



OXFORD JOURNALS
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Where You Come From or Where You Live? Examining the Cultural and Institutional Explanation of Generalized Trust Using Migration as a Natural Experiment

Author(s): Peter Thisted Dinesen

Source: *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (FEBRUARY 2013), pp. 114-128

Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23357109>

Accessed: 04-03-2019 14:26 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23357109?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *European Sociological Review*

Where You Come From or Where You Live? Examining the Cultural and Institutional Explanation of Generalized Trust Using Migration as a Natural Experiment

Peter Thisted Dinesen

Abstract: By utilizing the natural experiment of migration, this article attempts to answer whether generalized trust in other people is the result of cultural heritage or institutional quality. Looking at immigrants having migrated from a broad range of countries of origin to destination countries in Western Europe, I examine how their generalized trust is affected by the culture of their country of origin (in terms of the level of trust of this country) as well as institutional quality in the country they have migrated to (in terms of freedom from corruption). The results show that controlling for confounding variables, both factors have a highly significant impact on trust and hence that generalized trust appears to have both cultural and institutional foundations.

Introduction

Generalized trust in other people concerns our beliefs about the generalized other when no specific information exists (Rotter, 1980: p. 4; Yamagishi, 2001: pp. 123, 124 and 144; Sønderskov, 2008: pp. 17 and 18). In this regard—and from being inherently social—it differs from political trust, which tends to be based more on concrete evaluations of government performance (Uslaner, 2002). Similarly, by not being based on personal knowledge of the trusted, generalized trust differs in nature from ‘thicker’ forms of trust in people whom we have prior knowledge about such as our colleagues, friends, and family (Bahry *et al.*, 2005). Finally, generalized trust differs from trust in specific ethnic and social groups by being more general and unconditional in nature and hence holds greater potential for promoting cooperation and various desirable outcomes (Uslaner, 2008a). As Putnam (1993) argued in his classic book ‘Making Democracy Work’, civic virtues such as generalized trust underpin the well-functioning of democracy and it has been shown empirically that societies with high levels of generalized trust experience better government, have higher economic growth and are more capable of solving collective action dilemmas (Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack, 2002; Tavits, 2006; Sønderskov,

2008, 2009). Similarly, individual-level evidence shows that trusters are more tolerant, more likely to make donations to charity and more frequent joiners of common interest associations (Uslaner, 2002; Nannestad, 2007). In short, generalized trust in others promotes democratic government and other desirable collective outcomes and consequently we should try to understand how it is formed.

One central debate in the expanding literature on the causes of generalized trust has been the question of whether trust is mainly a cultural trait passed on from one generation to the next or rather the result of living in a context of fair and impartial institutions. However, distinguishing between the two explanations is difficult empirically as a culture of trust to a large extent coincides with fair and impartial institutions. While the problem of distinguishing between the cultural and institutional roots of trust prevails in studies focusing on people who grew up and are presently living in the same context, it can be overcome by analysing immigrants who are born in a different country than where they are presently living. In this case, the culture internalized at an early age is not related to the institutional context experienced later on. This is the logic applied in this article, which analyses immigrants in a number of Western European countries utilizing the European

Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark. Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark. Email: ptd@sam.sdu.dk

© The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. Submitted: April 2010; revised: May 2011; accepted: May 2011.

Social Survey in which the country of origin of each immigrant can be identified. Hence, the main contribution of this article lies in contrasting the role of cultural heritage and institutional context in explaining generalized trust.

Previous research has shown that the level of trust of the country of origin is associated with trust of immigrants or their children and grandchildren (Rice and Feldman, 1997; Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, 2007; Uslaner, 2008b). While this is an important and striking finding, other factors may also play a part in forming trust of immigrants, and previous research has shown that the institutional context is a likely candidate (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). If institutions also matter for generalized trust, we would expect the institutional context of the destination country of immigrants to matter for their level of trust in other people. By looking at a number of different destination countries, the present study diverges from earlier studies, which have kept the institutional context of the destination country of immigrants constant by examining only one destination country. As a consequence of this design, variation in the institutional context of the destination country exists, hence, it is possible to examine the role of the institutional surroundings in forming trust of immigrants.

In the following, I first present the two alternative theories of trust; the cultural and the institutional explanation. Then I elaborate further on the design of the study. Subsequently, the relevant control variables are presented before turning to the description of the data and the measures employed in the analysis. Then I present the empirical results before discussing the findings and drawing a conclusion.

The Foundations of Trust: Cultural Versus Institutional Explanations

The distinction between cultural and institutional explanations of generalized trust has emerged as one of the central dividing lines in the literature on the causes of trust. The cultural explanation focuses on the stability of trust, which is seen as a durable cultural trait passed on from parents to their children through socialization during childhood. Conversely, the institutional explanation claims that institutions, by providing transparency of the actions of others, exhibiting important behavioural norms and giving way to positive experiences of being treated fair and equally, can lay the foundation of a trustful relationship between citizens.

The cultural perspective on trust dates back at least to the work of Almond and Verba (1963) and gained

renewed momentum with Robert Putnam's (1993) seminal book 'Making Democracy Work'. In the book, Putnam argued that trust forms an integral part of the broader concept of social capital, which he found to be a persistent cultural feature dating back centuries in Italy. As a consequence, the southern regions in Italy, historically deprived of social capital and trust, are still to this day lagging behind their northern counterparts in these civic virtues. In recent years, Eric Uslaner has been the main proponent of the cultural perspective on trust, arguing that trust is founded early in life primarily through parental socialization of optimism and that it remains largely stable throughout life and over generations (Uslaner, 2002, 2008b). Hence, in this perspective, trust is a part of our cultural heritage, which is transmitted from one generation to the next (Uslaner, 2002; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). In essence, this means that a cultural heritage founded long ago still has profound consequences for the trust of individuals to this day. Empirically the cultural perspective has found considerable support in studies showing a high degree of stability in trust over time across nations (Bjørnskov, 2006) as well as over the life course of individuals (Claibourn and Martin, 2000). Moreover, empirical studies have shown a significant transmission of trust from parents to their children (Uslaner, 2002; Dohmen *et al.*, 2006; Guiso Sapienza and Zingales, 2008) thereby testifying to the underlying mechanism at the individual level posited to account for the stability in trust by the cultural perspective. Finally, some of the strongest support in favour of the cultural perspective is the finding that the level of trust of various ethnic groups in the United States to a large extent tracks the levels of trust of the home countries of their grandparents like mentioned earlier (Rice and Feldman, 1997; Tabellini, 2008; Uslaner, 2008b). However, while the cultural thesis appears to have strong support in the American context, the results from Canada are not as unequivocal. Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, (2007) show a strong relationship between immigrants' present-day trust and the level of trust in their home country, but no equivalent relationship between the trust of the home country of the respondents' parents and the respondents' present-day trust. Hence, other factors appear to wash out the long-term influence of cultural heritage on trust in the Canadian context. This shows that while trust may to some extent be culturally inherited and sticky, it is still subject to change under certain conditions—at least in some contexts. This raises the question about which factors contribute to the washing out of the effect of cultural heritage.

