processing. Happiness encourages least-effort strategies, because happy people like to conserve effort, but they can, if motivated, think harder and abandon stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994). Similarly, when group membership is not relevant (and thus motivation to think about it is low), people are likely to operate in a heuristic, rapid mode, and positive moods enhance this type of heuristic, categorical processing (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). In one study, when group relevance was low, participants who had watched "happy" videos discriminated in favor of their ingroup more than did those who had just watched neutral or "sad" videos. Positive moods also can increase judgments of outgroup homogeneity and stereotypicality (for a review, see Mackie, Queller, et al., 1996).

Encouraging the use of heuristics in a different way, some types of mood—for example, anger—can overwhelm people's mental capacity. That is, being angry can rob a person of capacity and inclination to think thoroughly; in contrast, being sad might not always drain capacity (Bodenhausen, 1993), depending on the depth and origin of the sadness. Empirically, anger enhances stereotyping, whereas sadness does not necessarily differ from neutral moods (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer 1994). Consistent with the idea that moods intervene under capacity constraints, people with intense moods show stronger mood effects on attitudes (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1994). Also consistent with the capacity constraint idea, people who have been assaulted by white noise then stereotype only if

given low-effort materials, such as a stereotypic label plus ambiguous, neutral information, but do not stereotype if given effort-inducing atypical information (Paulhus, Martin, & Murphy, 1992).

Anxiety seems to be another negative feeling state that constrains processing and encourages stereotyping. For example, anxiety undermines people's appreciation of an outgroup member who is a favorable exception to a negative stereotype (for a review, see Wilder, 1993). And anxiety can interfere with people's good-hearted attempts to interact successfully with people different from themselves (Devine & Vasquez-Suson, 1998). The anxiety can be damaging whether it is incidental to the encounter (one happens to be awaiting dental surgery) or integral to the perceiver's image of the outgroup member (the dentist is a Nazi) (Wilder & Simon, 1996).

A phenomenon possibly related to low-effort mood effects—particularly anxiety—is the salience of one's own mortality. Temporarily confronting one's own death has effects similar to those of negative mood—it increases prejudice, nationalism, and intergroup bias (Greenberg et al., 1994)—and this effect apparently operates when mortality is accessible but not conscious, which fits a low-effort or heuristic analysis. According to terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1990; see Pittman, 1998, in this *Handbook,* for a review), mortality salience increases ingroup attraction—namely, to those who validate one's beliefs—and also increases bias against outgroups; these effects hold especially for individuals high in authoritarianism, again highlighting the role of threat-induced prejudice for this group.

In sum, then, happiness encourages least-effort processing, anger steals capacity, anxiety debilitates thinking, and mortality salience can increase stereotyping—all apparently through low-effort strategies.

**High-Effort Processing** Mood can have a different sort of impact—namely, increasing the associations and interpretations formed under high-effort, systematic processing. For example, when group membership is relevant, people engage systematic processes, and negative stereotypes result from slower, more motivated thinking (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). Moreover, negative mood can affect the active generation of information (Fiedler, 1990). Further evidence for the role of mood in effortful processing comes from perceptions of atypical group members, who elicit systematic processing: Mood-primed associations influence perceptions of atypical more than typical group members (Forgas, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b).

Negative moods may not operate by changing what is accessible in memory, for mood intervenes only if people already possess negative stereotypes about an outgroup (Esses & Zanna, 1995). Negative moods can instead change the meaning of existing information (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993, 1994). How people interpret the unemployment of an immigrant, for example, might differ depending on mood—eliciting blame for a negative characteristic in one case and sympathy for a challenging struggle in the other.

So far, all the cited mood effects have involved the application of existing stereotypes. Besides the use of stereotypes, the formation of stereotypes may require capacity, for mood can wipe out processing needed for some types of stereotype formation. For instance, mood can take up mental space, eliminating illusory correlation effects (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 1993; Mackie, Queller, et al., 1996; Stroessner, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992). Thus, for processes that require some capacity, mood may have opposite effects on stereotype formation and stereotype use.

### Summary

This section has posed the question of people's ability to control their stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. As usual, most of the recent evidence pertains to stereotyping, and the news is both good and bad. The bad news is that people's habitual use of subjectively diagnostic information, certain information configurations, and perceived covariation sustains stereotypes. Various motivations, which safeguard ingroup membership, exacerbate stereotyping of outgroups and favor the ingroup. Happy, angry, and anxious moods all encourage stereotyping.