Uslaner (2008b) suggests that experiences in terms of the ethnic composition of the context in which people

live may matter for trust. The assumption is that trusting people display more trustworthiness and hence living among high-trust groups may 'rub off' and generate trust among groups who were initially less-trusting. Uslaner only finds limited empirical support for this claim as only the fraction of a state's population being of (traditionally high-trusting) British or German descent has a positive impact on trust at the individual level for out-groups (i.e. for people with a different ethnicity than German or British). While the ethnic composition of the context in which one lives may not be of great importance, other features of this context may well matter for generalized trust. In this regard, the institutional quality of this context seems a likely candidate as institutional accounts of generalized trust have gained prominence in recent years (Levi, 1996; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). The features of institutions which have been shown to be most consistently (positively) associated with generalized trust are procedural fairness, incorruptibility and impartiality, or in short; freedom from corruption (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; You, 2005; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). Compared to fair and impartial institutions, corrupt institutions are less credible in enforcing law and order and hence provide weaker incentives for trustworthy behaviour. Knowing that the expected costs of engaging in untrustworthy behaviour are lower will raise the costs of trusting other people (Levi, 1996; You, 2005). Corrupt institutions are also more likely to give way to negative experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment, which is likely to increase suspicion about the motives of other people and consequently decrease trust in the generalized other (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Corrupt institutions are manifested at the individual level in the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats and people's perceptions of institutional fairness are formed through experiences with these officials including policemen, doctors and tax officials. As representatives of institutions, these officials exhibit important behavioural norms that citizens use as a yardstick for the moral stock of the general population. If street-level bureaucrats, who are supposed to administer and implement the law in an unbiased way, do not themselves follow the rules that they administer, it sends the signal that they cannot be trusted. Moreover, as people tend to infer from representatives of institutions to people in general, this also implies that other people in general are not to be trusted (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Rothstein and Eek, 2009; Dinesen, P. T. Submitted for publication). Hence, when people experience discrimination and unfair treatment by street-level bureaucrats, they will reason according to the logic presented above and conclude that institutional

fairness is low and, consequently, that most people cannot be trusted. Empirically, the predicted association between freedom from corruption and trust is well documented (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; You, 2005). The problem is, however, that the direction of causality is not clear and remains debated (Uslaner, 2009). In other words, how do we know, in cross-sectional analysis, that it is freedom from corruption that furthers generalized trust and not the other way around. Below I present a design, which, by exploiting the natural experiment of migration, attempts to circumvent this problem.

Design

To examine the impact of institutional quality on generalized trust, one would ideally randomly assign one group of individuals to live in a specific institutional context, while at the same time assigning another comparable group to live in another institutional context. In this case, we would contribute any difference in generalized trust after living in different institutional contexts to different institutional experiences. Such an experiment is obviously not possible and as a consequence, one has to resort to other means for analysing the relationship between institutional quality and trust. In this regard, the process of immigration provides a natural experiment in the sense that variation in institutional context is induced when immigrants move to different countries and thus, institutional contexts. This provides an opportunity for examining if this variation in the institutional context of the destination country has an impact on trust. If the institutional context matters for trust, we would expect that having migrated to a country with little corruption would be more conducive to generalized trust than having migrated to a country where corruption is widespread. Two previous studies have applied the natural experiment of immigration when examining the effect of institutional quality on trust of immigrants. Nannestad and Svendsen (2005) find that mean differences in institutional quality between the country of origin and the destination country track differences in trust between immigrants and people living in their country of origin. This is seen as an argument in favour of the role of the institutional context in shaping trust. In contrast to this approach, which examines aggregate changes in institutional quality and trust, Bagno (2006) compares differences in trust at the individual level for Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Germany and Israel to that of Jews in Ukraine. She finds that Jewish immigrants in Germany display significantly higher levels of trust than that of Jews in Ukraine,

which also supports the notion that individuals' trust in others remains open to changes in context. Like in the study by Bagno, this article also focuses on the individual level, but differs in examining a much larger number of immigrants in a multitude of destination countries. Exploiting this variation in destination countries, allows for a much more fine-grained analysis of the role of institutional context compared to studies only looking at one or a few destination countries. Furthermore, the inclusion of a multitude of destination countries allows for an assessment of alternative explanations of generalized trust at the level of the destination country.

Like in earlier analyses in the North American context, the level of trust of the home country is linked to each immigrant in the present analysis. This is done in order to examine the impact of the level of trust of the country of origin on present-day trust of immigrants. In accordance with the Canadian study (Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, 2007), but in contrast to two of the American studies, which only look at a limited number of groups (Rice and Feldman, 1997; Uslaner, 2008b), the level of trust in the home country is linked to each immigrant for a large number of countries of origin. In contrast to Rice and Feldman (1997), trust data from the home country of immigrants stemming from non-European countries are also included. This results in greater variation in the level of trust of the country of origin and hence provides greater leverage in examining the impact of this variable on present day trust of immigrants. Furthermore, in contrast to the study by Uslaner (2008b), data are not pooled for a number of countries (e.g. collapsing Eastern Europeans into one category), thereby avoiding the risk of differences in trust between countries of origin disappearing after aggregation.

The Potential Problem of Self-selection

While exploiting the variation in institutional context induced by the process of immigration provides a way of circumventing the problem of reverse or bidirectional causality typically experienced in traditional cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between corruption and trust, this relationship may be confounded by another problem, namely that of self-selection. For the process of immigration to constitute a natural experiment well-suited for examining the effect of the culture of the home country and institutional context of the destination country on trust, it hinges on the assumption that immigrants with certain levels of trust are not self-selected into certain destination countries. This problem occurs if the backgrounds of immigrants differ; both between countries of origin and between

destination countries. This would for example be the case if immigrants from one country of origin are mainly highly educated, while immigrants from another country of origin have only little education (e.g. the difference between Indian doctors or engineers and low-skilled Turkish workers). If such differences exist, we would expect the relationship between the level of trust in the country of origin and immigrants' present day trust to be biased. Similarly, if the composition of immigrants differ between destination countries, e.g. if more trusting immigrants choose to migrate to countries where freedom from corruption is more widespread, it will appear that the latter has caused the high level of trust, while this may in fact only be the result of self-selection of immigrants. Although it is difficult to rule out the risk of self-selection completely, I try to circumvent this problem by taking into account the different backgrounds of immigrants in terms of education, which has proven to be one of the most important predictors of trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007). Stratifying immigrants according to their level of education and matching them with the level of trust of the similarly educated group in their home country, we get a more precise indication of their cultural background and avoid the risk that our results are biased by educational differences and concomitant pre-migration trust differences between immigrants.

Summing up, the question of whether trust has primarily cultural or institutional foundations has been difficult to answer empirically as a trustful culture and institutional quality are very tightly connected. In this article, I try to circumvent this problem of indeterminacy of the causes of trust by looking at immigrants, who hold the cultural background of their country of origin, while living in the institutional setting of the country they have migrated to. The question is now to which extent trust carries over from the immigrants' country of origin and is formed by the institutional context they presently live in.

Controls

In order to secure that the relationship between each of the independent variables and trust is not spurious, a host of control variables at both the individual and country level are included in the analysis. The control variables at the individual level are included to make sure that the impact of the independent variables, which are measured at the level of the country of origin and the destination country respectively, cannot be attributed to differences in individual-level characteristics between immigrants coming from and living in different

countries. Resources in general and education in particular, have been shown to be among the strongest and most consistent predictors of trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Pickles and Savage, 2005; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007; Li,) and, therefore, I include measures of education, employment and feelings about own income in the estimated model of trust. The latter measure of income was chosen due to non-response on the question regarding the respondents' objective income. Religion and religiosity have also been shown to be associated with trust in some analyses (Whiteley, 1999; Uslaner, 2002) and therefore, I include indicators of the religious denomination that the respondents indicate to belong to as well as a measure of how religious they consider themselves to be. Optimism and civic engagement in terms of participation in organizations and associations are also included, though the direction of causality between these factors and trust is still debated (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Claibourn and Martin, 2000; Stolle, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2008; Sønderskov, Submitted for publication). While the effect of these, potentially, endogenous variables on trust may be biased, they are included to increase confidence that the relationship between the independent variables and trust is not spurious. As the duration of stay in the destination country may alter the level of trust of immigrants, or, alternatively, that people migrating at different points in time may have different pre-migration levels of trust, I also include a measure of when each immigrant came to live in the destination country. Moreover, the standard demographic variables, gender and age (and age squared) are also included in the model. Finally, as data on immigrants from the first three waves of the European Social Survey are pooled, I also include a dummy for the round of the survey that a given respondent participated in, in order to control for differences between the three waves.

While the institutional quality of the destination country in terms of freedom from corruption represents one plausible explanation of trust of immigrants, other factors in the destination country may play a role as well. Including these factors in the analysis is necessary to avoid the relationship between freedom from corruption in the destination country and trust of immigrants being spurious. In earlier analyses of trust not restricted to immigrants, a Protestant cultural heritage, ethnic conflict and economic inequality have been shown to influence trust (see Uslaner, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005; You, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2008; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).¹ Consequently, I also examine the impact of these factors on trust of immigrants and the expectation is that arriving as an immigrant in a (trustful) Protestant

culture, with little ethnic or social conflict, is likely to be conducive to one's trust in others.

In addition to the control variables at the destination country level, I also include a measure of the level of trust in the destination country equivalent to that employed for the level of trust of the country of origin of immigrants. As argued by Dinesen and Hooghe (2010), the association between the aggregate level of trust of the destination country and present-day trust of immigrants at the individual level can be seen as an indication about the extent to which immigrants tend to adapt to the level of trust in their new country. In other words, the stronger the association between the aggregate level of trust of the destination country and trust of immigrants at the individual level, the more immigrants are considered to acculturate to the culture of trust of the destination country. Moreover, including the measure of trust of the destination country also allows for an analysis of the extent to which freedom from corruption in the destination country context contributes to the adaptation to the level of trust of this country among immigrants. This is done by examining the extent to which inclusion of the measure of freedom from corruption in the destination country context reduces the association between the level of trust of the destination country and trust of immigrants at the individual level.

Data and Measures

The data set consists of self-indicated immigrants in the three first rounds of European Social Survey (ESS). In order to secure comparability between the immigrants in the survey, I look exclusively at immigrants in Western European destination countries (defined as the EU-15, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland). While especially some of the countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia hold large numbers of immigrants in the survey, it turns out that most of the 'immigrants' in these destination countries in reality are born in present-day countries that were formerly part of the same united countries (e.g. Russians in Estonia and Latvia). Since many of these people arguably only became 'immigrants' after the division of their initial home country, it is highly questionable whether they can be counted as immigrants in the sense that they migrated from one country to another and it seems more appropriate to leave them out of the analysis.² After this demarcation of the group of destination countries, the initial sample ends up consisting of a total of 6,522 immigrants surveyed in one of 18 Western European destination countries.³

The dependent variable, generalized trust, is gauged using the standard question 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?', which is measured on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 to 10 with 0 being 'You can't be too careful' and 10 being 'Most people can be trusted'.⁴

In the survey, the respondents were asked to indicate their country of origin and on the basis of this indication it is possible to link data from this country to each respondent. The first independent variable, the level of trust in the country of origin of each immigrant, is measured by the fraction of people in the country of origin answering that 'most people can be trusted' in the dichotomous version of the same question used to measure the dependent variable. The trust data for the country of origin are calculated from the collapsed file of all waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) and European Value Survey (EVS) (average of all available waves), which contain survey data from a vast number of countries around the world.^{5,6} As mentioned above, the level of trust in the country of origin is differentiated by educational groups in order to reduce the risk of immigrant self-selection. This implied calculating the mean level of trust in the country of origin for those who have completed a university preparatory/upper secondary education (high education) and those who have not (low education) and then assigning this trust-score to each immigrant in the data set according to the respondents' educational level (e.g. highly educated respondents were assigned the level of trust of the highly educated segment in their home country).⁷ The level of trust in the country of origin was coded to run between 0 (no one in the respondents' educational group in the home country trusts others) and 10 (everyone in the respondents' educational group in the home country trusts others). The levels of trust (stratified by education) of the home countries of the immigrant groups present in the ESS are displayed in Appendix A (for the countries where data is available in the WVS/EVS). Finally, the measure of destination country trust included in some of the models was constructed similarly to the measure of trust in the country of origin.

The second independent variable, freedom from corruption in the destination country, is measured using the Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International, which ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).⁸ The average value from 1996 to the first year of the round of the survey in which the respondent participated (2002, 2004 and 2006) is used. Data were taken from the Quality of Government (QOG) time-series database hosted at the University

of Gothenburg (Teorell, Holmberg and Rothstein, 2008).⁹

Optimism is measured using an eleven-point scale of life satisfaction ranging from 'extremely dissatisfied' (0) to 'extremely satisfied' (10). Religiosity ranges from 'not at all religious' (0) to 'very religious' (10). Civic engagement is measured using a dummy indicating whether the respondent had worked in a voluntary organization or association for the last 12 months. While this is by no means a perfect measure, it is the best measure available in all three waves of the ESS. The remaining control variables at the individual-level should be self-explanatory from the tables.