The good news is that people can sometimes control even apparently automatic biases, if appropriately motivated, given the right kind of information, and in the right mood. People therefore *can* make the hard choice.

## SOCIAL STRUCTURE HAS AN IMPACT, SO IS IT THE SYSTEM?

Since the field's inception, social psychologists have studied stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, and these phenomena dog society into the twenty-first century. Some of the persistence has cognitive causes: Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination clearly profit from context-driven processes such as categorization, which can be automatic, as this chapter has documented at length. Other reasons also lie in the social context: Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination can be socially useful, given the nature of the categories and the ways in which people make them true. The last section addressed how and when individual people control their stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, depending on information, motivation, and mood. Before concluding, though, it seems important to note briefly the larger societal context that controls these phenomena.

Social cognitive approaches to stereotyping looked at the person as an isolated individual politely unconscious of group identity, with a color-blind (group-blind) ideal. In contrast, social identity and self-categorization approaches looked at groups in conflict, focusing on the struggling minority and the subjective reality of the group (Fiske & Leyens, 1997). These two approaches are converging, as social cognition researchers take social motivation and social pragmatics more seriously, and as self-categorization and social identity theorists reacknowledge cognitive underpinnings. Because this chapter has focused more on the social cognitive approaches (Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*, covering the other), a few brief thoughts on structural impact can address factors for future consideration.

Social psychologists have long considered the social conditions for successful intergroup contact, as noted earlier. Allport's (1954) ideas about the necessary social structure (equal status, under common goals, institutionally supported) have been supported (Miller & Brewer, 1984; Pettigrew, 1998). But only since the mid-1980s have social psychologists investigated other social interventions, such as affirmative action (Blanchard & Crosby, 1989; Pettigrew & Martin, 1987; Turner & Pratkanis, 1994). And other aspects of social structure still warrant research attention. Social psychological research can help (1) remedy the "pipeline" problem of getting and keeping underrepresented groups involved in training; (2) contribute to the mentoring and sponsorship processes that nurture newcomers and outsiders; (3) examine perceivers' and targets' perceptions that contribute to the experience of the "glass ceiling"; (4) identify organizational culture and interpersonal incentives that allow people who feel different to live together in tolerance of, or maybe even enthusiasm for, those differences; and (5) facilitate coping by victims of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, at the levels of both organization (Fiske & Glick, 1995) and person (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996).

## CONCLUSION

Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are too much with us. Yet the combined efforts of generations of social psychologists have generated much insight—humbling in its volume and wisdom, intimidating in its challenges. As the field moves into the twenty-first century, the automatic aspects of stereotyping and possibly prejudice and discrimination are evident. Their social pragmatics are also evident. Both cognitive functions and social pragmatics explain why these phenomena persist. Individual control is difficult, but possible. And social structures demonstrably can create the contexts that enable and encourage both individual and collective control, for whatever society determines to be the greater good.

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## NOTES

1. Unlike the chapter on intergroup relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998, in this *Handbook*)—which focuses explicitly on intergroup contexts, thus allowing more emphasis on behavior—the current concern is explicitly individual processes that contribute to category-based cognition, affect, and behavior. As accumulated research indicates, perceiving a group differs critically from perceiving a person (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Sedikides, Insko, & Schopler, 1997), so the need for two chapters will be apparent. This chapter also differs from related chapters on gender (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998, in this *Handbook*) and social development (Ruble & Goodnow, 1998, in this *Handbook*), which include some material on, respectively, gender and age stereotypes. The current chapter examines basic stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination processes more generally; however, for reasons soon to become apparent, the content will focus on race, gender, and age. Excluded from this chapter is a discussion of the identity-related implications for the targets of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, a topic covered elsewhere, in the chapter on social stigma (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, in this *Handbook*).
2. In a similar vein, but on the basis of different theoretical premises, Linville and Jones (1980) proposed that blacks elicit polarized responses from whites.
3. The Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory (noted in Glick & Fiske, 1997) assesses the same dimensions of power, gender roles, and heterosexuality, but focuses on women's attitudes toward men, including hostile and

benevolent versions of each: maternalism versus resentment of paternalism, complementary versus compensatory gender differentiation, and heterosexual intimacy versus hostility.

4. For this point about threat, I am indebted to Deborah Prentice.
5. Consistent with the script idea, generic judgments of societal discrimination are increased by primed exemplars of successful, likable group members not singled out as atypical (Bodenhausen et al., 1995). The constant presence of women in people's lives (and the concomitant priming of likable outgroup members) may help account for the general perception of greater societal barriers for women than for blacks (Smith & Kluegel, 1984).

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