As an indicator of ethnic fractionalization in the destination country, I employ the measure developed by Alesina *et al.* (2003), which captures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country do not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. This measure is also taken from the Quality of Government (QOG) time-series database. In addition, I also included the share of foreign born living in the destination country, which is taken from the OECD 'Country statistical profile' database.¹⁰ Each country is given the average of all available observations from 1995 to the first year of the round of the survey in which the respondent participated. Protestantism is measured by two dummies; one indicating that the country has a full Protestant heritage (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Great Britain) and another indicating that the country has a mixed Protestant and Catholic heritage (Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). Gini-coefficients are included to reflect income inequality in the destination country. Data is taken from the UNU-wider World Income Inequality Database (version 2.0c), which combines multiple data sources.¹¹ Each country is given the average of all available observations from 1995 to the first year of the round of the survey in which the respondent participated.

Empirical Analysis

Analysing the causes of trust of immigrants in Western Europe I employ a multi-level model. While the level-1 unit is obviously individuals, the choice of the level-2 unit is less clear as a non-hierarchical nesting structure exists. Immigrants are both nested within their country of origin and their destination country and hence, I use a crossed random effects model letting the intercept vary randomly between both the country of origin and the destination country.

The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I report the results of the analysis of a model of generalized trust among immigrants in Western Europe

including the two independent variables, trust of the country of origin and freedom from corruption in the destination country, as well as control variables at the individual level. Second, alternative explanations of trust at the level of the destination country are examined in order to rule out confounding of freedom from corruption in the destination country. Moreover, this analysis also examines the extent to which freedom from corruption in the destination country contributes to the adaptation to the level of trust of this country among immigrants. Third, I analyse whether the impact of the two independent variables is universal across Western and non-Western immigrant groups.

Table 1 reports the results of the analysis of a model of generalized trust among immigrants in Western Europe including trust of the country of origin and freedom from corruption in the destination country as well as control variables at the individual level.

The main finding from the estimated model in Table 1 is that both the level of trust in the country of origin and freedom from corruption in the destination country matter for the generalized trust of immigrants as both variables have a highly significant impact on trust in the model. A standard deviation change in the level of trust of the country of origin translates into a change of 0.187 on the eleven-point trust scale holding the other factors constant, while the equivalent standard deviation change in freedom from corruption in the destination country corresponds to a 0.340 unit change on the trust scale. The effect of the two independent variables is further scrutinized below. Looking at the effect of the control variables at the individual level in Table 1, we mostly see a confirmation of well-known patterns from research on the determinants of trust. People who are better educated, who do organizational work, who are more satisfied with life and who are in a more satisfactory economic situation are the more trusting. Hence, these factors matter for immigrants as well as for the general population. In order to check the robustness of the results, I tried omitting the potentially endogenous variables (life satisfaction and having worked in an organization) from the analysis. This produced largely similar results with regard to the effect of the independent variables. The effect of employment, religion and religiosity are either weak or non-significant. As for the demographic variables, trust is slightly lower among females than males and it rises with age until the late fifties after which, it drops again.

The variable tapping the immigrants' length of stay in the destination country deserves further mentioning as this variable is significant, showing that having lived in the destination country for >10 years are negatively associated with the level of trust. In this regard, it is

Table 1 Multilevel model of generalized trust of immigrants in Western Europe

Variable	Coefficient (SE)	
Independent country-level variables		
Trust in country of origin	0.108	(0.023)***
Freedom from corruption in destination country	0.260	(0.056)***
Individual-level variables		
Educational level (reference = lower)		
Secondary	0.036	(0.091)
Higher	0.495	(0.104)***
Feeling about household's income nowadays (reference = very difficult)		
Difficult	0.286	(0.146)
Coping	0.411	(0.142)**
Living comfortably	0.486	(0.151)**
Job (reference = employed)		
Unemployed	0.112	(0.108)
Other employment status	-0.048	(0.078)
Ever unemployed	-0.084	(0.067)
Life satisfaction (0-10)	0.172	(0.015)***
Worked organization	0.435	(0.091)***
Religion (reference = roman catholic)		
Protestant	0.261	(0.113)*
Eastern orthodox	-0.129	(0.149)
Other Christian	-0.043	(0.156)
Islam	-0.122	(0.124)
Other	0.050	(0.212)
Missing	0.145	(0.083)
Religiosity (0-10)	0.026	(0.011)*
First came to live in country (reference <1 year ago)		
1-5 years ago	-0.202	(0.238)
5-10 years ago	-0.140	(0.239)
11-20 years ago	-0.478	(0.235)*
>20 years ago	-0.494	(0.235)*
Age	0.038	(0.011)***
Age ² /100	-0.036	(0.011)**
Female	-0.140	(0.061)*
ESS round (reference = 1)		
2	0.112	(0.071)
3	0.070	(0.078)
Fixed part		
Constant	0.545	(0.583)
Random part		
Individuals	2.233	(0.021)***
Country of origin	0.134	(0.055)**
Destination country	0.294	(0.070)***
Log-likelihood	-13,388.333	

Level of significance: * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$.

Note: Parameter estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. The model is estimated with Residual Maximum Likelihood (REML). Number of observations: 5,995 individuals; 90 countries of origin; 18 destination countries.

important to point out that given the cross-sectional nature of data we cannot know whether this reflects that trust of immigrants diminishes with the length of stay in the destination country or rather that immigrants migrating at different points in time differed in pre-migration levels of trust. Given that the first interpretation is correct, the finding appears somewhat counterintuitive as one might expect that immigrants migrating to Western European countries with (on average) higher institutional quality than they have experienced in their home country, would become more trustful over time when having accumulated more experiences of institutional fairness. This is not the case, and the fading of trust of immigrants over time rather appears to reflect a 'honeymoon effect' in which immigrants' initial high expectations of the trustworthiness of others slightly drops (perhaps become more realistic) after having stayed in the destination country for a period of time. Interestingly, a similar 'honeymoon effect' is found in Scandinavia for political trust among immigrants from countries with low-quality (more corrupt) institutions (Strömblad and Adman, 2010).¹²

Examining Alternative Explanations of Trust of Immigrants

While the relationship between freedom from corruption in the destination country and generalized trust is well-founded in the literature, one may reasonably question whether this relationship is confounded by other factors at the level of the destination country such as cultural heritage or social and ethnic conflict. To control for these alternative explanations of trust at the level of the destination country I included measures of a Protestant heritage, ethnic diversity and income inequality in the analyses reported in Table 2. As some of the control variables at the level of the destination country are relatively highly correlated with freedom from corruption in this context as well as highly internally correlated, I estimate models with each of the variables one at a time before estimating a model, which includes the significant variables at the destination country level. All models include the variable tapping trust in the country of origin and the individual-level control variables, but as the effects of these variables remain essentially the same as reported in Table 1 after the inclusion of the control variables at the level of the destination country, I chose not to report these results in Table 2. In the last two models in Table 2, I include the measure of the level of trust in the destination country of immigrants in order to capture the extent to which immigrants adapt to the level of trust of their new country and to examine whether freedom from

Table 2 Correlates of trust of immigrants at the level of the destination country

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Destination country trust								
Freedom from corruption	0.260*** (0.056)						0.158*** (0.031)	0.108** (0.036)
Protestant country		0.884*** (0.193)				0.173* (0.078)		0.163** (0.056)
Mixed Protestant-Catholic country		0.273 (0.220)				0.465 (0.253)		
Ethnic Fractionalization						-0.018 (0.235)		
Share of foreign born								
Income inequality (GINI index)			-0.724 (0.668)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.036 (0.038)			

Level of significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Note: Parameter estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. The models include trust in the country of origin and the same individual level variables as in the model in Table 1, but these are not shown. The model is estimated with Residual Maximum Likelihood (REML). Number of observations: 5,995 individuals; 90 countries of origin; 18 destination countries.

corruption in the destination country can account for this adaptation.

All of the control variables at the level of the destination country show the expected relationship with trust of immigrants when they are included separately while simultaneously controlling for the individual-level confounders and trust of the country of origin. However, it is only the dummy tapping a full Protestant heritage that has a significant impact on trust. It is especially worth noting that income inequality does not have a significant impact on trust of immigrants in Western Europe as this runs counter to most previous research not restricted to immigrants including the analysis by Hooghe *et al.* (2009) in Europe in general (see also Uslaner, 2002; You, 2005; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009).¹³ When including the Protestant heritage dummies along with freedom from corruption (Model 6), the latter variable is significant and the dummy tapping a full Protestant heritage is marginally significant ($P=0.066$), but it is also evident that the effect of both variables are somewhat weakened as the variables are correlated.¹⁴ The effect of the dummy tapping a full Protestant heritage is almost halved in size and this may be interpreted as some of the effect of a Protestant culture on trust is mediated through incorrupt institutional structures. This makes sense in causal terms as a Protestant culture has been a permanent feature of countries' cultural heritage for centuries. Hence, it should be considered a factor at the back of the causal chain behind trust, which may be mediated by other more proximate factors. Indeed, Protestantism is likely to have been one of the factors producing institutional features conducive to trust, such as freedom from corruption, as argued by Delhey and Newton (2005). In sum, the above analysis shows that the impact of freedom from corruption remains significant when controlling for alternative explanations of trust at the level of the destination country of immigrants. Furthermore, apart from a full Protestant heritage, which may be seen as causally antecedent to an incorrupt institutional structure, none of the alternative explanations of trust at the level of the destination country have a significant impact on trust and this strengthens our confidence that freedom from corruption in the destination country indeed has a causal impact on trust of immigrants.

Having shown that freedom from corruption is the most important factor shaping trust of immigrants in the destination country context, it is relevant to examine the extent to which this variable contributes to the adaptation of immigrants to the level of trust of the country they have migrated to. This is scrutinized in Models 7

and 8. In Model 7, it is shown that the aggregate level of trust of the destination country is strongly associated with immigrants' trust at the individual level, which can be interpreted as a tendency for immigrants to adapt to the level of trust of the country they have migrated to. In Model 8, I include freedom from corruption in the destination country in addition to the level of trust in this country in order to see how much the former variable can explain of immigrant adaptation to the level of trust in their new country (gauged by the reduction in the association between destination country trust and trust of immigrants). The coefficient of the level of trust of the destination country is considerably reduced in this model (about one-third) and hence freedom from corruption in the destination country appears to explain a substantial part of immigrants' adaptation to the level of trust of their new country. At the same time, however, the level of trust of the destination country remains significant after controlling for freedom from corruption in this context and this shows that other aspects of the destination country context than institutional fairness contribute to the adaptation of immigrants to the level of trust of this country. Future research should be directed towards examining these factors. In conclusion, the above analysis have shown that institutional quality, in terms of freedom from corruption in the destination country, is the aspect of the destination country context, which matters most for immigrants' trust and to a substantial extent explain their adaptation to the level of trust of their new country.

A comment on alternative explanations of trust at the level of the country of origin is also in place. While I have focused on alternative explanations at the destination country level potentially confounding the impact of freedom from corruption in this context on trust of immigrants, I also considered whether religious heritage and institutional quality of the country of origin (measured similarly to the equivalent variables in the destination country context) affect trust of immigrants. Controlling for the level of trust of the country of origin and freedom from corruption in the destination country, none of the two factors had a significant impact on trust of immigrants, while the impact of the two independent variables remained unaltered.¹⁵ This has two implications for the two explanations of trust tested in the analysis. First, rather than alternative features of the culture of the country of origin embodied in the religious heritage, it appears that it is specifically the level of trust of this country, which is the central cultural feature of importance for the present-day trust of immigrants. Second, while one may theorize that there would be an early socialization effect of institutional fairness through the institutional context encountered in the country of

Table 3 Estimation of differential effects of the independent variables for Western and non-Western immigrants

Variable	Coef. (SE)
Trust in country of origin	0.192 (0.063)**
Trust in country of origin * Western immigrant (ref. non-Western immigrant)	-0.035 (0.068)
Freedom from corruption in destination country	0.149 (0.059)*
Freedom from corruption in destination country * Western immigrant (ref. non-Western immigrant)	0.239 (0.049)***

Level of significance: * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$.

Note: Parameter estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. The model includes the same individual level variables as in the model in Table 1 and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is a Western or non-Western immigrant, but these results are not shown. Interaction terms between whether the respondent is a Western or a non-Western immigrant and the independent variables are estimated in separate models. The model is estimated with Residual Maximum Likelihood (REML). Number of observations: 5,995 individuals; 90 countries of origin; 18 destination countries.

origin, it is evident that freedom from corruption in this country has not left a lasting impact on trust of immigrants. Conversely, it is contemporary experiences of institutional quality in terms of freedom from corruption in the destination country that shapes trust of immigrants.

To sum up, the above analyses have shown that trust has cultural roots with the level of trust of the country of origin having a significant impact on immigrants' present-day level of trust, but also support the institutional perspective on the roots of trust as freedom from corruption in the destination country significantly shapes trust of immigrants.

Different Immigrants, Different Effects?

Up to this point, the causes of trust have been examined for all immigrants in the destination countries, but one may question whether trust has the same foundations among immigrant groups of different origins. Most importantly, it seems reasonable to ask whether the culture in the country of origin and incorrupt institutional structures in the destination country have the same impact on trust of non-Western and Western immigrants as the two groups clearly differ in their cultural background. *Ceteris paribus*, the Western immigrants are more culturally similar to the people in the Western European destination countries they have migrated to.¹⁶ The question is now whether the varying cultural affinity to the destination country has any influence on how the culture of the country of origin and institutional quality of the destination country affect trust of immigrants. To examine if the effect of the independent variables is contingent upon the immigrant population under consideration, I add a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is from a Western or non-Western country of origin as well as interactions between this dummy variable and the two independent

variables (included in turn) to the model estimated in Table 1.¹⁷ Immigrants from the EU-15, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were defined as Western, with the remaining immigrants all defined as non-Western. The results of the estimation of this model are shown in Table 3.

The table reveals that both the culture of the country of origin and the institutional quality of the destination country has a significant impact on the level of trust of non-Western immigrants (the reference category). Changing the reference category to Western immigrants show that both variables also have a significant effect for this group. The interaction terms display an interesting difference between the effects of the independent variables between the two groups. The effect of trust in the country of origin does not vary significantly between the two groups, but the effect of incorrupt institutions in the destination country is significantly stronger for Western immigrants and the impact of this variable is more than doubled for this group compared to non-Western immigrants. Hence, while the impact of the culture of the country of origin appears to be universal across immigrant groups, incorrupt institutions matter more for the trust of Western than non-Western immigrants.

Finally, to get an idea about the substantial importance of trust of the home country and incorrupt institutions of the destination country for immigrants' level of trust, I have calculated predicted values of trust based on the model estimated in Table 3 for immigrants following typical patterns of migration. Looking at the impact of incorrupt institutions, a Turkish immigrant in incorrupt Sweden is predicted to score 0.687 points higher on the eleven-point trust scale than a Turkish immigrant in considerably more corrupt Greece.¹⁸ Similarly, the predicted trust-difference between a Moroccan immigrant residing in the Netherlands and a Moroccan immigrant living in neighbouring Belgium (with higher levels of corruption) is 0.370. The

equivalent difference for an Italian immigrant is even more marked as the Italian living in the Netherlands is predicted to score almost one point higher on the trust-scale than the Italian immigrant living in Belgium. Turning to the impact of the culture of the country of origin, comparing immigrants from the—among non-Western countries—relatively high-trusting country of India to immigrants from the low trust society of Turkey, the model predicts that the Indian immigrant on average score 0.482 higher on the trust scale.¹⁹ Equivalently, among the Western countries of origin, immigrants coming from high-trusting Denmark on average score 0.768 points higher on the trust scale than immigrants coming from the low trust culture of Portugal. Hence, as these illustrations highlight, both, the culture of the country of origin and the institutional quality of the destination country have a substantial impact on the level of trust of immigrants and therefore trust appears to have both cultural and institutional foundations.

Discussion and Conclusions

The aim of this article has been to examine whether the roots of generalized trust are mainly cultural or institutional. Using immigrants from 90 countries of origin in 18 Western European destination countries as the unit of analysis, variation is induced in both cultural heritage (in terms of the level of trust in the country of origin) and in institutional context (in terms of the extent of freedom from corruption in the destination country). The findings show that the two perspectives on trust are not at odds, but equally relevant as both cultural heritage and institutional context have a substantial and highly significant impact on trust of immigrants even after controlling for confounders at the individual level as well as at the level of the destination country and the country of origin. While the effect of both factors is significant for both Western and non-Western immigrants, incorrupt institutions have an additional impact on trust for Western immigrants.

The conclusion that immigrants' cultural background, in terms of the level of trust in their country of origin, matters for their present-day trust supports the findings by Rice and Feldman (1997), Tabellini (2008) and Uslaner (2008b) in the United States and thus speaks in favour of the generalizability of the cultural theory of trust to countries outside of the United States. However, while the results lend support to research showing that trust is in some part culturally inherited and sticky, they also demonstrate that trust is not culturally determined and still subject to change with the institutional context of the destination country as an incorrupt institutional structure furthers trust of immigrants. In other words,

the cultural and institutional theories of trust complement each other.

While the aim of this article has been to examine the causes of trust, it also provides an input to the pertinent discussion about the integration of immigrants into the societies they have migrated to. Given that civic virtues such as generalized trust underpin well-functioning political institutions and are central indicators of social cohesion, it is paramount to understand how these virtues are shaped among an immigrant population constituting an increasing share of the population in the host societies. This seems particularly relevant for migrants having migrated from lesser developed and less civic countries of origin to more developed and more civic destination countries. If these immigrants bring uncivic values from their home country and pass these on to their offspring it may to some extent pose a threat to the well-functioning of democracy in the host countries. In relation to this alleged consequence, the analysis has confirmed that the impact of the culture of the country of origin on trust of immigrants is somewhat durable, but also that the relationship is far from deterministic and that an incorrupt institutional structure in the destination country plays a role in breaking these culturally established patterns. Put differently, incorrupt institutions tend to breed the civic values, which in turn make these institutions and democracy as a whole, work better. By implication, when migrating to countries where freedom from corruption is widespread, immigrants from less civic cultures will, to some extent, 'catch up' with natives in terms of trusting other people.

Notes

1. It should be mentioned that, looking at immigrants, integration policy also seems a likely factor shaping trust in others. However, this turns out not to be the case empirically as Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) show that the most elaborate measure of integration policies in Europe, the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), does not have an impact on trust of immigrants in Western Europe. For this reason, I did not include measures of integration policy in the models of trust of immigrants.
2. Similarly, I excluded one respondent indicating having migrated from GDR to the united Germany.
3. This number refers to respondents having answered the trust question and for whom data on the two independent variables exist. In the analyses, this number drops to 5,995 due to non-response on the control variables.

4. I chose only to use this trust question and did not, like often done in the literature, create an index consisting of the trust question along with the questions regarding the helpfulness and fairness of others, which were also available in the survey. This was done to secure maximum comparability of the trust measure in ESS with the equivalent measure of trust in the WVS/EVS, which was used to create the variable measuring the level of trust in the country of origin of immigrants.
5. As noted by several scholars, the level of trust in some countries in the WVS/EVS surveys appears to be overestimated (China, Indonesia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam) or unreliable (Iran) (see Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2006; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010) and, as a consequence, I decided to leave out immigrants from these countries in the analysis in order to avoid bias when estimating the impact of the level of trust of the home country on immigrants' present-day trust. For the former communist countries of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, I used the average of the trust scores available from the now independent states that were formerly a part of these countries.
6. By assigning trust-scores from more recent surveys to immigrants, it is assumed that trust is a relatively stable feature of these home countries, which is indeed the case as shown by Bjørnskov (2006). However, it may be questioned whether post-communist trust-scores from the now independent states adequately reflect the levels of trust in the former countries of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, I also tried running a model without immigrants from these former countries. This did not change the results.
7. Depending on time of migration, some of the immigrants may not have received their education in the country of origin and to see whether this affects the influence of home country trust (stratified by education) on immigrants' present day trust, I tried limiting the sample only to people who indicated having migrated after the age of 25 years, when most would have finished their education. As the time of immigration/length of stay of the immigrant is measured in five crude intervals (<1 year, 1–5 years, 5–10 years, 10–20 years, >20 years), this group was constructed by subtracting the maximum number of years of the first four categories of length of stay of the respondent (1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years) from the respondents' age (the fifth category was not included as there is no bound to the respondent's length of stay for this category). Limiting the sample to only those having migrated after the age of 25 reduces the sample size to less than one-third and this resulted in estimation problems in some of the models including multiple country-level variables. However, for the general model reported in Table 1, limiting the sample to only those having migrated after the age of 25 years did not markedly change the results with regard to the impact of home country trust on present day trust of immigrants.
8. www.transparency.org.
9. Available at: <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.
10. Available at: <http://stats.oecd.org>.
11. For data access and documentation, see www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database.
12. Finally, in addition to the models including length of stay in the destination country as a main effect, I also tried including interaction terms between this variable and each of the independent variables (the level of trust in the country of origin and freedom from corruption in the destination country). None of these interaction terms reached significance pointing to the effect of the independent variables being independent of the length of stay of immigrants. Hence, while some research show that the impact of the level of trust of the country of origin diminishes with second generation in the destination country (Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, 2007; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010), there does not appear to be an equivalent reduction in the effect of home country trust with length of stay for first generation immigrants.
13. However, Bjørnskov (2008) shows that the negative impact of income inequality on trust is conditional on various country characteristics and this might be part of the explanation for this finding.
14. In line with the analyses by Delhey and Newton (2005) and Bjørnskov (2008), I also considered the possibility of Nordic exceptionalism in the sense that specific characteristics about the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Finland) make their citizens the most trusting in the world and may therefore also affect trust of immigrants in these countries positively. Entering a Nordic dummy along with the Protestant dummies in Model 6 results in both variables failing to reach

significance as they are highly correlated. Hence, Nordic exceptionalism seems to be intimately associated with a Protestant heritage and for this reason I chose to focus on the latter in the analyses.

15. I followed an approach equivalent to that for the control variables at the destination country level. Hence, I ran models with each of the control variables at the level of the country of origin in turn while controlling for freedom from corruption in the destination country and control variables at the individual level. A Protestant heritage was initially significant, but lost significance when controlling for the level of trust of the country of origin.
16. The two immigrant groups probably also differ in their motives for migrating. While we would expect the major share of non-Western migrants being 'traditional' immigrants having migrated to Western Europe in the search for a higher standard of living (in terms of jobs, education, security, etc.), the Western migrants are arguably considerably more heterogeneous. In this group, we would probably find both the 'traditional' immigrants (e.g. immigrants from the Mediterranean countries living in Northern Europe), but also immigrants from neighbouring countries having moved because of jobs or romantic liaisons, and retired Northern Europeans having moved to the Mediterranean countries because of the mild climate.
17. In the interaction models, the main effect of the independent variables in the interaction terms (trust in the country of origin and freedom from corruption in the destination country) display whether there is a significant effect of this variable for the reference group in the model (non-Western immigrants), while the interaction term captures whether there is a differential impact of the independent variables between the two groups (Western and non-Western immigrants) (Brambor Clark and Golder, 2006). In order to test whether the effects of the independent variables are significant for the other group (Western immigrants), I switch the reference category to this group.
18. The predicted trust values for various levels of corruption are calculated for respondents interviewed in the second wave of ESS.
19. The predicted trust values for various levels of home country trust are calculated for lower educated respondents (i.e. the level of trust of the home country is for the lower educated segment).

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Peter Nannestad, Søren Serritzlew, Dietlind Stolle, Mads Meier Jøger and Kim Sønderskov for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper, and Anders Windfeld for very capable research assistance.

References

- Alesina, A. et al. (2003). Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8, 155–194.
- Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bagno, O. (2006). *The Destination Does Matter*. Paper. Israel: The Graduate Conference, Haifa.
- Bahry, D. et al. (2005). Ethnicity and trust: evidence from Russia. *American Political Science Review*, 99, 521–32.
- Bjørnskov, C. (2006). Determinants of generalized trust: a cross-country comparison. *Public Choice*, 130, 1–21.
- Bjørnskov, C. (2008). Social trust and fractionalization: a possible reinterpretation. *European Sociological Review*, 24, 271–283.
- Brambor, T., Clark, W. R. and Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: improving empirical analyses. *Political Analysis*, 14, 63–82.
- Brehm, J. and Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41, 999–1023.
- Claibourn, M. P. and Martin, P. S. (2000). Trusting and joining? An empirical test of the reciprocal nature of social capital. *Political Behaviour*, 22, 267–291.
- Delhey, J. and Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: global pattern or Nordic exceptionalism? *European Sociological Review*, 21, 311–327.
- Dinesen, P. T. Parental transmission of trust or perceptions of institutional fairness? Explaining generalized trust of young non-Western immigrants in a high-trust society. *Comparative Politics* (submitted for publication).
- Dinesen, P. T. and Hooghe, M. (2010). When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the acculturation of generalized trust among immigrants in Western Europe. *International Migration Review*, 44, 697–727.
- Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D. and Sunde, U. The intergenerational transmission of risk and trust attitudes. (2006). Trust and growth. *IZA Discussion Paper No. 2380*.

- Freitag, M. and Bühlmann, M. (2009). Crafting trust. The role of political institutions in comparative perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, **42**, 1537–1566.
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2008). Social capital as good culture. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, **6**, 295–320.
- Helliwell, J. F. and Putnam, R. D. (2007). Education and social capital. *Eastern Economic Review*, **33**, 1–20.
- Hooghe, M. et al. (2009). Ethnic diversity and generalized trust in Europe. A cross-national multilevel study. *Comparative Political Studies*, **42**, 198–223.
- Knack, S. (2002). Social capital and the quality of government: evidence from the states. *American Journal of Political Science*, **46**, 772–785.
- Levi, M. (1996). Social and unsocial capital. *Politics and Society*, **24**, 45–55.
- Li, Y., Pickles, A. and Savage, M. (2005). Social capital and social trust in Britain. *European Sociological Review*, **21**, 109–123.
- Nannestad, P. (2007). *Does Social Capital help Solve Real-world Collective Action Problems? The Logic of Collective Inaction in Non-Western Immigrants in Denmark*. Paper No. Amsterdam: the First World Meeting of the Public Choice Societies.
- Nannestad, P. and Svendsen, G. T. (2005). *Institutions, Culture and Trust*. Paper No. Gothenburg: the Conference for Quality of Government.
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Rice, T. W. and Feldman, J. L. (1997). Civic culture and democracy from Europe to America. *The Journal of Politics*, **59**, 1143–1172.
- Rothstein, B. and Eek, D. (2009). Political corruption and social trust: an experimental approach. *Rationality and Society*, **21**, 81–112.
- Rothstein, B. and Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital. An institutional theory of generalized trust. *Comparative Politics*, **40**, 441–460.
- Rothstein, B. and Uslaner, E. (2005). All for all: equality, corruption and social trust. *World Politics*, **58**, 41–72.
- Rotter, J. (1980). Interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and gullibility. *American Psychologist*, **35**, 1–7.
- Sønderskov, K. M. (2008). *Making Cooperation Work: Generalized Social Trust and Large-N Collective Action*. Aarhus: Politica.
- Sønderskov, K. M. (2009). Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action. *Public Choice*, **140**, 145–160.
- Sønderskov, K. M. Does Generalized Social Trust Lead to Associational Membership? Unravelling a Bowl of Well-Tossed Spaghetti. *European Sociological Review* (Advance access April 12, 2010; doi:10.1093/esr/jcq017).
- Soroka, S. N., Helliwell, J. F. and Johnston, R. (2007). Measuring and modelling trust. In Kay, F. M. and Johnston, R. (Eds.), *Diversity, Social Capital and the Welfare State*. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, pp. 95–132.
- Stolle, D. (2001). Clubs and congregations: the benefits of joining an association. In Cook, K. (Ed.), *Trust in society*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 202–244.
- Strömblad, P. and Adman, P. (2010). *Exploring Political Trust Among Immigrants in Scandinavia*, Paper No. Münster: the ECPR Joint Sessions.
- Tabellini, G. (2008). Presidential address. Institutions and culture. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, **6**, 255–294.
- Tavits, M. (2006). Making democracy work more? Exploring the linkage between social capital and government performance. *Political Research Quarterly*, **59**, 211–225.
- Teorell, J., Holmberg, S. and Rothstein, B. (2008). *The Quality of Government Dataset*. Version 15 May 08. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.
- Uslaner, E. (2002). *The Moral Foundation of Trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Uslaner, E. (2008a). Trust as a moral value. In Castiglione, D., van Deth, J. W. and Wolleb, G. (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 101–121.
- Uslaner, E. (2008b). Where you stand depends on where your grandparents sat: the inheritability of generalized trust. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, **72**, 725–740.
- Uslaner, E. (2009). Corruption, inequality, and trust. In Svendsen, G. T. and Svendsen, G. L. H. (Eds.), *The Handbook on Social Capital*. London: Edward Elgar, pp. 127–142.
- Whiteley, P. F. (1999). The origins of social capital. In van Deth, J. W. et al. (Eds.) *Social Capital and European Democracy*. London: Routledge, pp. 25–44.
- Yamagishi, T. (2001). Trust as a form of social intelligence. In Cook, K. S. (Ed.), *Trust in Society*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 121–147.
- You, J.-S. (2005). *Corruption and Inequality as Correlates of Social Trust: Fairness Matters More Than Similarity*. Working Paper No. 29. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA, USA: Full organizational affiliation: The hauser center for nonprofit organizations and the John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Zak, P. J. and Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. *Economic Journal*, **111**, 295–321.

APPENDIX A

Table A1 Trust of educational groups in the countries of origin of immigrants

Country	Low education	High education
Albania	2.67	2.30
Algeria	1.28	0.98
Argentina	1.50	2.36
Armenia	2.59	2.40
Australia	3.52	5.01
Austria	2.69	5.53
Azerbaijan	1.85	2.21
Bangladesh	2.43	1.70
Belarus	2.80	3.20
Belgium	2.11	4.44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.23	2.05
Brazil	0.61	0.88
Bulgaria	2.50	2.73
Burkina Faso	1.52	1.09
Canada	3.11	5.17
Chile	1.74	2.46
China	5.10	5.75
Colombia	1.01	1.40
Croatia	1.58	2.37
Cyprus	1.29	0.85
Czech Republic	2.30	3.10
Czechoslovakia (former)	2.15	2.64
Denmark	5.83	8.20
Dominican Republic	1.84	2.89
Egypt	3.23	1.94
El Salvador	1.44	1.51
Estonia	2.01	2.52
Ethiopia	2.48	2.31
Finland	5.21	6.56
France	1.41	3.67
Georgia	1.67	1.96
Germany	3.12	4.88
Ghana	0.90	0.40
Great Britain	2.51	4.16
Greece	2.11	2.45
Guatemala	1.54	1.65
Hong Kong	3.91	4.87
Hungary	1.66	3.30
Iceland	3.39	5.57
India	3.54	3.36
Indonesia	4.61	4.53
Iran	3.18	3.45
Iraq	4.70	3.61
Ireland	3.38	4.45
Israel	1.30	2.85
Italy	2.25	4.08
Japan	3.41	4.42
Jordan	2.93	2.93
Kyrgyzstan	1.55	1.76
Latvia	1.89	2.42
Lithuania	2.13	2.63
Luxembourg	2.26	3.36
Macedonia	1.00	1.35
Malaysia	0.86	0.92
Mali	1.75	1.42
Malta	1.82	3.00
Mexico	2.33	2.52
Moldova	1.83	1.81
Morocco	2.04	1.68
The Netherlands	4.23	7.36
New Zealand	4.40	5.75
Nigeria	2.38	1.97
Norway	5.75	8.11
Pakistan	2.89	2.53
Peru	0.56	1.02
Philippines	0.68	0.71
Poland	1.72	2.20
Portugal	0.94	1.48
Puerto Rico	0.61	1.51
Romania	1.75	1.61
Russia	2.45	2.45
Rwanda	0.50	0.35
Saudi Arabia	5.14	5.37
Serbia and Montenegro	2.32	2.48
Singapore	1.47	2.45
Slovakia	2.00	2.16
Slovenia	1.43	3.23
South Africa	1.88	1.96
South Korea	2.44	3.17
Soviet Union (former)	2.14	2.46
Spain	2.86	3.57
Sweden	5.46	7.47
Switzerland	3.97	5.82
Taiwan	2.30	3.60
Tanzania	0.80	0.78
Thailand	4.46	3.16
Trinidad and Tobago	0.29	0.83
Turkey	1.03	1.39
Uganda	0.69	1.01
Ukraine	2.88	3.02
United States	2.88	4.56
Uruguay	2.29	3.44
Venezuela	1.27	1.83
Vietnam	4.83	4.36
Yugoslavia (former)	1.71	2.30
Zambia	1.15	1.18
Zimbabwe	1.18	1.38

Note: The entries indicate the fraction of the population within each educational group within each country of origin answering 'Most people can be trusted'. The trust variable is coded to run from 0 (no one trusts others) to 10 (everyone trusts others).

Source: World Value survey and European Value Survey collapsed file. Data weighted by weight variable s017.